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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation contributes to the development of philosophy of disability by drawing on 
disability studies, feminist philosophy, phenomenology, and philosophy of biology in order to 
contest epistemic and ontological assumptions about disability within biomedical ethics as well 
as within philosophical work on the body, demonstrating how philosophical inquiry is radically 
transformed when experiences of disability are taken seriously.  
In the first two chapters, I focus on epistemological and ontological concerns surrounding 
disability within biomedical ethics. Although disabled people and their advocates have been 
quite vocal regarding their views on disability and in critiquing bioethicists’ approaches to issues 
that affect them, the interests, knowledge, and experiences of disabled people have had minimal 
impact on discussions within biomedical ethics textbooks. The risks of making problematic 
assumptions about disability are high within this subfield insofar as bioethicists impact practices 
within medical facilities, public policy, and, through student engagement with their texts in 
biomedical ethics courses, the views of potential health care professionals. All of these, in turn, 
affect the care provided to disabled people and potential/actual parents of disabled children. 
 Chapter three raises ontological issues related to disability theory, examining the role of 
the impairment/disability distinction in framing discussions of the body as well as the status of 
experience. I discuss two approaches to incorporating subjective experiences of the body in 
disability, arguing that neither is sufficient. I examine debates within feminist theory on 
questions related to experience. I argue that a feminist phenomenological approach that builds on 
Merleau-Ponty’s work offers the best way to address bodily experiences in disability theory. The 
	   	   	  
vi 
assumptions that disability theorists and Merleau-Ponty make about disability are often at odds. 
Chapter four points out the ableism in Merleau-Ponty’s use of a case study and considers some 
of the oversights within Phenomenology of Perception. In spite of my critique, I argue that his 
approach to phenomenology—with appropriate modifications—is useful not only for theorizing 
the experiences of disabled people but also for addressing other types of marginalized 
embodiment. Chapter five applies this method to body integrity identity disorder (BIID), arguing 
that combining Merleau-Ponty’s insights with those of disability theory allows us to address 
lived experiences of BIID and to identify assumptions about disability within research on this 
condition. 
	   	   	  
1 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last couple of decades, philosophers such as Ron Amundson, Adrienne Asch, Eva 
Kittay, Martha Nussbaum, Anita Silvers, Shelley Tremain, and Susan Wendell have been 
philosophically examining numerous issues concerning disability, including such things as 
perceptions of and attitudes toward disability, the implications of disability for ethics of care, and 
questions of justice and disability. Nonetheless, philosophy of disability is only now showing 
signs of emerging as a recognized area of philosophical inquiry. With few exceptions, 
historically, disability has not been considered to be of philosophical interest or importance. One 
of the reasons for this is that disability, like other types of marginalization associated with 
particular bodily features, has often been conceived of in terms of lack—in regard to bodily 
abilities as well as moral status—rather than as a way of being that can contribute to a greater 
understanding of what it means to be human and to live a good life.   
Within philosophy, there is a tendency to ignore or discount the richness of experiences 
of disability and the knowledge that can be gained from them. One might expect to find 
considerations of experiences of disability within philosophical treatments of embodiment. 
However, much of the philosophical work on embodiment assumes that privileged types of 
bodies can represent human bodies in general. In addition to assuming maleness, whiteness, and 
heterosexuality, such accounts are ableist in the sense of being able-centric, i.e., presuming able-
bodiedness to be universal or at least the only kind of embodiment with which philosophers need 
to be concerned. If experiences of disability are cited, it is typically in order to clarify 
nondisabled experiences: to tell us what is normal. In addition, the attempt to account for 
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disability within existing frameworks describing embodiment demonstrates their inadequacy 
insofar as these frameworks often do not cohere with lived experiences of disability.   
Dominant discussions of disability within and beyond the discipline of philosophy are 
filled with dichotomies and determinisms. The medical model of disability focuses on the body 
as it can be analyzed and measured in scientific terms, while the social model of disability 
largely excludes the body in favor of attending to disabling social influences.1 Biological, and 
often, specifically, genetic determinism as well as various forms of cultural determinism are 
cited as unidirectional causes of disability. In the case of genetic determinism as applied to pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis and prenatal genetic testing, genetic material serves as a stand-in 
thought to predict the lived experience of an embryo or fetus if allowed to develop into a child. 
In the case of cultural determinism, biological characteristics of bodies become largely irrelevant 
because they have a secondary ontological status; they are not only interpreted but also produced 
by social practices such as diagnosis and other types of cultural impositions upon bodies. Genetic 
determinism gives too much explanatory weight to particular aspects of the body, while cultural 
determinism gives too little. Both miss the negotiation between the embodied subject and her 
social milieu and fail to account for the role of the individual in making sense of her situation. 
Thus, I will argue that these approaches are inadequate for theorizing experiences of disability 
because they cannot begin to capture the complexity of embodied subjectivity.   
 Chapter one is divided into two sections. In the first section, I describe three epistemic 
and ontological assumptions that bioethicists uncritically adhere to in their discussions of 
disability: the medical model of disability, bad-difference views of impairment, and biological 
reductionism and determinism—especially genetic determinism. The medical model of disability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As Ron Amundson states, “[t]he reader may consider the Social and Medical Models to present a false 
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conceives of disability as an individual, biomedical condition that disadvantages those it affects. 
The focus remains on the individual and ways that she might be cured, rehabilitated, or otherwise 
assisted to live with her limitations. While social factors affecting disabled people may be given 
cursory mention, most bioethicists endorse bad-difference views of impairment insofar as they 
assume that functional limitations always greatly reduce the quality of one’s life and the 
corresponding assumption that not having functional limitations guarantees that an individual 
will have more opportunities, better health, and a higher quality of life (QOL) than a person with 
an impairment. Bioethicists provide inadequate conceptions of human bodies and lives when 
they rely on simplified and suspect scientific accounts used to support ableist ideologies. In 
doing so, they provide a great disservice to the field of biomedical ethics and to disabled people. 
I discuss ways that these assumptions are epistemically problematic and largely antithetical to 
the interests of disabled people. I also introduce concepts that are useful for understanding how 
the inferior social position of disabled people is perpetuated and for conceiving of alternatives. 
With this context in place, section two examines articles on genetic and other types of 
prenatal testing and selective abortion within six biomedical ethics anthologies published 
between 2010-2014 in order to show how models of disability, views on impairment and QOL, 
and genetic determinism influence authors’ approaches and conclusions about what moral 
principles such as beneficence and justice require of parents and/or society. The majority of these 
articles adopt the view that living with impairment is a harm that limits opportunity and results in 
a low QOL. Given this starting point, these bioethicists tend to focus on the responsibility of 
parents and society to prevent impairment through genetic intervention. However, a few of the 
articles that endorse the social model of disability contend that impairment is compatible in many 
cases with satisfactory levels of opportunity and a high QOL, if society enables people with 
	   	   	  
4 
impairments rather than disabling them. Instead of focusing merely on ways of altering the 
bodies of individuals, these authors consider what changes would expand the reproductive 
choices of women and opportunities for disabled people. Assumptions about what disability is 
have a tremendous impact on conclusions regarding what types of intervention move us toward 
beneficence and justice for disabled people.  
Conceptual disagreements about disability are one of the reasons there is tension between 
biomedical ethicists and disability advocates. The experience and knowledge of disabled people 
and their advocates ought to be central for making judgments about medical and social 
interventions, yet they are often excluded in favor of less-informed perspectives. In chapter two, 
I examine the ways that the dominant assumptions regarding disability, which I have developed 
in chapter one, impact epistemic practices in biomedical ethics. I argue that appeals to conceptual 
neutrality regarding disability, which Anita Silvers—a philosopher of disability—recommends, 
are counterproductive. Objectivity as neutrality serves to obscure the social values and interests 
that inform epistemic practices. Drawing on feminist standpoint theory and epistemologies of 
ignorance, I examine ways that appeals to objectivity as neutrality serve to maintain the status 
quo and ignorance regarding disability. Bioethicists commonly dismiss the reports of disabled 
people regarding their QOL as biased. This chapter clarifies ways that “wrongful requests to 
understand” and calls for “neutrality” contribute to epistemic harms of disabled people within 
biomedical ethics. Gaile Pohlhaus explains that what she calls “wrongful requests to understand” 
protect the privileged from the type of epistemic openness that undergirds just knowledge 
practices while rendering members of marginalized groups vulnerable to a number of harms. I 
will show that this is especially apparent within biomedical ethics. Sandra Harding’s notion of 
strong objectivity is useful for thinking about ways that examination of values and interests 
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informing epistemic practices related to disability in biomedical ethics could create better 
knowledge practices by taking the standpoint of disabled people seriously.  
In chapter three, I argue for the importance of incorporating bodily experience into 
disability theory as an epistemic resource. I examine the role of the social model of disability’s 
impairment/disability distinction in making exclusion of the body more likely within disability 
theory. I also show that when the body is included in disability theory, this tends to be in terms 
of impairment. For instance, Liz Crow suggests that impairment as a value-free description of 
bodies should be theorized in order to address disabled people’s lived experiences. Judith 
Butler’s work on gender has been especially influential for calling into question the naturalness 
of impairment and the impairment/disability distinction within disability theory. I focus on 
Shelley Tremain’s application of Butler’s notion of “performativity” for thinking about ways that 
impairment is produced through discourse. While I agree with Crow and Tremain that embodied 
experiences of disabled people should be included in disability theory, neither the conception of 
impairment as value-free description nor a performative notion of impairment is adequate for this 
task. 
Like disability theorists, feminist theorists have struggled with how and whether to 
include bodily experiences. They have important insights that are relevant to disability theory. I 
discuss the influential position of feminist historian Joan Scott on this question as well as the 
responses of feminist philosopher Linda Martín Alcoff and disability theorist Tobin Siebers. 
Scott considers social identity and experience to be produced by ideology, and therefore, she 
holds that drawing on either can only be counterproductive for challenging dominant narratives. 
Like Alcoff and Siebers, I contend that although social identities can be limiting and experience 
is fallible, both can be important resources for understanding and changing oppressive social 
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practices. Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology can be used to address these concerns, 
while maintaining the centrality of embodiment for being in the world.  
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has been the starting point for numerous theorists 
concerned with marginalized embodiment. Yet, in chapter four, I argue that the primary aim and 
effect of Phenomenology of Perception was to clarify “normal” (read non-disabled heterosexual 
white male) being in the world, rather than to consider the richness of other ways of being. 
Disability theorists often cite Merleau-Ponty but seldom engage in sustained discussion of the 
relationship between his approach to phenomenology and his assumptions about disability. 
Philosophers who are beginning to consider the usefulness of Merleau-Ponty for theorizing 
disability likewise tend to spend little time analyzing his approach in favor of developing 
constructive phenomenological accounts of various types of impairments and illnesses. While I 
think this is an important contribution to philosophy of disability, there is little discussion of the 
role of disability in Merleau-Ponty’s own project. I address this gap in the literature through 
careful examination of his treatment of a case study of a person with an impairment and his 
remarks on impairment in Phenomenology of Perception.  
I show that disability theorist Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s notions of material 
anonymity, fitting, and misfitting are useful for drawing attention to oversights within Merleau-
Ponty’s description of the normal subject. These oversights are also present in the works of his 
successors, who assume that the normal subject’s body recedes from awareness (attains material 
anonymity, in Garland-Thomson’s terms). This stance fails to consider ways that the material 
environment and social expectations facilitate the smooth functioning of some bodies while 
hindering others. Experiences related to marginalized social identities are connected (and 
overlap) insofar as they often require that one attend to one’s bodily comportment to an extent 
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that is not required of those in privileged positions. In spite of my critique, I contend that 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of one’s own body is very useful for theorizing disability because it 
moves beyond descriptions of impairment in order to address experiences of embodied 
subjectivity. For example, this approach can make sense of the fact that individuals alter their 
bodies, sometimes drastically, in order to enact an identity.  
In chapter five, I apply a phenomenological approach informed by insights from 
disability theory to body integrity identity disorder (BIID), a condition that entails a strong desire 
to acquire an impairment, in part, in order to obtain social recognition as a disabled person. 
Neither psychological nor neurological accounts are able to fully address lived experiences of 
people with BIID. Many theorists who hold bad-differences views of impairment have thought 
about this condition as an incomprehensible desire to trade normal function for pain, limited 
function, and reduced social status. Mere-difference and good-differences views of impairment 
provide alternative perspectives from which to think about BIID. I argue that the dominant way 
of thinking about BIID is unnecessarily narrow and suggest that future empirical research will be 
able to provide a more complete account of BIID by thinking about living with limb loss as a 
way of being. 	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CHAPTER ONE: PERSPECTIVES ON DISABILITY WITHIN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS2 
 
Within philosophy, disability is most often discussed in the context of biomedical ethics. 
Textbooks in this area commonly contain philosophical debates regarding issues that 
disproportionately affect disabled people. Discussions surrounding topics such as euthanasia, 
physician-assisted suicide, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), prenatal testing, selective 
abortion, and health care rationing all tend to be premised on shared assumptions regarding 
disability, biology, and quality of life (QOL), with little recognition that even the term “disability” 
is contested. Bioethicists often share three types of unacknowledged and unexamined epistemic 
and ontological assumptions about disability. First, their positions tend to be in line with the 
medical model of disability, which conceptualizes disability at the level of the individual as a 
biomedical condition that creates disadvantages. Second, bioethicists are likely to endorse what 
Elizabeth Barnes terms bad-difference views of impairment, which hold that impairment 
inherently and inevitably reduces QOL, and would do so even apart from social factors such as 
stigmatization, poverty, and inaccessibility (2014, 91). Third, bioethicists’ arguments often rely 
on biological determinism and biological reductionism. Bioethicists provide inadequate 
conceptions of human bodies and lives when they rely on these types of suspect scientific 
accounts, which are informed by and support ableist ideologies.3 Furthermore, the ways in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Portions of this chapter have been previously published in 2015, “Thinking Critically about Disability in 
Biomedical Ethics Courses,” American Association of Philosophy Teachers Studies in Pedagogy 1: 83-98 
and, per the author agreement, do not require permission to be reproduced here. 
3 Some authors make a distinction between ableism and disablism. In a previous paper, I characterized 
these terms in the following way:  
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most bioethicists discuss disability are often in conflict with the lived experiences, perspectives, 
and interests of disabled people. Compounding the issue is the reality that the perspectives of 
disability rights advocates and disabled people remain marginal within biomedical ethics 
textbooks.4 This is a problematic state of affairs because it makes it seem as though there is only 
one possible perspective from which discussions within biomedical ethics can emerge; disability 
is presented as an apolitical issue, and philosophical debates about disability are unnecessarily 
limited.  
I focus on biomedical ethics textbooks here on the basis of my assumption that these 
readings are likely to have the greatest readership beyond bioethicists and other philosophers. In 
addition, many of the students in biomedical ethics courses plan to become healthcare 
professionals. A number of studies have suggested that nondisabled people are likely to estimate 
the QOL of disabled people to be much lower, on average, than disabled people themselves 
report, and several studies have provided evidence that there is an even greater disparity between 
the judgments of nondisabled healthcare professionals and disabled people’s rankings of QOL.5 
Thus, assumptions about disability and QOL in biomedical ethics textbooks are especially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
I adopt Veronica Chouinard’s definition of ableism: “ideas, practices, institutions, and social 
relations that presume ablebodiedness, and by so doing, construct persons with disabilities as 
marginalised” (Chouinard 1997, 380). Disablism consists of beliefs and practices that inferiorize 
and/or discriminate against people with impairments or who are thought to have impairments. 
Practices informed by ableism privilege able-bodied people by centering their needs and 
experiences (Wieseler, 2013, 16).  
 
However, I have since decided to follow the more standard practice of using the term “ableism” to refer to 
this set of phenomena because they are so intertwined as to be almost indistinguishable. The presumption 
of able-bodiedness as an ideal—with the corresponding view that impairment is something to be avoided 
at all costs—is used to argue that discrimination is not unjust.  
4 Significantly, there are disabled people and disability advocates who are also bioethicists. Indeed, this 
seems to be the primary reason that the perspectives of disabled people and their advocates have been 
included within the biomedical ethics literature.   
5 See Gerhart and Corbet 1995; Amundson 2010. 
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important to evaluate because they have the potential to either reinforce or challenge dominant 
narratives of disability among students, including future healthcare professionals.  
 This chapter highlights ways that uncritical reliance on the medical model of disability, 
endorsement of bad-difference views of impairment, biological reductionism, and biological 
determinism shape how disability tends to be treated within biomedical ethics. In the first section, 
I discuss these three prevalent assumptions and their alternatives as well as concepts that are 
central for the textbook analysis undertaken in the second section. These include: oppression, 
ideology, and ableism. The second section examines articles from six biomedical ethics 
anthologies in order to illustrate how these assumptions frame issues surrounding PGD, prenatal 
testing, and selective abortion. While I want to emphasize that not all bioethicists engage in the 
practices I critique here, these practices are widespread enough—especially within biomedical 
ethics textbooks—and sufficiently influential to warrant critical scrutiny. Although there are a 
number of bioethicists and disability theorists who adopt the social model of disability and mere-
difference view of impairment and reject biological determinism, the medical model of disability, 
bad-difference views of impairment, and biological determinism—specifically, genetic 
determinism—maintain dominance within the biomedical ethics textbooks surveyed.  
1.1 Three Types of Assumptions and Some Concepts Related to Disability  
 
1.1.1 Assumption one and an alternative: The medical model of disability and the social model of 
disability 
 
Much of the time, bioethicists uncritically adhere to the medical model of disability. This model 
conceives of disability as a biomedical condition that disadvantages the individuals it affects. 
“Biomedical condition” is to be understood as inclusive of a wide range of functional and 
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morphological variations considered to be species atypical for humans (e.g. congenital disorders, 
mental illnesses, and consequences of traumatic injuries). Since this model focuses on bodies as 
the sole origin of any disadvantages individuals may face, those who subscribe to this model 
recommend development of medical cures, treatments, and methods for normalization of bodies 
with functional limitations. Examples include medication, psychiatric treatment, surgical 
intervention, prosthetics, speech, occupational, and physical therapy. This model has also been 
referred to as an individual model of disability because it conceives of disability as a problem 
that inheres within an individual rather than as a relational phenomenon; individuals’ bodies (and 
sometimes their attitudes) need to be changed in order to alleviate or learn to live with the 
disadvantages of disability (Kafer 2013, 5). Despite the name “medical model,” it is not the only 
model medical professionals adopt and its influence extends well beyond the theory and practice 
of medicine.6 Disability activists coined the name “medical model of disability” for this view, 
since those endorsing it did not perceive a need for a label for the view. As Ron Amundson 
points out, those who adopt this perspective, “typically do not see it as a model at all, but rather 
as simple truth” (2005, 123n2). While social factors may be given cursory mention in discussions 
of the QOL of disabled people, many bioethicists make the reductionist assumption that 
functional variations themselves always greatly reduce opportunities and QOL as well as the 
corresponding assumption that not having functional variations guarantees that an individual will 
have more opportunities, better health, and a higher QOL than a person with an impairment. The 
medical model is currently the dominant way of understanding disability within and beyond the 
field of biomedical ethics (Amundson 2005). 
 Some have claimed that the medical model entails the view that disabled people ought to 
be pitied and thought of as victims of their biomedical conditions, but there is disagreement on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Bricout et al. 2004; Swain and French 2010. 
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the question of whether or not this is a necessary component of the model.7 While those who 
explicitly or implicitly endorse the medical model may espouse these views, for the purposes of 
this dissertation, I will not assume that the medical model necessarily implies them. My critique 
of unreflective endorsement of the medical model by bioethicists does not require that this model 
entail these views.  
The social model of disability, which has been hugely influential within disability theory 
and activism, makes a distinction between the biomedical condition of an individual and 
disadvantages created by social obstacles such as unjust discrimination, lack of accessibility, and 
limited options for health care and education. Michael Oliver coined the phrase “social model of 
disability” in 1983 to describe the views articulated by the Union of the Physically Impaired 
Against Segregation (UPIAS), a disability rights organization created in the United Kingdom in 
1974 (Barnes 2012, 13; Roulstone, Thomas, and Watson 2012, 3). Within this model, species 
atypical morphology and functionality are termed “impairment,” and social factors that 
systematically disadvantage people with impairments are collectively termed “disability.” 
UPIAS states, “Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are 
unnecessarily isolated and excluded from society” (1976, 4). Though there are some important 
exceptions, disability theorists and activists tend to focus on disability rather than impairment.8 
This is because the goal activists had in creating this model was to shift attention from 
differences or limitations resulting from biomedical conditions to disadvantages caused by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For example, Amundson claims that pity for disabled people is a component of the medical model (2005, 
102). Anita Silvers views the medical model as dealing with “biological conditions that disadvantage 
individuals” and advocates bringing the medical and social models together in order to address both 
disadvantages resulting from bodies and social arrangements (Silvers 2003, 485). The view that disability 
is inherently a misfortune that warrants pity is, on the other hand, constitutive of what has alternately been 
termed the “personal tragedy” or “charity” model of disability (Oliver 1996, 34).   
8 See Crow 1996; Wendell 1997; Thomas 2007. For example, disability activists have drawn on the social 
model of disability in order to influence legislators to enact laws such as the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990.  
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oppression of disabled people, which cannot be accounted for if the focus remains on isolated 
individuals. To understand why, it will be helpful to expand on how “oppression” is being used 
within the social model of disability. 
 According to Iris Marion Young, the term “oppression” took on a new meaning when 
social movements in the 1960s and 1970s adopted the term to designate, “systematic constraints 
on groups that are not necessarily the result of the intentions of a tyrant. Oppression in this sense 
is structural, rather than the result of a few people’s choices or policies” (1990, 41). Though 
Young wants to move away from the notion that there must always be an individual or group that 
is intentionally constraining members of another social group, she contends that for every social 
group that is oppressed, there is a corresponding group that experiences benefits.9 Young notes 
that tyranny is also considered oppression; the new meaning of oppression broadened the term’s 
definition rather than superseding the previous one. Because the types of oppression social 
movements such as the disability rights movement are concerned with are structural, identifying 
whether or not a particular harm or set of disadvantages an individual faces is due to oppression 
requires examination of that person’s social context.10   
In seeking to articulate a concept of oppression that is comprehensive and applicable to 
all oppressed groups, Young explains five “faces” or aspects of oppression: exploitation, 
marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence. While I would argue that, as 
a social group, disabled people experience all of these aspects of oppression in particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Recently, my claim that disabled people are oppressed was challenged on the basis that there is not a 
dominant group that intentionally limits opportunities of disabled people in order to benefit economically 
or politically. Young’s definition of oppression does not require this. In addition, it might be argued that a 
great deal of profit is generated through unnecessary institutionalization of disabled people and through 
prenatal testing made to seem necessary, in part, through stigmatization of impairment. See Saxton 2013.   
10 I will return to Young’s conceptualization of oppression later in this chapter in connection with my 
discussion of the term “ableism.” 
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circumstances, I will limit my discussion here to cultural imperialism11 because it is most 
relevant for understanding how disability is conceptualized within biomedical ethics textbooks 
and, more generally, how ideology becomes naturalized.  
Young explains that within cultural imperialism the dominant group’s perspectives are 
widely circulated and become “the unremarkable,” and “the dominant group constructs the 
differences which some group exhibits as lack and negation” (1990, 59). Disabled people tend 
not to be thought of as having their own positive characteristics or communities but rather as 
being people who lack abilities. Young goes on to assert that:  
The culturally dominated undergo a paradoxical oppression, in that they are both marked 
out by stereotypes and at the same time rendered invisible. As remarkable, deviant beings, 
the culturally imperialized are stamped with an essence. The stereotypes confine them to 
a nature which is often attached in some way to their bodies, and which thus cannot 
easily be denied. These stereotypes so permeate society that they are not easily noticed as 
contestable (1990, 59). 
 
The systematic disadvantages faced by members of some social groups evade identification as 
oppression when they are conceived of as justified on the basis of bodily “abnormality.” 
Although legislation such as the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act rejects the view that 
impairment invalidates claims of unjust discrimination because it necessitates a reduction in 
opportunities, the opposite perspective remains pervasive. Because impairment does itself often 
entail functional limitations, it is especially difficult to keep the focus on ways that society 
sustains unjust practices that limit opportunities. At the same time, cultural imperialism results in 
disabled people’s perspectives being delegitimized when they challenge the dominant narratives 
that construe living with impairment as the experience of suffering and lack (e.g., of ability, 
dignity, opportunity, autonomy, and QOL).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Young adopts this term from Lugones and Spelman 1983.	  
	   	   	  
15 
In focusing on disadvantages created by society rather than bodily limitations, the social 
model seeks to challenge the authority of medical professionals and other experts to define 
disability. It should be noted that the medical and social models of disability are not the only 
frameworks for thinking about disability. I have chosen to focus on these models because the 
medical model is dominant and the social model is the most influential opposing model. 
Although I will later argue that the social model has its own shortcomings, it does show that 
there are important omissions in the medical model’s description of disability. 
 
1.1.2 Assumption two and alternatives: Bad-difference, mere-difference, and good-difference 
views of impairment 
 
In “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability” (2014) Barnes discusses three ways of thinking about 
impairment:12 as a bad difference, mere-difference, or good-difference. Bad-difference and mere-
difference views of impairment involve opposing perspectives on the relationship between 
impairment and QOL, while good-difference views of impairment are compatible with mere-
difference views. I will discuss these views and how they relate to judgments about QOL.  
 Barnes states that the claims in figure 1 in column 1 are examples of ways that a person 
may hold a bad-difference view of impairment. None of these claims is necessary for a bad-
difference view of impairment, but each is sufficient (92). These claims are often taken to be 
commonsense understandings that do not need to be interrogated or even made explicit (93). As 
will be demonstrated in section two of this chapter, bioethicists are among those who take bad-
difference views to be obvious.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 She uses the term “disability,” but notes that those who make a distinction between impairment and 
disability should substitute “impairment” where she uses this term. For the sake of clarity and consistency, 
I will do so when discussing her work. 
	   	   	  
16 
Table 1: Barnes’ Three Types of Views of Impairment  
 
 According to Barnes, those who hold a mere-difference view of impairment reject all 
three of the claims that fall under the bad-difference view. She notes that it is compatible with a 
mere-difference view of impairment to acknowledge that impairment “involves the loss of 
intrinsic goods or basic capabilities (and, mutatis mutandis, needn’t deny that disability 
[impairment] is, in a restricted sense, a harm—a harm with respect to particular features or 
aspects of life)” (2014, 90). Unlike a bad-difference view, a mere-difference view does not 
conceive of impairment as “merely a loss or a lack;” for example, it can include the claim that 
1. Bad-difference Views of 
Impairment 
2. Mere-difference Views of 
Impairment 
3. Good-difference Views of 
Impairment 
 
(i) “Disability [impairment] is 
something that is an automatic 
or intrinsic cost to your well-
being” (Barnes 2014, 91). 
 
(ii) “Were society fully 
accepting of disabled people, 
it would still be the case that 
for any given disabled person 
x and arbitrary nondisabled 
person y, such that x and y are 
in relevantly similar personal 
and socioeconomic 
circumstances, it is likely that 
y has a higher level of well-
being than x” (91). 
 
(iii) “For any arbitrarily 
disabled person x, if you could 
hold x’s personal and 
socioeconomic circumstances 
fixed but remove their 
disability [impairment], you 
would thereby improve their 
well-being” (92) 
 
(i′) Impairment is not 
something that is an automatic 
or intrinsic cost to your well-
being. 
 
(ii′) Were society fully 
accepting of disabled people, 
it would not be the case that 
for any given disabled person 
x and arbitrary nondisabled 
person y, such that x and y are 
in relevantly similar personal 
and socioeconomic 
circumstances, it is unlikely 
that y has a higher level of 
well-being than x. 
 
(iii′) For any arbitrarily 
disabled person x, if you could 
hold x’s personal and 
socioeconomic circumstances 
fixed but remove their 
impairment, you would not 
necessarily thereby improve 
their well-being. 
 
 
(i′′) Impairment is something 
that is an automatic or 
intrinsic benefit to your well-
being. 
 
(i′′) Were society fully 
accepting of disabled people, 
it would be the case that for 
any given disabled person x 
and arbitrarily nondisabled 
person y, such that x and y are 
in relevantly similar personal 
and socioeconomic 
circumstances, it is likely that 
x has a higher level of well-
being than y. 
 
(iii′′) For any arbitrarily 
disabled person x, if you could 
hold x’s personal and 
socioeconomic circumstances 
fixed but remove their 
impairment, you would reduce 
their well-being.      
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impairment may cause an individual to lose out on some goods while enabling one to participate 
in others (90). 
Good-difference is the third type of view of impairment Barnes describes. She claims that 
expressions of this view, such as those listed below, are compatible with mere-difference views. 
To be clear, not everyone who holds a mere-difference view of impairment maintains that 
impairment is a good-difference. 
To illustrate the claim that the absence of an ability need not reduce well-being even if it 
is not “compensated for,” Barnes provides a different kind of example:   
We might think that the ability to be pregnant and give birth—to grow a new person in 
your own body—is an intrinsic good, at least insofar as any ability is an intrinsic good. 
Nor is there any obvious man-specific ability we can point to which compensates men for 
this lack. But we don’t tend to think that people who are biologically male are 
automatically worse off than people who are biologically female, simply because they 
lack an ability we might count as an intrinsic good (90n30). 
 
It seems correct that most people do not assume that the inability of males to be pregnant and 
give birth automatically reduces their level of well-being in comparison to females who have this 
ability. In fact, in contexts with high mortality rates during childbirth and/or where contraception 
and abortion are illegal or difficult to obtain, we may expect that this inability among males is 
likely to increase QOL by comparison. It might be objected that the male inability to be pregnant 
is disanalogous to impairment insofar as the latter tends to involve limitations on major life 
activities while the former does not. This is a fair observation, but I do not think it detracts from 
Barnes’ point. In fact, her example likely needed to be at least somewhat disanalogous to make it 
clear that there are cases in which lacking an ability tends to not be thought to automatically 
reduce QOL. Barnes’ use of this example serves to challenge the necessity of the connection 
between impairment and reduced QOL.  
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Amundson discusses two opposing views on the relationship between disability and QOL, 
which map on to Barnes’ distinction between bad-difference and mere-difference views of 
impairment. The standard view is that “disabilities [impairments] have very strong negative 
impacts on the quality of life of the individuals who have them” (2005, 103). In other words, this 
view assumes that impairments themselves greatly reduce QOL. Amundson notes that this is the 
view most nondisabled people hold, and that it “is well integrated within the literature of 
biomedical ethics” (2005, 104). Those who hold the standard view are likely to at least implicitly 
endorse one or all of the claims that Barnes lists to describe a bad-difference view of impairment. 
The anomaly of the standard view is that when disabled people are asked about their QOL, they 
report, on average, that it is only slightly lower than the QOL nondisabled people report (103). 
Amundson points out that many factors that tend to reduce QOL such as poverty, unemployment, 
and lack of transportation are “contingently associated with impairment [emphasis in original]” 
(2005, 118). Even if a particular impairment creates limitations, it does not follow that an 
individual with this impairment has a lower—much less significantly lower—than average QOL.   
Impairment itself does not automatically greatly reduce QOL, though social factors contingently 
related to impairment may (2005, 118-119). The anomaly is in alignment with mere-difference 
and good-difference views of impairment, which track the perspectives of many disabled people 
and disability rights advocates. While the standard view and its anomaly are useful as a starting 
point for considering opposing positions on the relationship between disability and QOL among 
bioethicists, Barnes’ description of bad-difference, mere-difference, and good-difference views 
of impairment contains more elaboration on the nuances within these categories.  
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1.1.3 Assumption three: Biological reductionism and biological determinism  	  
As R.C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon Kamin state in Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology, 
and Human Nature, “reductionists try to explain the properties of complex wholes—molecules, 
say, or societies—in terms of the units of which those molecules or societies are composed” 
(1984, 5). In regard to characterizing a society, one form of reductionism sets out from an 
individualist ontology. Lewontin et al. suggest that biological determinism might be considered a 
type of biological reductionism insofar as it conceives of human lives as determined by 
components of human bodies. In response to the questions of why individuals are how they are 
and why they act as they do, the authors explain that, “they [biological determinists] answer that 
human lives and actions are inevitable consequences of the biochemical properties of the cells 
that make up the individual; and these characteristics are in turn uniquely determined by the 
constituents of the genes possessed by each individual” (1984, 6). Of course, genetic 
determinism does not exhaust the category of biological determinism. For example, biological 
determinists also focus on finding and assigning social significance to other biological features 
such as differences in brain characteristics, reproductive organs, and hormone levels (Fausto-
Sterling 2000). Biological determinists may consider environmental factors, but they are 
typically framed in terms of how they inhibit or facilitate the development of genetically pre-
programmed capacities or propensities within individuals and groups. In addition, this approach 
entails a “spurious dichotomization of nature and nurture” (Lewontin et al. 1984, 56). Scientists 
and others have adopted biological determinism in the attempt to explain sexual inequality, 
violence, class, homosexuality, and a long list of other phenomena (Lewontin et al. 1984).  
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1.1.3.1 Biological reductionism, biological determinism, and ideology 	  
Lewontin et al. forcefully argue that biological reductionism and biological determinism are used 
in order to express ideologies, which they define as “the ruling ideas of a particular society at a 
particular time. They are ideas that express the ‘naturalness’ of any existing social order and help 
maintain it” (1984, 3-4). Young states that ideology “systematically distorts people’s 
understanding of their social conditions in ways that reinforce unjust relations of economic and 
social power, at the same time that it inhibits imagining alternatives” (2002, 42). Lewontin et al. 
critically examine ways that biological determinism has been used in the service of patriarchy 
and white supremacy. Regarding the former, they state, “ ‘facts’ about differences between men 
and women in society—gender differences—are seemingly naturalized as manifestations of 
essentially biological sex differences, so apparently obvious as to be beyond question” (1984, 
132). If women have subordinate positions in society in comparison to men, this is said to be the 
outcome of biological traits such as biological differences in the brain, hormones, or role in 
reproduction (1984, 135). Women and men are considered to have diverging capacities, with 
men possessing those abilities that ensure they will occupy the most powerful positions in any 
society. The implication is that women and men are suited for different roles both in the 
household as well as in the public sphere.  
Biological determinism serves to naturalize the status quo. Attempts to make society 
more just by remedying disparities in status, wealth, and influence are said to “go against nature” 
(Lewontin et al. 1984, 7). In the words of Lewontin et al., “What is not always realized is that if 
one accepts biological determinism, nothing need be changed, for what falls in the realm of 
necessity falls outside the realm of justice” (1984, 236). The authors’ argument that biological 
reductionism and determinism are used to naturalize patriarchy, white supremacy, and 
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differences in socioeconomic status also applies a fortiori to the case of ableism. If disability is 
conceptualized as the inevitable result of genetic or other types of biological variation, and 
disabled people are thought to be oppressed by nature, then it doesn’t make sense to talk about 
injustice faced by disabled people, other than the injustice imposed when impairment is not 
prevented.  
In order to clarify oppression on the basis of impairment, it will be helpful to spend a 
moment considering both the function of the term ableism and ways that this type of injustice has 
been legitimated as natural. In Claiming Disability: Knowledge and Identity, Simi Linton asserts 
that an important purpose of the term ableism is to draw attention to and challenge the 
“domination of the nondisabled experience and point of view,” a central aspect of cultural 
imperialism (1998, 9). Ableism, as the term is commonly used, refers to two sets of mutually 
supportive beliefs and practices: first, able-bodiedness is presumed and privileged, and, secondly, 
people with impairments are inferiorized and/or unjustly discriminated against.13 Importantly, 
ableism does not require that individuals intentionally contribute to marginalization or 
inferiorization of disabled people; many acts that accomplish this end are intended to be 
beneficent. Since ableism is a type of oppression, it is structural. As Anita Ho states: 
“Historically, frameworks impoverished by the omission of disabled people’s own standpoints 
have supported systems and practices that patronize and thereby further oppress disabled people, 
even while intended to serve their supposed good” (2007, 413). Within biomedical ethics, 
ableism is often couched in the language of beneficence, choice, and rights. Indeed, as I will 
show in this and the following chapter, arguments in favor of practices that prevent the birth of 
children with impairments make use of these terms. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 To compare these beliefs and practices to terminology related to oppression on the basis of gender: the 
first is analogous to androcentricism, while the second is analogous to sexism. 
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Nirmala Everelles’ “In Search of the Disabled Subject,” argues that adopting a historical 
materialist perspective can elucidate ways that the ideology of ableism works to create and 
maintain inequalities within capitalist societies. Inequalities along the lines of race, gender, class, 
and disability have all been purportedly explained through scientific claims that members of 
subordinated groups are characterized by biological defect or deviance that inevitably causes 
them to occupy an inferior social position (Everelles 2001, 100-105). At this point, there is much 
more recognition (still far from universal) that this is a problematic attempt to justify racism, 
sexism, and classism than is the case with ableism.14 Indeed, ableism is often not identified as a 
prejudice but rather a common-sense understanding of or response to disability.  
 Genetic reductionism and determinism are commonly assumed within discussions of pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and prenatal testing in biomedical ethics. Thus, it is 
important to understand what these approaches entail and the problems inherent in them. As 
molecular biologist Jackie Scully puts it in Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral 
Difference:  
Genetic reductionism uses the popular but oversimplified picture of gene action in which 
DNA sequences (molecular biologists call this the genotype) encode instructions for 
proteins that ultimately determine people’s bodily characteristics (or phenotype), from 
hair color to their sexual preferences, and especially their health. According to this model, 
genes provide the most fundamental (and therefore, in reductionist terms, the best) 
account of human embodiment (2008, 5).  
 
Within this conception, inheritance is narrowly discussed in terms of genetics, and knowledge of 
genes is privileged and often isolated as a means for understanding the capacities of individuals 
as well as group differences. According to geneticist Eva Jablonka, this is problematic insofar as 
it fails to consider epigenetic, behavioral, and symbolical inheritance systems as well as “the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Bioethicists sometimes suggest that unjust treatment of disabled people is analogous or disanalogous to 
the effects of racism and/or sexism in order to support their positions on genetic testing and quality of life 
of disabled people. See Amundson 2005; Asch 2013; Davis 2013, 560; McMahan 2005, 167-168; and 
Singer 2006. 
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whole dynamics of an inheritance, which is an aspect of the development process” (Jablonka 
2001, 114). Another shortcoming of genetic reductionism is that it can be used to support the 
notion that there is one standard human genome, when there is actually a great deal of variation 
that may be considered typical. Scully claims, “the main problem with genetic reductionism as 
popularly practiced is its tendency toward essentialism, and the reification of one genotype as 
species typical” (2008, 6). This tendency aligns with use of the categories “normal” and 
“abnormal.” However, it is not legitimate to claim that this distinction is necessarily grounded in 
genetic models. In Scully’s words: “Although medical practice is structured by a 
normal/pathological dichotomy, genetic models of human variation can be used without 
necessarily supporting such binary oppositions between normal and abnormal” (24).  
 Biological reductionism and biological determinism are so ingrained in the literature of 
biomedical ethics as well as everyday conversation that it can be difficult to conceive of an 
alternative. Some have suggested that the alternative to biological determinism must be 
environmental or cultural determinism, but this is not a viable, much less the only, alternative 
(Lewontin et al. 1984, 10). Lewontin et al. suggest that cultural determinism is just as flawed as 
biological determinism insofar as it underestimates the importance of biology in placing the 
emphasis of causation on culture. Some versions of social construction developed by the “post-
1968 New Left in Britain and the United States” go too far, according to the authors, who state:  
The helplessness of childhood, the existential pain of madness, the frailties of old age 
were all transmuted to mere labels reflecting disparities in power. But this denial of 
biology is so contrary to actual lived experience that it has rendered people the more 
ideologically vulnerable to the “commonsense” appeal of reemerging biological 
determinism (Lewontin et al. 1984, 10). 
 
In considering nature to be radically malleable and susceptible to the influence of society’s force, 
cultural determinism obscures understanding and departs from lived experience. Ironically, as 
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the authors note, the attempt to oppose biological determinism with its antithesis made biological 
determinism seem more palatable.  
Rather than endorsing either of these determinisms, Lewontin et al. advocate dialectical 
explanations, for which, “the phenomena we see at any instant are parts of processes, processes 
with histories and futures whose paths are not uniquely determined by their constituent units” 
(1984, 11). They state, “[d]ialectical explanations, on the contrary, do not abstract properties of 
parts in isolation from their associations in wholes but see the properties of parts arising out of 
their associations. That is, according to the dialectical view, the properties of parts and wholes 
codetermine each other” (11).  
Susan Oyama, Paul Griffiths, and Russell Gray also reject the false dichotomization of 
biological determinism and cultural determinism, in favor of what has come to be called 
developmental systems theory (DST). In Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems as 
Evolution, they discuss DST in terms of the following “major themes”: 
1. Joint determination by multiple causes—every trait is produced by the interaction of many 
developmental resources. The gene/environment dichotomy is only one of many ways to divide 
up these interactants. 
 
2. Context sensitivity and contingency—the significance of any one cause is contingent upon the 
state of the rest of the system. 
 
3. Extended inheritance—an organism inherits a wide range of resources that interact to 
construct that organism’s life cycle. 
 
4. Development as construction—neither traits nor representation of traits is transmitted to 
offspring. Traits are made—reconstructed—in development. 
 
5. Distributed control—no one type of interactant controls development. 
 
6. Evolution as construction—evolution is not a matter of organisms or populations being 
molded by their environments, but of organism-environmental systems changing over time 
(Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001, 2). 
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 If these claims are adopted in place of the “program model of gene action,” which 
privileges the causal role of genes in development, there are significant implications for what 
conclusions it is possible to draw on the basis of knowledge of genetic variation (Scully 2008, 
32). As Scully notes:   
if the systems theories of gene action are correct, the outcome of the DNA sequence 
changes at the level of the organism may be inherently unpredictable. The identification 
of a person as disabled on the basis of his or her genotype is a radical shift in the meaning 
of both disability and impairment. It takes chemically encoded information as a suitable 
marker for phenotypic change, and then for impaired structure and function, and then for 
the lived experience of disadvantage (Scully 2008, 32).   
 
As Scully makes clear, the practice of conflating genetic variation with disability involves the 
assumption of the program model of gene action and a number of unjustified inferences. The 
rejection of genetic determinism requires instead an account that can capture the contingency and 
complexity of these phenomena in place of simplistic accounts that assume a linear relationship 
from genotype to phenotype to impairment and lived experience of disability. Developmental 
systems theory is such an approach. 
In sum, biological determinism is informed by and used to support ideologies and it is an 
inadequate “way of explaining the world;” indeed these aspects of biological determinism are 
intertwined (Lewontin et al. 1984, 8). Yet, biological determinism is often uncritically assumed 
to be an objective scientific approach in discussions of disability within biomedical ethics. 
 
1.1.3.2 The medical model, bad-difference views of impairment, and genetic determinism:  
A perfect storm? 
 
Because the assumptions of the medical and social models of disability as well as the bad-
difference and mere-difference views of impairment differ both in how they conceptualize 
disability and its relation to QOL, they entail not only very different conclusions regarding issues 
central within biomedical ethics but also contrasting approaches to formulating the issues 
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themselves. Assumptions about QOL tend to be made explicit in relation to PGD, prenatal 
testing, selective abortion, the right to refuse treatment, euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, 
and health care rationing. I will focus on topics related to reproduction in order to illustrate how 
the medical and social models along with the bad-difference and mere-difference views of 
impairment shape discussions within biomedical ethics.  
In the context of discussions of PGD, prenatal genetic testing, and selective abortion, 
theorists whose positions are in line with the medical model often engage in genetic determinism. 
There are numerous problems with thinking about disability through this lens. I will begin by 
focusing on two problems related to pre-implantation and prenatal genetic testing. First, genetic 
testing yields only degrees of likelihood, not certainty, regarding whether or not an embryo or 
fetus will go on to develop a disease or condition. Evelyn Fox Keller notes that while single-gene 
disorders such as Tay-Sachs, Huntington’s disease, cystic fibrosis, thalassemia, and 
phenylketonuria are better understood than conditions involving multiple genes, “even in these 
clear-cut cases much remains to be understood about the processes that link the defective gene to 
the onset of disease” (2000, 68). Likewise, the degree of severity of a possible condition of a 
potential child cannot typically be known in advance. One of the reasons that genetic testing 
cannot provide these answers is that knowledge of genotype is insufficient for predicting 
phenotype.  
 Second, in the context of discussions of prenatal genetic testing, PGD, and selective 
abortion, bioethicists often conceive of limited opportunities and low QOL as necessary 
consequences of genetic variations. Insofar as this view engages in genetic determinism, it fails 
to account for phenotypes as interactively constructed by genetic, environmental, and other 
factors. In Evolution’s Eye: A Systems View of the Biology-Culture Divide, Oyama states: 
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Everyone “knows” that any phenotype, normal or anomalous, depends on a given set of 
interactions between a specific set of genes and specific environments. Yet such 
knowledge does not prevent people from believing that some special executive or 
formative power resides in the guide of a plan, program, or code. In this view, the genetic 
potential of the organism is defined by the cellular code (2000, 38). 
 
The formulation of phenotype as a product of interaction between genes and environments may 
leave out epigenetic factors (Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray 2001, 4; Jablonka 2001, 99-116). 
Bioethicists are prone to exhibiting this pattern in their discussions of genetic testing. For 
example, while it is not uncommon for bioethicists to acknowledge that the environment is 
relevant for development in the context of discussing selective abortion, they often revert back to 
speaking about genes as determining not only the phenotype but also the level of QOL and 
opportunities available to humans with a particular genotype. In sum, claims that posit a direct 
causal connection from genotype to phenotype to level of opportunities and QOL assume a 
greatly simplified and misleading account of molecular biology and fail to consider social 
context.  
If one accepts the medical model as an adequate description of disability, de-
contextualization of issues related to disability makes sense because this view suggests that all 
relevant information can be read at the level of an individual body, genotype, or other bodily 
component. Within discussions of genetic testing and selective abortion, bioethicists who accept 
this model commonly make claims about opportunities and QOL solely on the basis of genotype. 
Scully clearly articulates the limitations of extrapolating out from components of a body, such as 
genes, to the experience of living as a particular embodied subject, in the following:  
Its [molecular biology’s] power to provide descriptions of the human body in terms of 
constituent genes and cells is also an inappropriate place to find an account of living with 
or as or in a particular kind of body. This is an important distinction to keep in mind: 
since ethics is about living and not chemistry, it is surely accounts of lived experience, 
and not biomedical description, that should form the basis for morally evaluating types of 
embodiment (2008, 6). 
	   	   	  
28 
 
In discussing the value of life with an atypical genotype, bioethicists are clearly concerned with 
projected future lived experiences of potential people. They often assume that they can predict 
what the lived experiences of an individual will be on the basis of the particular genotype or 
other characteristics of an embryo or fetus. On this basis, bioethicists have found it fitting to 
make claims about the morality of reproducing when there is a chance that potential offspring 
may develop in ways that are not species-typical.  
The notion that parents have the choice to avoid having children with genetic and other 
variations challenges the view that impairment is unavoidable in such cases (Denier 2014). 
Indeed, it has been argued that justice requires “genetic interventions” to prevent disability 
(Buchanan et al. 2013, 287). Because the medical model locates the disadvantages of disability at 
the level of individuals’ bodies, approaches informed by this model typically endorse use of 
technology to prevent conception or birth or, failing that, medical interventions to eliminate or 
reduce the limitations of impairment. The bad-difference view of impairment serves to bolster 
the case. Bioethicists such as Peter Singer do occasionally suggest that a just society should 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability (impairment), but they tend to fall back into 
thinking about disabled people as naturally inferior to nondisabled people and to characterize 
their lives as filled with suffering and lack of opportunities (Singer 1993, 188-189; Brock 2013, 
570; Buchanan et al. 2013, 604). 
Oyama uses phenylketonuria (PKU) as an example to demonstrate the limitations of 
genetic reductionism. Those with PKU are unable to process phenylalanine, and the buildup of 
this amino acid can cause intellectual impairment as well as a number of other symptoms. 
However, if a child consumes a diet without phenylalanine, he will not develop these symptoms. 
Oyama notes that the genotype and the diet are both essential in determining the phenotype of a 
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child with PKU (2000, 37). For this reason, Oyama endorses constructivist interaction, which 
conceives of ontogeny—the development of individuals—as wholly genetic and wholly 
environmental; both “cause” the phenotype to develop in a particular way. Thus, it does not 
make sense to say that a biomedical condition (including those considered “normal” or species-
typical) is genetic or environmental because it is always inextricably both. As Keller points out, 
“a cell’s DNA is always and necessarily embedded in an immensely complex and entangled 
system of interacting resources that are, collectively, what give rise to the development of traits” 
(2005, 51). Even if certainty regarding the severity of a so-called genetic disease could be 
ascertained in advance, the environment within and beyond an individual’s body—including 
social context—is an essential aspect of an individual’s level of opportunities and QOL.  
 Since it is not possible to predict, prior to birth, the phenotype, much less the quality of 
an individual’s life, solely on the basis of genetic or other information obtained through PGD and 
prenatal testing, it seems clear that it is a mistake to frame ethical debates on PGD, prenatal 
testing, and selective abortion as if this is possible. Yet, as I will show, this is the approach many 
bioethicists take. In addition, the question of the subjective experience of living with a particular 
condition is an empirical rather than a conceptual question. It would seem that, in many cases, 
the best way to develop knowledge regarding the lived experiences of people with a particular 
condition would be to ask those living with that condition, when possible. However, bioethicists 
are much more likely to advocate relying on moral imagination, in which the reader is asked to 
imaginatively take on the perspective of a disabled person (or even a fetus likely to develop into 
a child with an impairment) than this approach (Singer 2006; Hare 2006).15  
If disabled people’s lives are imaginatively reduced to limitation and suffering, it is easy 
to understand why genetic testing and selective abortion have been seen as averting unnecessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The problems inherent in this approach will be developed in chapter two. 
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pain by preventing the existence of individuals with impairments and serving the interest of 
societal progress. A particular misguided interpretation of evolution may be perceived as 
providing support for this position. As Oyama states, “Evolution, or natural selection, with which 
evolution is too often identified, is frequently depicted as an agent that continuously scrutinizes 
organisms in order to identify those best suited to life” (Oyama 2000, 10). Indeed, this is the 
understanding of evolution that seems to inform some bioethicists’ and others’ thinking about 
genetic testing and selective abortion, in spite of efforts to distance themselves from eugenics 
through emphasis on personal choice and inclusion16 (Savulescu 2001, 424; Davis 2013, 
Buchanan et al. 2014). It is not accidental that “selective abortion” has resonance with “natural 
selection,” and many assume that we are able to and should use technology to “optimize” 
reproductive outcomes through identification of “those best suited to life” and selecting against 
those “at risk” of developing a congenital illness or impairment (Oyama 2000, 10). This 
approach is also framed as a preventative measure to ensure that children whose lives, it is 
imagined, will be filled with suffering and lack of opportunities are not brought into the world. 
The view that there is a parental responsibility to select “those best suited to life,” formulated in 
a variety of ways, undergirds the positions articulated in several of the articles that will be 
considered in the following section.  
Section one has detailed three types of unacknowledged and unexamined assumptions 
that tend to be adopted by bioethicists in their discussions of disability as well as problems with 
and alternatives to these assumptions. I have also engaged in a preliminary exposition of how the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In “Genetic Intervention and the Morality of Inclusion,” Buchanan et al. state:  
Surely the difference between the old eugenics and the new genetics is unmistakable: The former 
was particularistic and exclusionary, condemning as defective all those who failed to meet 
supposed criteria of racial purity or human perfection; the latter is universalistic and inclusive, 
seeking to prevent suffering for all of humanity through eradication of genetic disease (2014, 
281). 	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medical model, bad-difference views of impairment, and genetic determinism coincide within 
discussions of genetic testing and selective abortion. In the following section, I will examine 
several articles within biomedical ethics textbooks in order to elucidate ways that these and 
opposing assumptions shape the authors’ positions on the relationship between genotype, level of 
opportunities, and QOL, which frames their discussions of both selective abortion and genetic 
testing (Savulescu 2001; Brock 2013; Buchanan et al. 2013; Davis 2013; McMahan 2013; Purdy 
2013; Buchanan et al. 2014). Those whose positions are in line with the medical model need not 
adopt the bad-difference view of impairment or engage in genetic determinism, but, in the 
context of discussions about PGD, prenatal testing, and selective abortion, they often do.  
1.2 Survey of Articles on PGD, Prenatal Testing, and Selective Abortion in Biomedical 
Ethics Anthologies 
 
Anita Ho’s 2007 article “Disability in the Bioethics Curriculum” surveys seven biomedical ethics 
textbooks in order to examine how the authors approach disability in the context of the topics of 
genetic testing, euthanasia, and physician-assisted suicide. While noting that philosophy 
anthologies generally are slowly beginning to include the voices of women and ethnic minorities, 
Ho contends that perspectives of disabled people still tend to be excluded, even when disability 
is central to the discussion. Regarding the articles in the biomedical ethics textbooks she 
examined, she states that they “all represent a particular viewpoint—one that sees disability as 
inherently and unrelentingly barring attainment of a good life” (2007, 406). She concludes that, 
“They continue to adopt the ableist presumption that life with impairment is inherently inferior to 
one without impairment” (2007, 405). Ho characterizes an ableist society as assigning “lower 
value or worth to people based on their bio-physical and mental impairments” (2007, 405). 
Although there is a growing body of literature related to biomedical ethics challenging ableist 
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narratives,17 the biomedical ethics textbooks Ho examined seldom provided resources for 
thinking critically about disability. 
Given the frequency with which new editions of biomedical ethics textbooks are issued 
and the increasing presence of disability rights perspectives within journal articles and 
monographs, it is worth finding out if there has been a change in representation of perspectives 
on disability since Ho’s article was published in 2007. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine 
articles on PGD, genetic and other types of prenatal testing, and selective abortion reprinted in 
six biomedical ethics textbooks published between 2010-2014.18 This survey is limited in scope, 
and I do not claim that it is necessarily a representative sample; these texts were chosen from a 
number of textbooks that I had considered adopting for my biomedical ethics courses. Textbooks 
were excluded from this survey if they did not cover the topics under consideration or if they had 
a single author. Seventeen articles focused on these topics; four of these articles were reprinted 
twice (Asch 2013, 2014; Davis 2010, 2013; Kass 2011, 2013; Purdy 2011, 2013). Ten of the 
articles are clearly in line with the medical model, three adopt the social model, and four contain 
elements of both. Some of the authors who assume the correctness of the medical model engage 
with disability rights critiques; however, they tend to focus on extreme versions of the social 
model rather than more commonly held views and to equate mere-difference and good difference 
views of impairment (McMahan 2013; Steinbock 2013; Buchanan et al. 2014). 
Although prenatal genetic testing is not the only type of prenatal testing available, it is the 
main focus in the articles discussed here. Ten of the seventeen articles focused solely on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Here are a few examples of authors who have published on these topics who adopt a disability rights 
perspective: Amundson 2005; Asch 2005; Barnes 2014; Barnes 2016; Bickenbach, Felder, and Schmitz 
2014; Kittay 2002; 2010; 2011; Ouellette 2013; Parens 1998; Silvers 1998; 2005, Scully 2008; Stramondo 
2011; and Wendell 1997.  
18 Beauchamp, Walters, Kahn, and Mastroianni 2014; DeGrazia, Mappes, and Brand-Ballard 2011; 
Holland 2012; Pierce and Randels 2010; Steinbock, London, and Arras 2013; Vaughn 2013. 
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preconception, pre-implantation, and/or prenatal genetic testing (Robertson 2010; Savulescu 
2012; Brock 2013; Buchanan et al. 2013; Davis 2013; Purdy 2013; Buchanan et al. 2014; Denier 
2014). 19 In a number of the articles, implicit or explicit endorsement of genetic determinism, the 
bad-difference view of impairment, and the medical model underlie the claim that there is a 
moral obligation to prevent the birth of children with impairments. In contrast, the articles that 
reject genetic determinism and subscribe to the mere-difference view of impairment and the 
social model are concerned with ways that the stigmatization of impairment and mistaken 
assumptions about disability influence decisions regarding prenatal testing and selective abortion. 
The following sub-sections will clarify the assumptions made in these articles and provide 
critical analysis.  
 
1.2.1 Theme One: The parental obligation to maximize opportunity and QOL 	  
The authors I will discuss in this section assume that it is possible to know ahead of time what 
level of opportunities will be available to potential children on the basis of genetic testing. They 
further assume that the number of opportunities available to a person determine quality of life. 
Since the authors considered here combine these assumptions with the view that parents have a 
moral obligation to provide their children with a certain QOL, this informs their positions on 
how preconception and prenatal genetic testing ought to be employed.  
In “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children” (originally 
published in 2001, reprinted in Holland 2012) Julian Savulescu contends that there is a parental 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 As Lippman observes, “Though it is only one conceptual model, ‘genetics’ is increasingly identified as 
the way to reveal and explain health and disease, normality and abnormality” (1991, 18). Asch’s “Prenatal 
Diagnosis and Selective Abortion” is one of the exceptions. She notes that a number of fetuses have been 
surgically operated on to repair atypical neural tube development in order to prevent the development of 
myelomeningoceles (2012, 59-60). This is a condition that is diagnosed through the use of one or a 
combination of: a maternal serum alpha-feroprotein test, ultrasound, and amniocentesis, rather than 
genetic testing, since it does not have a genetic basis.  
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responsibility to have offspring with the “best genes.” His argument clearly exhibits genetic 
determinism. Savulescu primarily focuses on pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), a type 
of genetic testing women using in vitro fertilization (IVF) may employ in order to find out the 
genotype of embryos prior to implantation. He summarizes his argument as follows:  
(1) some non-disease genes affect the likelihood of us living the best life; (2) we have a 
reason to use information which is available about such genes in our reproductive 
decision-making; (3) couples should select the embryos or fetuses which are most likely 
to have the best life, based on available genetic information, including information about 
non-disease genes [italics in original] (2001, 413). 
 
As the quotation makes clear, Savulescu contends that genetic testing should not be limited to 
identifying what he calls “disease genes” because, on his account, other types of genes have a 
significant influence on an individual’s level of well-being. He assumes that “disease genes” or 
genes related to impairment, reduce QOL—the medical model, a bad-difference view of 
impairment, and genetic determinism are all at play here. As a result, Savulescu considers it to be 
an obvious moral imperative that if a woman uses IVF, she (perhaps in consultation with a 
partner) should select embryos without genes that may contribute to disease or impairment. Here 
his approach is to show that the moral imperative should be expanded beyond selecting against 
embryos with “disease genes” to selecting embryos with the “best” genotype (i.e., genes he 
supposes will contribute to desired behaviors, characteristics, and abilities such as an above 
average level of memory and intelligence). Enhancement is construed as unequivocally good 
insofar as Savulescu assumes that it contributes to well-being. He thinks it is only a matter of 
time before behavioral genetics will be able to identify genes that predispose individuals to 
“criminal behaviour,” “maternal behaviour,” and homosexuality as well as those that impact 
memory and intelligence (2001, 417).20 Regarding intelligence, Savulescu acknowledges that it 
may turn out that there is only a “weak probabilistic relation between genes and intelligence” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Savulescu claims, “a gene has been identified for criminal behaviour in one family” (2001, 413). 
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(414). Nonetheless, he contends that there is a parental moral responsibility to obtain information 
from whatever genetic tests are available in order to have offspring likely to have the “best life.”  
 Savulescu assumes that it is possible to know which potential child is likely to have the 
“best life” solely on the basis of genotype. There is slippage from “expected to have the best life” 
to the “best children,” in the title of the article. He characterizes the “best life” as the one “with 
the most well-being,” noting that he does not want to restrict his conception to health-related 
well-being (2001, 419). He provides some clues as to what he has in mind through his examples 
of intelligence and memory. He claims that whether a hedonistic, desire-fulfillment, or objective 
list account is adopted, intelligence is necessary for evaluating and making choices that will 
enable one to have the best life (421). In regard to memory, he points out that, “Failing to 
remember can have disastrous consequences. Indeed, forgetting the compass on a long bush walk 
can be fatal” (420). Thus, he concludes that there is an obligation to select embryos ceteris 
paribus with the “best” genotype in regard to intelligence and memory when (if) this becomes 
possible.  
Like Savulescu, John Robertson is primarily concerned with the moral status of using 
PGD to select for particular traits rather than against potential disease and impairment in 
“Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Medical and Non-Medical Uses” (in Pierce and 
Randels 2010). Both articles have implications for thinking about impairment. Though they have 
similar concerns, their assumptions and approaches differ. For example, unlike Savulescu, 
Robertson claims that it is unlikely that it will be possible to use PGD to select for traits such as 
intelligence, sexual orientation, and memory. He states, “Because the genetic basis of those traits 
is unknown, and in any case is likely to involve many different genes, they may not be subject to 
easy mutational analysis, as Mendelian disease or susceptibility conditions are” (2010, 648). 
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Robertson adds, “Aside from gender [chromosome type], which is identifiable through 
karyotyping, it is unrealistic to think that non-medical screening for other traits, with the possible 
exception of perfect pitch, will occur anytime soon” (648-649). He lays out five types of 
concerns that must be addressed in order to evaluate the permissibility of using PGD to select for 
or against a trait and then uses selection for sex and perfect pitch as test cases. 
1. How important is “the reproductive choice being asserted”? (649) 
2. Is it justified to create and to destroy embryos in order to serve this choice? 
3. Will resulting offspring be harmed as a result? (649) 
4. Will selecting for/against a trait contribute to the stigmatization of existing persons? 
(649) 
5. What are the potential implications for society? (650)   
 
In Robertson’s discussion of the use of PGD for sex selection, he notes that it is 
controversial “because of the bias against females which it usually reflects or expresses, and the 
resulting social disruptions which it might cause” (649). He states that it “may reinforce 
entrenched sexism toward women” (649). This is a problem in regard to questions 1, 4, and 5. 
However, Robertson asserts that the motivations and effects of selecting for male offspring 
differs in the case of first born children in contrast to selecting for a particular sex in later 
children in order to have a “balance” of male and female children (649). In the first case, he 
thinks it is more likely to express and reinforce sexism as well as to create disparities in the sex 
ratio within the population, which is already a problem as a result of selective abortion in India 
and China (649). In the second case, Robertson thinks there is are motivations and effects other 
than sexism. For him, the remaining question is whether or not a desire for a child of a particular 
sex is a strong enough justification to create and to destroy embryos.  
Robertson then turns to examining the case of selecting for perfect pitch, “the ability to 
identify and recall musical notes from memory” (2010, 650). While the genes or gene coding 
have not yet been mapped or sequenced for this trait, he thinks it is feasible that they could be. 
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Robertson suggests that the desire for children with perfect pitch could be strong within “highly 
musical families,” especially if other family members have perfect pitch. Regarding question 1, 
he states, “Parents clearly have the right to instill or develop a child’s musical ability after birth. 
They might reasonably argue that they should have that right before birth as well” (650). On 
question 2, Robertson asserts that the judgment of whether or not the desire for offspring with 
perfect pitch justifies creating and destroying embryos rests with the couple [or individual]. On 
the question of potential harm to children resulting from selection, he contends that as long as the 
child is not prevented from developing interests and abilities other than music, the parental 
investment in having a child with perfect pitch is unlikely to cause harm. Since not having 
perfect pitch is not stigmatized, Robertson thinks that this case fares well on question 4. He 
raises a concern regarding question 5 that using PGD to select for perfect pitch would set a 
problematic precedent, making it more likely that screening for other traits would be seen as 
acceptable and “moving us toward a future in which children are primarily valued according to 
the attractiveness of their expected characteristics” (651). Robertson concludes that this worry is 
too hypothetical to justify limiting parental choice. 
Although Robertson focuses on the use of PGD for sex selection and potential use to 
select for perfect pitch, the questions he raises are relevant for considering the use of PGD to 
decrease or increase the likelihood of the birth of children with impairments. He is concerned 
about the possibility that selecting for/against a trait may contribute to the stigmatization of 
existing persons as well as broader implications for society as a whole. He does not assume that 
genetic information is sufficient to predict the opportunity of QOL of potential children. In these 
ways, his approach differs from Savulescu as well as many of the other authors that will be 
discussed here.  
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Like Savulescu, Laura Purdy emphasizes parental responsibility to avoid the birth of 
children who may develop impairments or diseases, and she assumes that it is possible to predict 
the QOL of potential children on the basis of genetic information. In “Genetic and Reproductive 
Risk: Can Having Children Be Immoral?” (reprinted in DeGrazia, Mappes, and Brand-Ballard 
2011; Vaughn 2013) Purdy contends that, “it is morally wrong to reproduce when we know there 
is a high risk of transmitting a serious disease or defect (2013, 544).” 
Purdy uses Huntington’s disease (HD) as an example, but her argument has much broader 
application. Thus, it is important to go beyond this example in order to consider her overall 
argument, which is as follows:  
Premise 1: Parents ought to try to provide their children with a minimally satisfying life. 
Premise 2: A minimally satisfying life requires normal health. 
Implicit: Parents ought to ensure that their children have normal health. 
Implicit: Lack of normal health entails that one is unable to have a minimally satisfying life. 
Implicit: It is better not to exist than to lack a minimally satisfying life. 
Implicit sub-conclusion: It is better not to exist than to be born without normal health. 
Therefore, it is immoral to have children who will lack normal health (2013, 546). 
 
For the sake of argument, let us assume that premise 1 is true. Should premise 2 be accepted? 
Dominant narratives regarding health and disability would suggest that it should, but this premise 
is actually highly controversial.21 Of course, if this premise is called into question or rejected, 
then the implicit premises and sub-conclusion as well as the conclusion lack sufficient support.  
In assuming that normal health is required for a minimally satisfying life, she conceives of health, 
which can purportedly be predicted through genetic testing, as determinative of QOL. 
Throughout most of the essay, Purdy uses lack of normal health and serious disease or 
defect interchangeably. However, she does assert that, in spite of substantial agreement to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Though the categories of disease, disability (“impairment” in the terms of the social model), and lack of 
normal health are not necessarily equivalent, there is overlap between these categories. Some diseases 
themselves are classified as impairments, while others can lead to or increase functional limitations. For 
further discussion see Michael Oliver, The Politics of Disablement; Susan Wendell, “Unhealthy Disabled: 
Treating Chronic Illnesses as Disabilities,” 161-176.   
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contrary, abortion may be justified even in cases of “relatively trivial problems” because “lesser 
defects can cause great suffering,” (2013, 544; 548n6). This statement implies that physical 
“defects” themselves, including cosmetic ones, cause great suffering. She further suggests that 
aborting a fetus in favor of conceiving and carrying to term a normal fetus in such cases is 
warranted because the goal is to “bring those with better prospects into existence, instead of 
those with worse ones” (2013, 546). The assumption that genetic testing can predict the 
prospects of potential children is central within the majority of the articles discussed here that 
align with the medical model, a bad-difference view of impairment, and genetic determinism. In 
this particular case, lack of normal health or typical appearance is thought to be sufficient to 
reduce opportunities and preclude a minimally satisfying life.  
 Taking a similar approach, in “Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open 
Future” Dena Davis considers whether or not it is a harm to intentionally increase the likelihood 
of having D/deaf children (reprinted in Pierce and Randels 2010; Vaughn 2013).22 She is 
primarily concerned with the question of whether or not it would be moral for genetic counselors 
to assist D/deaf clients in having D/deaf children.23 She contends that genetic counselors should 
not help clients to have D/deaf children because it is a harm to be D/deaf. She bases this 
conclusion on the claim that being D/deaf limits one’s possibilities. Davis considers the 
preference for a D/deaf child to be irresponsible and based on self-serving motives such as 
having a child that is able to fully be a part of the family and the Deaf community.  
Davis proposes that we should adopt Joel Feinberg’s notion of “the child’s right to an 
open future” to assess the moral status of genetic counselors in assisting women in having D/deaf 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 I use “D/deaf” here as a way to indicate the contested status of deafness as an impairment versus 
Deafness as a culture. 
23 The widely publicized case of Sharon Duchesneau and Candace McCullough, a D/deaf lesbian couple 
that used sperm from a donor with a heritable form of deafness to increase the likelihood of having D/deaf 
children did not involve a genetic counselor (Scully 2008, 60).  
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children (2013, 556). This right is comprised of what Feinberg calls “rights-in-trust,” which are 
to be preserved for children to exercise when they are older. Davis provides the example of the 
right to reproduce; although this right cannot be robustly asserted until adulthood, it would be 
wrong for parents to have their children sterilized on this account. In sum, rights-in-trust “can be 
violated by adults now, in ways that cut off the possibility that the child, when it achieves 
adulthood, can exercise them” (2013, 555). Although she states that it is a fraught approach to 
oppose parental autonomy to concerns about the QOL of their potential children, her use of the 
right to an open future does, ultimately, pit these against each other. Though Davis frames her 
argument in terms of the future autonomy of potential children, her application of the notion of 
the right to an open future entails the assumption that a high quantity of options is a necessary 
condition for children to develop into adults with a high QOL. She claims that parental action 
taken in the attempt to have a particular kind of child puts limits on that child’s future by 
reducing the number of options open to him or her.24 This, in turn, results in a low QOL. That is 
why she considers it to be morally wrong for genetic counselors to assist clients in having D/deaf 
children.  
In “The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms” Dan Brock notes that most genetic 
risks that can be detected through preconception and prenatal screening are “compatible with 
having a life worth living” (2013, 568). His concern is to be able to articulate the wrong that is 
done by bringing disabled children into existence in spite of the fact that most are better off than 
if they had not been born. Brock posits what he terms a “non person-affecting principle” that, “It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Purdy contends that use of PGD for sex selection to achieve “balance” in family composition ought to 
be discouraged because parents are likely to have expectations that are likely to allow for the child to 
pursue his or her own interests (2013, 562). Her position differs from that of Robertson on this matter. He 
does not think that potential parents’ willingness to use PDG in the attempt to have a child with perfect 
pitch is significantly different from other ways they could play a role in a child’s development. He 
suggests that parents who are heavily invested in having a child with perfect pitch may still encourage 
their child to be well-rounded. 
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is morally good to act in a way that results in less suffering and less limited opportunity in the 
world” (2013, 570). When applied to the question of genetic testing in order to avoid having a 
disabled child, he claims, “a couple acts in a morally good way by taking steps not to have a 
child whom they learn from genetic screening will experience suffering and limited opportunity 
that another child they could have instead would not experience [emphasis added]” (570). Like 
most of the previous authors discussed here, Brock explicitly assumes the medical model, a bad-
difference view of impairment, and that it is possible to know on the basis of genetic screening 
whether or not a potential child will experience suffering and limited opportunity. 
On the same basis as Purdy, Davis, and Brock, Buchanan et al. state in “Genetic 
Intervention and the Morality of Inclusion” (reprinted in Beauchamp et al. 2014): 
[We] have argued [elsewhere] that there can be obligations of justice, as well as 
obligations to prevent harm, that require genetic interventions. From this perspective, we 
are committed to the judgment that in the future the world should not include so many 
disabilities and hence so many individuals with disabilities. But it is not the people with 
disabilities that we disvalue; it is the disabilities themselves (Buchanan et al. 2014, 287). 
 
The distinction between impairments and people with impairments can be a very useful one, 
which makes it possible to distinguish between effects of impairment that may be undesirable 
and the overall life of the person with that impairment, which may be highly satisfying. However, 
Buchanan et al. are not consistent in making this distinction when discussing potential children, 
as evidenced in the following remark regarding “wrongful life cases”: “[a]borting a fetus found 
during the first two trimesters to have a disease that would make life a burden to the child 
prevents the creation of a person with a life not worth living [emphasis added]” (2013, 603).25 If 
the goal is to reduce the number of impairments, in the context of discussing genetic prenatal 
testing and selective this distinction may lose its force when the only means suggested for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Though they were reprinted in different textbooks in different years, these quotations are both 
excerpted from Buchanan et al. 2000.	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preventing impairment is through preventing the birth of people who might develop 
impairments.2627  
In addition, Buchanan et al. focus on genetic interventions alone, rather than including 
what Lippman terms “low technology” approaches to reducing the incidence of impairment and 
infant mortality such as “providing essential nutritional, social, and other supportive services” 
(1991, 25). While it may, prima facie, seem feasible and praiseworthy to attempt to reduce the 
number of impairments in the world, this discussion ignores non-genetic causes of impairment as 
well as the fact that medical technology including ventilators and antibiotics have made it 
possible for people with impairments to live much longer lives than were previously possible, 
increasing, in a sense, the number of impairments rather than reducing it.28   
Buchanan et al. do not think there is a moral distinction between forms of genetic 
intervention including gene therapy that might be developed in the future, avoiding conception if 
genetic testing indicates a risk of having a child with an atypical genetic make-up, and selective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 They add:  
We hope that our analysis so far makes it clear why we believe that there are some cases, albeit 
very few, in which it would be clearly and seriously morally wrong for individuals to risk 
conceiving and having such a child. However, use of government power to force an abortion on 
an unwilling woman would be so deeply invasive of her reproductive freedom, bodily integrity, 
and right to decide about her own health care as to be virtually never morally justified. Allowing 
the child to be born and then withholding life support even over its parents’ objections would 
probably be morally preferable. The government’s doing this forcibly and over the parents’ 
objections would be extraordinarily controversial, both morally and legally, but in true cases of 
wrongful life, the wrong done is sufficiently serious as to possibly justify doing so in an 
individual case [emphasis added] (Buchanan et al 2013, 603). 27	  In “Implications of Prenatal Diagnosis for the Human Right to Life” Leon Kass pointedly asks in 
regard to selective abortion, “in the case of what other disease does preventative medicine consist in the 
elimination of the patient-at-risk?” (2013, 541). Of course, in calling a fetus a “patient,” Kass introduces 
language that is likely to be controversial, but, setting that aside, it is still possible to appreciate the point 
that in some cases the only “preventative measure” currently available is abortion.  
28 As Kass puts it, “The existence of ‘defectives’ cannot be fully prevented, not even by totalitarian 
breeding and weeding programs” (2013, 541). Lennard Davis observes, “medical advances have kept 
people alive who otherwise would have died from their disabilities. This increase in the numbers of the 
disabled is particularly notable in the case of premature babies, those with spinal cord injuries, and older 
people with debilitating conditions” (1995, 8). 
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abortion. They claim that the same motivation is likely to inform these interventions: “the desire 
not to bring into the world an individual with seriously limited opportunities” even if that 
individual’s life would be worth living (2014, 287). Buchanan et al. assume that impairments 
greatly limit opportunities, even if they do not necessarily reduce QOL to the point that a 
person’s life is not worth living. Since their approach is informed by genetic determinism, and 
they do not adequately consider the impact of the social context, these authors remain fixated on 
genetic interventions to prevent impairment and limited opportunity. Because, on their account, 
disabilities reduce opportunities, “justice—and more specifically, equal opportunity as one 
component of justice—sometimes requires genetic intervention to prevent disabilities” (2014, 
284). This claim seems sensible if we assume that impairments inevitably seriously limit 
opportunities, that this situation in unjust, and that genetic intervention, including selective 
abortion, is the only way to prevent limitations of opportunities. 
So far, I have discussed the assumptions of Savulescu, Purdy, Davis, Brock, and 
Buchanan et al. that it is possible to predict opportunities and QOL on the basis of genetic testing 
and that there is a parental responsibility to ensure that their children have a high level of 
opportunities and QOL. This responsibility means that potential parents should prevent the birth 
of children likely to have less than the best genes (Savulescu), normal health and appearance 
(Purdy), and ability to hear (Davis) in order to make sure that they don’t have children with 
limited opportunities or reduced QOL in comparison to nondisabled children. However, each of 
these authors notes, to an extent, the possibility that social factors can also limit opportunities. I 
now turn to a discussion of their perspectives on the relationship (or lack thereof) between 
limitations assumed to result from genetic variation and reductions in opportunities as a 
consequence of social arrangements.  
	   	   	  
44 
 
1.2.2 Theme two: Bad-difference views of impairment decontextualize “genetic-choices” 
 
Some of these authors whose assumptions are in line with the medical model note that unjust 
discrimination against disabled people is a problem but suggest this is all but irrelevant for 
discussing genetic testing and selective abortion because they endorse a bad-difference view of 
impairment. Thus, the disadvantages of impairment itself are thought to be sufficient reason to 
prevent the birth of children likely to develop impairments, regardless of the social context 
(Savulescu 2001; Brock 2013; Buchanan et al. 2013, 2014; Davis 2013; McMahan 2013). On 
this view, changing discriminatory social institutions is a separate issue from that of potential 
parents making reproductive choices on the basis of genotype. While the issue of social pressure 
to obtain genetic testing and select against embryos or fetuses that may develop into children 
with impairments is not addressed, Buchanan et al. do mention that public funding may be 
required so that all women have access to these prenatal testing and selective abortion (2013, 
603).  
In regard to the question of the impact of discrimination on the opportunities of members 
of marginalized social groups, Savulescu contends that even if it serves to reinforce inequality, 
couples or individuals should use PGD to select embryos with the “best” genetic profile. He 
states that, “there are other avenues to correct inequality than encouraging or forcing people to 
have children with disabilities or lives of restricted genetic opportunity” (2001, 424). While he 
acknowledges that social inequality may limit opportunities, Savulescu implies that genes 
themselves limit opportunities, and he claims that it is wrong even to encourage people to have 
children with less than the “best” genes. In sum, for Savulescu, the “best” genes produce the 
“best” children and the highest QOL, and the context is irrelevant to the parental imperative to 
choose to have these children. 
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Purdy notes that, “There are many causes of misery in this world, and most of them are 
unrelated to genetic disease. In the general scheme of things, human misery is most efficiently 
reduced by concentrating on noxious social and political arrangements” (2013, 543). This may 
seem like a statement informed by the social model of disability. However, Purdy does not 
consider how noxious social and political arrangements may create disadvantages for those with 
genetic diseases. Her position is in line with the medical model insofar as her focus is on the 
individual, and she assumes that lack of normal health itself is the sole cause of disadvantages 
and suffering. She does not consider ways that societal attitudes toward those with atypical 
features may contribute to or even be the sole cause of any suffering associated with these 
features. It is clear that she thinks there is a divide between misery caused by genetic diseases in 
contrast to misery caused by social and political arrangements and that there is a moral duty to 
avoid having children at risk for genetic diseases. Purdy assumes that it is possible to predict 
QOL on the basis of genetic variation, and she does not consider social context, except to 
contrast social and political arrangements with genetic diseases as sources of misery.29  
Davis demonstrates awareness of the social factors that impact D/deaf people. After 
stating that, “deafness is a very serious disability,” she cites a dismal statistic on the income 
disparity between D/deaf and hearing people30 and the insufficient education most D/deaf people 
receive (2013, 560). While not being able to hear in the context of living in a social environment 
that assumes the ability to hear and does not encourage hearing people to learn sign language 
may lead to disadvantages, Davis does not explain how it is that deafness itself leads to low 
wages and inadequate educational opportunities. She notes that hearing parents typically do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 In her claim that selective abortion may be warranted in cases in which the fetus is likely to develop 
relatively trivial problems due to the suffering and reduction of prospects they cause, Purdy endorses and 
even extends the standard view that impairment greatly reduces QOL (2013, 544; 548n6).  
30 She cites the statistic that, “Deaf people have incomes thirty to forty percent below the national average” 
(Davis 2013, 560). This figure is attributed to Groce 1985, 85.  	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expect to have a child who cannot hear and may not obtain the correct diagnosis for months or 
even years. Subsequently, they may be unprepared to raise and educate their child (2013, 560). 
Of course, these are not the circumstances of hypothetical D/deaf children who could be selected 
for with the assistance of genetic counselors because, to date, the potential parents have 
themselves been D/deaf. Yet, Davis’ argument assumes that D/deaf people inevitably have much 
more limited opportunities than hearing people. In this way, her position assumes the correctness 
of the medical model of disability. In response to the question of whether D/deafness constitutes 
harm, Davis replies:  
If deafness is considered a disability, one that substantially narrows a child’s career, 
marriage, and cultural options in the future, then deliberately creating a deaf child counts 
as a moral harm. If Deafness is considered a culture, as Deaf activists would have us 
agree, then deliberately creating a Deaf child who will have only very limited options to 
move outside of that culture, also counts as a moral harm (2013, 561).    
 
Clearly, she is correct that there are some careers and ways of participating in culture that require 
the ability to hear. Interestingly, few of these assumed limitations are a direct effect of not being 
able to hear.  
 In spite of her acknowledgement that selecting for D/deafness is a “same number choice” 
rather than a “same person choice,” Davis maintains that parents harm their children if they do so 
(2013, 559). To clarify this point: a single child would be (or not be) brought into existence in 
contrast to a child with different possible characteristics. In this case, a D/deaf child brought into 
existence with the assistance of a genetic counselor is a child that would not otherwise have been 
born (same number) rather than a child that would otherwise be able to hear (same person). 
Davis focuses on instances in which potential parents seek to have a D/deaf child; she does not 
address whether or not women or couples have a moral obligation to use PGD, prenatal testing, 
and selective abortion in the attempt to prevent the birth of D/deaf children.    
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 Thus far, the authors discussed have focused on the choices and responsibilities of 
individuals—potential parents and genetic counselors—in relation to genetic testing and 
selective abortion. Though these authors acknowledge that unjust discrimination sometimes 
limits opportunities, they continue to focus on the reduced opportunities and QOL thought to 
result from impairment itself. 
 
1.2.3 Theme three: Social context and responsibility, informed choices, and QOL 
 
In the following, I will discuss the articles that unequivocally adopt the social model of disability 
and a mere-difference view of impairment. They are “The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal 
Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations” by Erik Parens and Adrienne Asch 
(reprinted in Holland 2012) and “Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to 
Practice and Policy” (reprinted in Steinbock, London, and Arras 2013; Beauchamp, Walters, 
Kahn and Mastrioanni 2014). 
Rather than focusing on genetic interventions, social theorists of disability point to social 
constraints on potential and actual parents of disabled children such as the lack of resources 
available to parents raising disabled children, stigmatization of impairment, and the pressure 
women face to abort fetuses likely to develop into children with impairments. The authors I have 
discussed whose positions are in line with the medical model and a bad-difference view of 
impairment do not consider the perspectives of pregnant women, much less engage with the 
views of disabled people or disability rights advocates.  
In her discussion of prenatal testing—including ultrasound, maternal serum α-feto-
protein screening, chorionic villus sampling, and amniocentesis—Asch notes:  
These tests, which are widely accepted in the field of bioethics and by clinicians, public 
health professionals, and the general public, have nonetheless occasioned some 
apprehension and concern among students of women’s reproductive experiences, who 
	   	   	  
48 
find that women do not uniformly welcome the expectation that they will undergo 
prenatal testing or the prospect of making decisions depending on the test results. Less 
often discussed by clinicians is the view, expressed by a growing number of individuals, 
that the technology is itself based on erroneous assumptions about the adverse impact of 
disability on life (2013, 610). 
 
Asch claims that public health should consider the ways that social and economic factors “pose 
obstacles to health and health care” for disabled people as it does when considering 
disadvantages on the basis of race, sex, and sexual orientation rather than narrowly focusing on 
medical interventions (2013, 610). She states that it is due to this focus that “it appears natural to 
use prenatal testing and abortion as one more means of minimizing the incidence of disability” 
(2013, 610). Asch suggests that the difference between race, sex, and sexual orientation and 
disability is that the former characteristics are generally thought to be compatible with a 
rewarding life, while the latter is not (2013, 610). 
 Asch asserts that it makes sense that healthcare professionals are “especially attuned to 
the problems and hardships that affect the lives of their patients” (2013, 611). Healthcare 
professionals encounter patients while they are experiencing the effects of “acute illness or 
sudden injury” as well as those who have congenital conditions or acquired ones to which they 
have adjusted (2013, 611). Asch claims that it is easy for healthcare professionals as well as 
bioethicists to mistakenly assume that “the life of a person with a chronic illness or disability is 
forever disrupted, as one’s life might be temporarily disrupted as a result of a back spasm, an 
episode of pneumonia, or a broken leg” (2013, 611). However, the experiences of many disabled 
people and people affected by chronic illnesses belie this view. While Asch maintains that the 
fields of medicine and bioethics tend to show adequate concern regarding the physical and 
psychological effects of medical crises on patients and their families, she finds it highly 
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problematic to think of all impairments and illnesses in this way. Once again, we encounter a 
clash between bad-difference and mere-difference views of impairment. 
Like Asch, Yvonne Denier is concerned with the context in which potential parents use 
prenatal testing and make decisions regarding whether or not to have children with impairments. 
In “From Brute Luck to Option Luck? On Genetics, Justice, and Moral Responsibility” 
(reprinted in Beauchamp et al, 2014) she argues that use of prenatal genetic diagnosis as an 
example demonstrates that the luck egalitarian approach is disrespectful of individual choice and 
that what it posits as justice is actually unjust. To illustrate, she notes that Buchanan et al. claim 
that through genetic interventions, what was formerly a matter of good or bad fortune is now 
possible to control, which brings “genetic endowments” into the realm of justice (Denier 2014, 
175).  
Denier seems to assume the bad-difference view of impairment and vacillates between 
the medical and social model of disability. For example, she refers to “genetically based 
disadvantage,” but she also claims that justice requires society to provide support for disabled 
people in the form of accessibility and basic goods such as education (175, 181).31 Denier is 
attentive to the pressure potential parents may feel to avoid having children with impairments 
due to the societal view that disabled people are a “drain on social resources” (175). She suggests 
that “genetically responsible parenthood” conceptualizes responsibility in a flawed way insofar 
as it incorporates a hegemonic view of the good life and moral convictions (176). This 
application of option luck, whereby potential parents “willingly take a risk in the full knowledge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 She also states, “Our genetic identity—who we and our children are—has long been a paradigm of 
nature’s responsibility and not ours, and a substantial shift of that determination to the sphere of our own 
responsibility destabilizes much of our conventional morality” (Denier 2014, 179-180). The assumption 
here seems to be that nature previously determined who we are and our children were, but through genetic 
interventions we are able to subvert nature’s ability to determine this. 	  
	   	   	  
50 
of its possible consequences” demands parents expend their own resources to raise a disabled 
child as a penalty if they refuse to obtain prenatal genetic testing and/or refuse to abort based on 
the results (173; 176). In this case, caring for a disabled child may be characterized under “the 
class of voluntary expensive tastes for which people are supposed to take full individual 
responsibility” (179).  
Denier suggests an alternative way of thinking about responsibility whereby prenatal 
genetic testing is used to help parents to prepare for a child with a disease or impairment in line 
with their own view of the good life and moral convictions with the knowledge that they can 
depend on society to fulfill its responsibility to provide necessary resources (178). She contends 
that is only when this is realized that prospective parents will be able to make a “free and 
responsible choice” about whether or not to give birth to a disabled child (178). 
Though there are differences in their views of impairment and level of commitment to the 
social model, Denier and Asch agree that practices surrounding genetic testing and selective 
abortion can be done in ways that limit or enable informed choices. Asch states, “this article 
assumes a pro-choice perspective but suggests that unreflective uses of testing could diminish, 
rather than expand, women’s choices” (2013, 610). Her primary focus is on advocating that, if 
we as a society insist on the practices of prenatal genetic testing and selective abortion, then 
health care professionals need to improve on how they provide information about “predictable 
difficulties, supports, and life events associated with a disabling condition to consider how a 
child’s disability would it into their own hopes for parenthood” (2013, 616). More specifically, 
she suggests that to engage in responsible practice, health care professionals should provide 
potential parents:  
information about the services to benefit children with specific disabilities in a particular 
area, and about which of these a child and family are likely to need immediately after 
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birth; contact information for a parent-group representative; and contact information for a 
member of a disability rights group or independent living center (617). 
  
To be clear, Asch herself opposes prenatal testing and selective abortion, but she thinks it is 
possible to provide such options in ways that allow potential parents to make informed decisions.  
 Parens and Asch explain that some disability rights critics are concerned that “[r]ather 
than improving the medical or social situation of today’s or tomorrow’s disabled citizens, 
prenatal diagnosis reinforces the medical model’s view that disability itself, not societal 
discrimination against people with disabilities, is the problem to be solved” (2012, 60). Parens 
and Asch state, “living with disabling traits need not be detrimental either to an individual’s 
prospects of leading a worthwhile life, or to families as they grow up, or to society at large” 
(2012, 60). While acknowledging that impairments themselves may cause pain and 
disadvantages, Parens and Asch think it is wrongheaded to attempt to prevent the birth of 
children that may have impairments on the assumption that they are unlikely to have worthwhile 
lives. 
 In section two, I surveyed a number of articles reprinted in six biomedical ethics 
anthologies in order to show how influential the medical model remains within discussions of 
QOL in the context of PGD, prenatal testing, and selective abortion. I have highlighted the 
tendency of these authors to adopt genetic determinism in their assessments of the implications 
of genetic variation for potential children’s opportunities and QOL. Conversely, those who 
endorse the social model deny that genetic variation and impairment necessarily reduce 
opportunities or QOL, while drawing attention to ways that social obstacles do.   
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1.3 Conclusion 	  
In this chapter, I have focused on ways that bioethicists characterize disability. I detailed three 
types of epistemic and ontological assumptions that bioethicists tend to make that relate to 
disability: the medical model of disability, bad-difference views of impairment, and biological 
determinism—often, genetic determinism, specifically, in discussions of so-called reproductive 
choices. I also discussed alternatives to these assumptions, which are often adopted by disability 
theorists. After detailing these assumptions and a few other key terms, I surveyed articles in 
biomedical ethics anthologies in order to examine which assumptions these articles endorsed and 
the effect this had on their recommendations related to preconception, pre-implantation, and 
prenatal testing and selective abortion. One of the clear distinctions between authors whose 
positions are in line with the medical model and a bad-difference view of impairment in contrast 
to those who endorse the social model and a mere-difference view of impairment is the type of 
responsibility they emphasized (parental and societal, respectively). As shown in Table 2, one of 
the significant divides between these perspectives is located in their responses to the following 
questions:  
Whose responsibility is it to respond to potential and actual children with impairments? 
What constitutes an appropriate response? 
 
In addition, positions informed by genetic determinism tended to narrowly focus on 
genetic interventions to prevent suffering and limited opportunities rather than considering social 
changes. These trends point to the limitations of the medical/social model distinction: namely, 
they may be seen as supporting a spurious dichotomy between medical and social interventions, 
which implies that disabled people must choose one or the other rather than leaving open the 
possibility that both may be desirable. 
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Table 2 Models of Disability and Roles and Responsibilies 
 
Model of Disability Medical Model of Disability 
Bad-difference Views of 
Impairment 
Social Model of Disability 
Mere-difference Views of 
Impairment 
Role of Potential 
Parents 
Potential parents should use 
genetic testing to make 
responsible choices (i.e. prevent 
the birth of children likely to 
develop impairments) or they 
should be responsible for 
bearing the costs of raising such 
children. 
Potential parents may find 
genetic and other types of 
prenatal testing to be useful in 
preparation to raise a child that 
may develop an impairment or 
disease. However, they should 
not be pressured to use this 
testing. 
Role of Healthcare 
professionals 
Healthcare professionals should 
provide genetic and other 
prenatal testing on demand and 
provide medical interventions to 
prevent/reduce impairment. 
Healthcare professionals should 
provide information about 
possible outcomes to help 
potential parents to have an 
understanding of what it is like 
to live with the particular 
impairment or disease the 
potential child may develop. 
Role of Society Society should fund genetic and 
other prenatal testing as well a 
research to cure impairments 
and diseases. 
Society should provide resources 
so that potential parents feel as 
though they have a choice about 
whether or not to raise a child 
that may develop a congenital 
impairment or disease. 
Primary Focus The primary focus is on parental 
responsibility. The responsible 
choice is for potential parents to 
prevent the birth of children 
with impairments and congenital 
diseases. 
The primary focus is on societal 
responsibility. Disability should 
be prevented, but it cannot be 
uniformly assumed that 
preventing impairment is good. 
 
All of the authors considered here are concerned to prevent suffering, to the extent that is 
possible, and envision a world in which children have worthwhile lives filled with opportunities. 
Indeed, several authors state that justice requires interventions to ensure that this is the case. 
However, their perspectives differ on whether or not impairment inevitably causes suffering and 
limited opportunities. Accordingly, they differ on the necessity and appropriateness of genetic 
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and other types of social intervention. In chapter two, I will examine the epistemic dimensions of 
the divide between these positions.  
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CHAPTER TWO: EPISTEMIC ISSUES IN BIOMEDICAL ETHICS: IGNORANCE, 
KNOWLEDGE, OBJECTIVITY, AND DISABILITY 
 
“With the right kind of philosophical account, empirical evidence can appear irrelevant” 
(Amundson 2005, 109). 
 
[P]erhaps even more important than ideologies at the explicit and articulated level (for 
example, libertarianism, biological determinism) are ideologies in the more primeval 
sense of underlying patterns and matrices of belief, or ideology as “common sense.” The 
former are at least visible as ideologies, specific demarcated bodies of thought in 
contestation for people’s belief, whereas the latter may seem to be mere neutral 
background, an ideational framework to be accepted by all, without political implications. 
Thus the latter may well be more influential and efficacious than the former simply by 
virtue of their ability to set the terms of the debate, to limit the options deemed worthy of 
consideration (Mills 1988, 253). 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I argue that objectivity as neutrality in biomedical ethics sustains ignorance and 
makes the perspectives of disabled people and their advocates seem superfluous or even 
antithetical to knowledge production. As a result of the exclusion of these perspectives, 
bioethicists do not know as well or as much as they could, and they are considered untrustworthy 
among many members of the disability rights community. I argue that strong objectivity, which 
makes social interests and values affecting research explicit rather than denying their existence, 
provides an approach that is superior both epistemically and ethically. 
In 2001, The American Journal of Bioethics published an essay by Mark Kuczewski 
entitled “Disability: An Agenda for Bioethics” along with fifteen commentaries.32 Kuczewski 
argues that, “bioethics needs to be more concerned with issues related to disability and to engage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See The American Journal of Bioethics 3(1). 
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the disability perspective” (43). In spite of the time that has passed since he wrote this article, it 
raises concerns that are just as relevant today. For example, as I have shown in chapter one, the 
perspectives of disabled people are still marginalized within a number of biomedical ethics 
textbooks published between 2010-2014. In addition, there is continued tension between 
prominent bioethicists and disability advocates. Bioethics as a field generally fails to consider the 
disabled people’s experiences and knowledge to be central for issues that affect disabled 
people’s lives.  
Later in this chapter, I will discuss Kuczewski’s position in more depth as well as the 
responses of Anita Silvers and Peter Singer, which both call for neutrality. Concepts developed 
throughout the chapter serve to clarify why objectivity as neutrality is epistemically 
counterproductive. In an expanded version of her response to Kuczewski, Silvers argues that 
“bioethicists and disability advocates need to construct a conceptually neutral space around 
disability” (2003, 474). She contends that it is possible and desirable for both communities to set 
aside their differing political values in order to develop “conceptual neutrality” regarding 
disability (2003, 475). For Silvers, “neutral” means value-free (2003, 473). Yet, her description 
of how bioethicists and disability advocates ought to proceed does not entail the absence of 
values and interests. Nonetheless, I contend that Silver’s approach shows promise if it is 
reframed as a means for making values and interests explicit and beginning to distinguish 
between liberatory and anti-liberatory values rather than achieving neutrality. There are a 
number of persuasive arguments within philosophy of science and feminist standpoint theory that 
challenge her overall claim that conceptual neutrality in regard to the concept of disability is 
possible or desirable. Given that I reject the possibility of a neutral conception of disability, my 
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aim here is to develop an alternative way of framing the desire I share with Silvers to facilitate 
respectful dialogue between bioethicists and disability advocates.  
Feminist standpoint theory and epistemologies of ignorance provide conceptual tools that 
are useful for clarifying the obstacles to the sort of reconciliation between bioethicists and 
disability advocates that Silvers endorses. In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the key 
insights of feminist standpoint theory and epistemologies of ignorance prior to developing the 
ways in which they are beneficial for mapping out the epistemological terrain regarding 
conceptualizations of disability within biomedical ethics.  
I will begin with a discussion of feminist standpoint theory in section one. I will then turn 
to considerations related to objectivity in light of feminist standpoint theory. Because I am 
concerned with the question of how it is possible to conceptualize disability without the ideal of 
objectivity as neutrality, I will develop Sandra Harding’s claim that it is possible to create 
stronger standards for objectivity by recognizing the ways that values are integral to knowledge 
production rather than purporting that they are not. I will also discuss Naomi Scheman’s 
examination of the purpose of objectivity. 
In section two, I will describe epistemologies of ignorance, drawing on the work of 
Charles Mills. Epistemologies of ignorance might be thought of as an extension of feminist 
standpoint theory. Epistemologies of ignorance contend that ignorance, like knowledge, is 
produced and sustained through power relations and serves particular interests and values (Tuana 
2006, 3). While there is a precedent for drawing on epistemologies of ignorance within 
scholarship on disability,33 I have not found work on biomedical ethics that takes this approach. I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Gilson 2011 and Hall 2012. In “Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression,” Gilson argues that 
epistemic vulnerability among members of dominant groups can mitigate the harms of oppressive forms 
of ignorance. In “ ‘Not Much to Praise in Such Seeking and Finding’: Evolutionary Psychology, the 
Biological Turn in the Humanities, and the Epistemology of Ignorance” Kim Hall argues that what she 
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will draw on Gaile Pohlhaus Jr.’s discussion of the ways in which being asked to understand 
from dominant perspectives can curtail individual epistemic agency and reinforce oppression. I 
use her notion of “wrongful requests to understand” in order to explore the epistemic harms 
imposed upon disabled people as well as to provide suggestions for moving toward more just 
epistemic practices (Pohlhaus 2011). The section elaborates on ways that appeals to neutrality 
obstruct efforts to know and harm those who seek to challenge dominant perspectives.  
In section three, I will argue that the ignorance among bioethicists regarding the 
perspectives and claims of disabled people and disability rights advocates is not a simple lack of 
knowledge; epistemologies of ignorance can help to elucidate the ways in which dominant 
beliefs regarding disability are reified while non-ableist beliefs tend either not to be taken into 
consideration or to be quickly dismissed. In light of the insights of feminist standpoint theory and 
epistemologies of ignorance, it is not tenable to appeal to objectivity as neutrality in discussions 
of disability and quality of life (QOL). I will also discuss claims regarding the QOL of disabled 
people made in the name of objectivity by some bioethicists in order to show how objectivity as 
neutrality can work against the interests of disabled people. I will focus on the ableist view that 
impairments necessarily greatly reduce QOL, which is widely endorsed within the literature of 
biomedical ethics in spite of the protests of people who live with impairments. Pohlhaus explains 
that “wrongful requests to understand” protect the privileged from the type of epistemic 
openness that undergirds just knowledge practices while rendering the marginalized vulnerable 
to a number of harms (2011). I will show that this is especially apparent within biomedical ethics 
and medical practice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
terms the “biological turn” in the humanities is “an epistemology of ignorance that contributes to a 
climate of hostility and intolerance regarding feminist approaches to gender, identity, and the body” (2012, 
30).	  
	   	   	  
59 
Finally, in section four, I will develop Silvers’ recommendations for developing 
conceptual neutrality regarding disability. I will demonstrate that her approach is not actually 
value-free and that rather than constituting a weakness, this is a strength. I conclude by arguing 
that strong objectivity and objectivity as trustworthiness provide both a more accurate 
description and a better prescription of just epistemic practices within biomedical ethics in regard 
to disability than approaches that appeal to objectivity as neutrality. 
2.1 Feminist Standpoint Theory and Objectivity 
 
Although there are a number of feminist standpoint theorists worthy of discussion,34 I will limit 
my focus to three of these theorists who have been influential within philosophy and are most 
relevant for the concerns of the current project: Sandra Harding, Nancy Hartsock, and Alison 
Jaggar. After discussing the notion of a feminist standpoint, I will draw on the work of Harding 
and Scheman in order to examine the relationship between feminist standpoint theory, objectivity, 
and trustworthiness.  
 
2.1.1 Feminist standpoint theory 
 
In her ground-breaking 1983 essay “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a 
Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,” Hartsock draws on Marxian theory in order to 
consider the potential for applying Karl Marx’s insights to feminist concerns. She is primarily 
interested in the epistemological usefulness of a feminist historical materialism. Before we can 
discuss Hartsock’s suggestion, it is necessary to understand the epistemic consequences of non-
feminist historical materialism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See, for example, Patricia Hill Collins 2000; Donna Haraway 1988; Sandra Harding 1986, 1991, 1992, 
1993; Nancy Hartsock 1983; Alison Jaggar 1983; Hilary Rose 1987; and Dorothy Smith 1974, 1987.  
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According to Marx, class is the primary social structure within capitalist society, and this 
has significant epistemic consequences. Marx considers the differences between the perspectives 
of the capitalist (at the level of commodity exchange) and the worker (at the level of production) 
to be epistemically telling. While the capitalist is likely to believe that his relation to the worker 
is one of equality, the worker has a greater possibility of recognizing the exploitative nature of 
their relationship (Hartsock 1983, 286-287). According to Hartsock, “a Marxian account of 
exchange vs. production indicates that the epistemology growing from exchange not only inverts 
that present in the process of production but in addition is both partial and fundamentally 
perverse” (287). On Hartsock’s account, the proletariat is able to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of social reality in being able to take on the perspectives of both the capitalist and 
the proletarian, whereas the capitalist’s version is partial—often confined to a single perspective. 
She claims that the capitalist’s perspective is perverse insofar as it wrongly privileges exchange 
rather than use, which is essential for preserving and reproducing the human race. In Charles 
Mills’ words, “Marx believes that the illusory appearances of capitalism—though admittedly 
exerting a certain doxastic pull on everybody—can be at least partially ‘seen through’ from a 
certain perspective, that of course being the perspective of the working class” (1988, 242). While 
being a member of the working class does not guarantee that one will identify the illusory 
appearances of capitalism, such as the fable that workers freely sell their labor, Marx posits that 
members of the working class—proletarians—have the best chance of recognizing and 
attempting to change the causes of their exploitation. Proletarians have less investment in 
maintaining the status quo than capitalists, who benefit from the system and stand to lose a great 
deal if it is overturned. 
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Marx has been widely critiqued for failing to adequately attend to the relevance of gender 
and race for understanding exploitation (Young 1980; Hartsock 1983; Mills 1988). Due to his 
focus on wage labor, for example, his approach is unable to problematize the domestic labor 
performed by women. Hartsock claims that Marx and Engels’ theorizing is, in fact, premised on 
it. She states, “It is no surprise to feminists that Engels, for example, simply asks how women 
can continue to do the work in the home and also work in production outside the home. Marx too 
takes for granted women’s responsibility for household labor” (Hartsock 1983, 291). 
Nonetheless, feminist Marxists and materialist feminists have sought to adapt Marxist theory, 
claiming that women’s lives differ greatly from men’s and “that the position of women is 
structurally different from that of men” (Hartsock 1983, 284). Hartsock seeks to develop the 
epistemic resources implicated by this claim. She suggests that, “like the lives of proletarians 
according to Marxist theory, women’s lives make available a particular and privileged vantage 
point on male supremacy, a vantage point which can ground a powerful critique of the 
phallocratic institutions and ideology which constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy” (284). 
While, like the proletariat, women are prone to colluding in our domination, we also have less 
material interest in maintaining the current social structure than men do. 
Hartsock describes the characteristics of the proletarian standpoint in order to consider 
the possibility of a feminist standpoint. Before discussing the notion of a specifically feminist 
standpoint, it will be helpful to clarify the nature of a standpoint. Hartsock states:  
A standpoint is not simply an interested position (interpreted as bias) but is interested in 
the sense of being engaged…A standpoint, however, carries with it the contention that 
there are some perspectives on society from which, however well-intentioned one may be, 
the real relations of humans with each other and with the natural world are not visible 
(1983, 285). 
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A standpoint is not a given; one must work to attain it. While it is possible for those in privileged 
positions to take on a proletarian standpoint, it involves difficulties beyond their desire to 
maintain the status quo. For example, aspects of social relations that are readily apparent from 
the perspectives of some workers are not salient to capitalists in most cases. Attaining a 
standpoint involves the insights of others, and this is especially true for those in privileged 
positions because they are at an epistemic disadvantage. Developing a standpoint is a social 
endeavor. 
 Marx contends that the proletarian standpoint originates in practical activity (Hartsock 
1983, 285). While Hartsock’s notion of a feminist standpoint builds on his insights, she disagrees 
with Marx on a fundamental point. She says that Marx “dismisses the sexual division of labor as 
of no analytic importance,” whereas Hartsock argues that the sexual division of labor has 
profound effects for differences in the experiences of men and women, making it a logical 
starting point for a feminist standpoint (290). She uses the term “sexual” rather than “gender” for 
two reasons. First, insofar as women and not men bear children, the division of labor is not 
reducible to social determinations. Second, Hartsock wants to emphasize “the bodily aspect of 
existence—perhaps to grasp it over-firmly in an effort to keep it from evaporating altogether” 
(289). She examines ways that practical activity can contribute to the development of a feminist 
standpoint. 
 Hartsock’s discussion of practical activity focuses on the institution of motherhood, 
gender socialization, female bodily experiences, and the nature of work undertaken by women —
indeed, it becomes clear that these foci are all intertwined. In regard to the institution of 
motherhood, she asserts that the socialization of almost all girls includes preparation for 
motherhood (1983, 294). Mothering and other domestic work is tied to necessity and 
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embodiment, making it difficult for women to reside in the abstract realm of masculinity (296). 
Hartsock states, “the female experience in bearing and rearing children involves a unity of mind 
and body more profound than is possible in the worker’s instrumental activity” (294). Women’s 
labor is also more likely than men’s to be central to self-definition insofar as women, on average, 
work much more when wage labor and work to sustain the family and home are considered. 
 Hartsock concludes “These different (psychic) experiences both structure and are 
reinforced by the differing patterns of male and female activity required by the sexual division of 
labor, and are thereby replicated as epistemology and ontology” (1984, 296). She suggests that 
the domination of ways of thinking stemming from male activity has led to dualist oppositions 
and radical individualism, whereas unity and the dialectic ways of thinking that originate in 
women’s activity are marginalized (298-299). Because the former abstract modes of thinking are 
in accord with other patterns of male activity, Hartsock contends that it is more difficult for men 
to notice that there are alternatives or that these ways of thinking are particular rather than 
universal. This is one aspect of the epistemic disadvantage she thinks characterizes the male 
social position that gives rise to abstract masculinity, which provides a partial and perverse 
perspective. Conversely, women are more likely to recognize the inadequacy and contingency of 
these ways of thinking. 
 According to Jaggar, feminist critiques of existing knowledge “reveal how prevailing 
systems of conceptualization are biased because they invalidate women’s interests and promote 
the interests and values of the men who created them” (1983, 371). The impact of systems of 
conceptualization is not confined to theory; it plays an important role in structuring societal 
practices more generally. A feminist standpoint allows for identification of the values and 
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interests being served within systems of conceptualization and allow for the provision of 
alternative possibilities. 
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that a standpoint is not something one simply has in 
virtue of being in a marginalized social position. Members of marginalized groups do not 
automatically recognize that there are alternatives to the dominant narratives. Hartsock maintains 
that both science and the education gained through working to change social relations are needed 
in order to achieve a standpoint (1983, 285). This is what distinguishes a perspective from a 
standpoint. Harding reminds us that, “the dominant ideology restricts what everyone, including 
marginalized people, are permitted to see and shapes everyone’s consciousness” (Harding 1992, 
582-583). She elaborates on Hartsock’s contention that activism contributes to one’s ability to 
think in opposition to the dominant ideology in the following: 
Only through such struggles [political activism by and on behalf of oppressed, exploited, 
and dominated groups] can we begin to see beneath the appearances created by an unjust 
social order to the reality of how this social order is in fact constructed and maintained. 
This need for struggle emphasizes the fact that a feminist standpoint is not something that 
anyone can have simply by claiming it. It is an achievement. A standpoint differs in this 
respect from a perspective… (Harding 1991, 127). 
 
This quotation refers to multiple dominated groups. Although Hartsock’s essay seeks 
commonalities between women in different social locations, she calls a feminist standpoint “an 
important epistemological tool for understanding and opposing all forms of domination” (1983, 
283). Other feminist theorists attend to differences within the category “women” related to race, 
sexuality, class, and, most recently, disability status in order to develop in greater detail how a 
feminist standpoint might be used to address all forms of domination (Mairs 1990, 1996; Morris 
1995; Collins 2000; Garland-Thomson 2005; Mahowald 2005; Wendell 2008). 
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2.1.2 Feminist standpoint theory and disability  	  
Feminist disability theorists have recognized the significance of feminist standpoint theory for 
both disability activism and theory. In “Personal and Political: A Feminist Perspective on 
Researching Physical Disability” feminist disability theorist Jenny Morris claims that one of the 
obstacles entailed in the oppression disabled people face is a difficulty in developing a standpoint 
and having our knowledge and experiences included in cultural representations of disability. 
Morris asserts, “Making our standpoint known to both ourselves and to others is a central part of 
the feminist research agenda, as it must also be of a disability rights agenda” (1995, 263). As this 
remark makes clear, she considers this work to be vital not only for disability advocates but also 
for feminist theory. Morris challenges nondisabled feminists to recognize the concerns of 
disabled women as feminist concerns.  
 As the title of her essay suggests, Mary Briody Mahowald asserts in “Our Bodies 
Ourselves: Disability and Standpoint Theory” that her defense of a human-flourishing based 
definition of disability is premised on feminist standpoint theory. Central to her position is the 
claim that false universalization of the perspectives of privileged people leads to injustice based 
on unnecessarily limited epistemic practices. She states, “Ethicists commit this epistemological 
error when they claim that impartiality is indispensable to ethical judgments and consider their 
own ethical positions as exemplars of such impartiality” (Mahowald 2005, 241). Mahowald 
contends that inclusion of the standpoints of disadvantaged groups such as disabled people 
serves as a corrective to this epistemological error. Though there is slippage in her discussion 
between the perspectives and standpoints of disabled people, she is clear on this point: it is a 
necessary condition of just policy and health care decisions impacting disabled people to take 
their experiences and knowledge into account. 
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 Like Morris and Mahowald, Susan Wendell contends that feminist theory needs to 
include disabled women. She suggests that feminists ought to be suspicious of the claim that 
when disabled people face social disadvantages such as unemployment, poverty, and lack of 
access to appropriate education it is because they are “victims of nature or accident” (2008, 829). 
Wendell thinks that feminists are likely to be able to identify parallels between this claim and the 
claim that women are disadvantaged by nature. However, she maintains that disabled people are 
in a better position than able-bodied people to develop a critical consciousness regarding 
disability in the following: “From the standpoint35 of a disabled person, one can see how society 
could minimize the disadvantages of most disabilities, and, in some instances, turn them into 
advantages” (829). Wendell discusses reasons she thinks the knowledge of disabled people is 
“silenced” as well ways that this knowledge could benefit society as a whole (837).  
Like Hartsock, Wendell conceives of a critical standpoint as something that is achieved 
through dialogue. She states: “[b]ecause I do not want simply to describe my own experience but 
to understand it in a much larger context, I must venture beyond what I know first-hand. I rely on 
others to correct my mistakes and fill in those parts of the picture I cannot see” (2008, 827). 
Significantly, Wendell suggesting that experience is fallible and should not be uncritically 
accepted. She also notes the limitations on any one person’s experience and knowledge.   
 Although Nancy Mairs does not explicitly cite feminist standpoint theory in Waist-High 
in the World: A Life Among the Nondisabled, she reflects on her experiences as a disabled 
women and the disability community’s awareness of the political nature of disability. Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson suggests that Mairs articulates a “feminist disability sitpoint theory,” 
regarding which she states, “my use of sitpoint particularizes standpoint theory to disabled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Here Wendell uses “standpoint” in the way that Hartsock uses “viewpoint.” For example, Wendell 
asserts, “[l]ike everyone who is disabled, I have a particular standpoint determined in part by both my 
physical condition and my social situation” (2008, 827). 
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women by calling attention to the normative assumption that one perceives the world from a 
standing rather than sitting position” (2005, 1570). While I appreciate Garland-Thomson’s effort 
to prompt feminists to be wary of ableist assumptions, I worry that she may be taking 
“standpoint” a bit too literally. In addition, she verges on conflating being a disabled woman 
with having a feminist disability “sitpoint,” which is problematic in at least two ways. First, it 
seems to exclude the possibility that disabled men might develop this critical consciousness. 
Secondly, I think it is important to preserve the distinction between a perspective stemming from 
being disabled from a standpoint in order to recognize that insights regarding social relations are 
not automatic but require sustained effort.  
 While feminist theorists have long recognized the applicability of feminist standpoint 
theory for thinking about disability, this approach remains marginal within epistemic practices 
within biomedical ethics as well as research on disability. The notion that feminist standpoint 
theory entails social values and interests and is thus antithetical to objectivity—the proper 
approach to research—is central for understanding why the impact of feminist standpoint theory 
has not been greater.  
 
2.1.3 Feminist standpoint theory and objectivity 	  
The epistemological insights that emerge from Marxian theory and its feminist adaptations have 
significant consequences for thinking about objectivity, particularly for problematizing the 
conception of objectivity as neutrality. Jaggar remarks:  
Since knowledge is one aspect of human productive activity and since this activity is 
necessarily purposive, the basic categories of knowledge will always be shaped by human 
purposes and the values on which they are based. For this reason, Marxists conclude that 
even so-called empirical knowledge is never entirely value-free. The conceptual 
framework by which we make sense of ourselves and our world is shaped and limited by 
the interests and values of the society that we inhabit (Jaggar 1983, 358).  
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On this account, when epistemic practices are contextualized it becomes clear that they are 
motivated by societal interests and values, which may not be shared or even recognized. This 
understanding of knowledge and feminist standpoint theory undergirds Harding’s discussion of 
two notions of objectivity. 
 
2.1.3.1 Objectivity as neutrality 
 
Within feminist as well as mainstream epistemology, science has often been taken to be the 
paradigm for examining knowledge practices. One might think that if objectivity as neutrality is 
possible within any human domain, it is within science. While there is no consensus among 
feminist theorists about whether or not to maintain objectivity as an epistemic ideal, there is 
widespread criticism of claims that science is objective in the sense of being disinterested and 
value free (Amundson 2013; Haraway 1988; Harding 1991; Harding 1992; Harding 1993; 
Lewontin, Kamin, and Rose 1984; Tuana 2006). Later in the chapter (section 5), I will show that 
Harding’s discussion of objectivity is especially useful for considering how best to conceptualize 
disability without appealing to neutrality as an ideal (Harding 1991; Harding 1992; Harding 
1993). I will recount her explanation of ways that politics influence scientific practices in order 
to set the stage for clarification of the limitations of objectivity as neutrality as well as the 
benefits of what she terms “strong objectivity.”  
Harding distinguishes between two types of politics related to science. The first 
conceives of politics “as the overt actions and policies intended to advance the interests and 
agendas of ‘special interest groups’” (1992, 567). As the quotation makes clear, this 
understanding of the politicization of science involves intentional manipulation. Politics impacts 
scientific practices from the outside, so to speak, influencing the research questions that are 
pursued and how results of research are framed (567). Examples of this type of politics 
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impacting research include corporations and organizations commissioning scientists to obscure 
findings regarding the harms of smoking cigarettes or being exposed to environmental tobacco 
smoke (i.e. secondhand smoke) or to create doubt about the existence of or causes of climate 
change (Proctor 2008; Oreskes and Conway 2008; Christensen 2008). Another example is when 
pharmaceutical companies engage in public relations campaigns to promote awareness of 
conditions that they produce medications to treat. Sprout Pharmaceuticals, manufacturer of 
flibanserin—a medication currently under review by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) to 
treat female hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD)—provides funding to the “Even the 
Score” campaign, which claims that gender equality requires safe and effective treatments for 
HSDD, often referred to as “female sexual dysfunction” on the website (even though this is not 
consistent with the terminology adopted in the DSM-V), apparently to emphasize the purported 
similarities to “male sexual dysfunction.”36 In all of these cases, there is a clear attempt to distort 
or reframe scientific evidence in order to shape policy and public opinion in a way that benefits 
corporations and actually or potentially harms members of the public. Harding contends that the 
idea of objectivity as neutrality is most apt for addressing this type of involvement of politics in 
science.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Their website states: 
As supporters of the Even the Score campaign, we believe that women have the right to make 
their own informed choices concerning their sexual health; that gender equality should be the 
standard when it comes to access to treatments for sexual dysfunction; and that the approval of 
safe and effective treatments for women’s sexual dysfunction should be a priority for action by 
the FDA (http://eventhescore.org/about-us/). 
Even the Score claims that the problem is as follows:  
There are 26 FDA approved drugs to treat various sexual dysfunctions for men (41 if you count 
generics!), but still not a single one for women's most common sexual complaint. You can see a 
list of all 26 individually evaluated and approved drugs for men right here, compiled from the 
FDA's own website. 26 v 0. That just doesn't make sense all these decades and scientific 
publications later (http://eventhescore.org/about-us/). 
Although there is no mention of flibanserin by name, it is easy to infer that these claims are meant to 
bolster support for flibanserin insofar as it is the first drug to be reviewed by the FDA for treatment of 
HSDD. 
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The second type of politics works within science rather than from the outside. Harding 
states, “power is exercised less visibly, less consciously, and not on but through the dominant 
institutional structures, priorities, practices, and languages of the sciences” (1992, 567). Rather 
than acting on the structures of science, this type of politics structures science. The politics of 
male dominance, racism, classism, and imperialism are examples she cites that function in this 
way (568). The ideal of objectivity as neutrality is unable to detect such structural biases. Worse 
yet, according to Harding this ideal “certifies as value-neutral, normal, natural, and therefore not 
political at all the existing scientific policies and practices through which powerful groups can 
gain the information and explanations that they need to advance their priorities” (568-569). As a 
corollary, Harding notes that objections to these claims are silenced through definition as 
“agitation by special interests that threaten to damage the neutrality of science” (569). Scientific 
claims are legitimated through appeals to neutrality even as they are thoroughly political in this 
second sense. 
Harding explains that one of the differences between what she terms “spontaneous 
feminist empiricists”—feminist biologists attempting to correct for sexism and 
androcentricism—and feminist standpoint theorists is that the former think that these biases can 
be eliminated by adhering to objectivist methods more carefully in order to attain objectivity as 
neutrality, while the latter think that new methods are necessary for systematic identification of 
the values and agendas that shape scientific practices (1993, 51). On Harding’s account, feminist 
empiricists—with the notable exceptions of Helen Longino and Lynn Hankinson Nelson—are 
concerned with the first rather than the second type of politics. Spontaneous feminist empiricists 
think social values and interests only guide ideologically tainted science, while feminist 
standpoint theorists hold that social values and interests are ineliminable from science. Harding 
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contends that the conservatism of feminist empiricism is both its strength and weakness; it is 
more widely accepted than feminist standpoint theory but also less effective in identifying the 
impact of widely held social values and interests due to its adherence to objectivity as neutrality 
(1993, 52-53). 
The ideal of objectivity as neutrality is used to reify dominant narratives and to serve the 
interests of privileged groups. Chapter one referred to the claim of Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin 
that biological determinism and reductionism are appealed to in order to buttress ideologies, 
defined as “the ruling ideas of a particular society at a particular time” (1984, 3-4). Biological 
determinism and reductionism, it is claimed, are simply “objective” descriptions. Harding argues 
that one problem with objectivity as neutrality is that, “Objectivist methods are designed to 
identify and eliminate those social and political values and interests that differ between the 
individuals who constitute a scientific community [emphasis added]” (1992, 577). What these 
methods are not designed to do is to locate and eliminate the values and interests that are shared 
among members of a scientific or other type of epistemic community.  
According to Harding, objectivism conceives of objectivity too narrowly, in one sense, 
and too broadly, in another, to be able to achieve its goals (1991, 144).37 Objectivity is too 
narrow insofar as it concerns differences in values and interests between individuals, as noted 
above, and limits its scope to the context of justification, which deals with gathering and 
interpreting evidence. Objectivist methods do nothing to address the context of discovery, which 
clearly incorporates interests and values in prioritization and formulation of research questions.38 
This leads to Harding’s next criticism, which is that objectivity is too broad in seeking to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Harding reports that “the conventional notion of a value-free, impartial, dispassionate objectivity” is 
“sometimes referred to as ‘objectivism’” (1991, 138-139). She uses these terms interchangeably. 
38 Harding states, “it is in the context of discovery that culture-wide assumptions which subsequently are 
among the most difficult to identify make their way into the research process and shape the claims that 
result” (1992, 577-578).	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eliminate “all social values and interests from the research process and the results of research” 
(1991, 144). She finds this problematic not only because she thinks it is impossible to prevent 
values and interests from influencing research, but also due to her position that it is unnecessary 
to do so. In her words “not all social values and interests have the same bad effects upon the 
results of research” (Harding 1993, 71). In sum, methods for meeting the standard of objectivity 
as neutrality cannot be entirely effective, but, fortunately, it is not requisite to rid science of all 
values and interests, on Harding’s view.    
Objectivity as neutrality, which Harding refers to as “weak objectivity,” leads to another 
significant problem: “It offers hope that scientists and science institutions, themselves admittedly 
historically located, can produce claims that will be regarded as objectively valid without their 
having to examine critically their own historical commitments, from which—intentionally or 
not—they actively construct their scientific research” (1991, 147). Harding contends that this 
hope is in vain. Here she reiterates that scientists need not purposely, much less malevolently, 
incorporate shared commitments into their work for it to reflect these commitments. The 
presence of interests and values within science is not an issue in itself; however, denial of this 
presence may serve to mask the actual influences and functions of scientific research.  
Harding notes that “antiliberatory interests and values” can insulate knowers from 
looking for or taking into account evidence against their claims (1991, 149). Conversely, she 
holds that, “Democracy-advancing values have systematically generated less partial and distorted 
beliefs than others” (1993, 71). The former are informed by ideologies that serve to sustain 
privilege and oppression while the latter oppose these ideologies. The task, then, is to sort out 
antiliberatory interests and values from democracy-advancing ones. On Harding’s account, the 
traditional notion of objectivity as neutrality is woefully inadequate for this task insofar as it 
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cannot detect values and interests shared within a scientific or broader community, and it is 
incongruous with the possibility that a standpoint could provide epistemic resources.  
 
2.1.3.2 Strong objectivity 	  
Harding argues that objectivity needs to be reconceptualized as what she terms “strong 
objectivity” in order to make it possible to systematically identify the values and interests that 
shape scientific and other epistemic practices. Strong objectivity incorporates the insights of 
feminist standpoint theory, which entails rejection of central tenets of conventional approaches to 
Western science and epistemology. Rather than assuming a subject/object dichotomy, strong 
objectivity recognizes that socially situated individuals play a role in constituting objects of 
knowledge. Harding states, “Strong objectivity requires that the subjects of knowledge be placed 
on the same critical, causal plane as the objects of knowledge. Thus, strong objectivity requires 
what we can think of as ‘strong reflexivity’” (1993, 69). This entails broadening science’s scope 
of inquiry to consider subjects as objects of knowledge. Rather than limiting the focus to 
identification of idiosyncratic beliefs of individuals, strong objectivity locates the beliefs of 
individuals within a broader social context.  
Western science and epistemology have traditionally judged that the social identities of 
knowers are irrelevant, as long as individuals are able to prevent their particular characteristics 
from affecting their work (Jaggar 1983, 357). Within strong objectivity, by contrast, involvement 
of participants with heterogeneous social identities is conducive to making science more critical 
and reflexive than it would be if the default were to prevail. On this matter, Harding states:  
[K]nowledge-seeking requires democratic, participatory politics. Otherwise, only the 
gender, race, sexuality, and class elites who now predominate in institutions of 
knowledge-seeking will have the chance to decide how to start asking their research 
questions, and we are entitled to be suspicious about the historical location from which 
those questions will in fact be asked (1991, 124).  
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Harding is skeptical regarding the likelihood of scientists who are privileged across all axes 
identifying ways in which androcentricism, sexism, and racism impact their research. In addition, 
the questions that members of a homogenous, privileged epistemic community raise may only be 
of concern to a small fraction of the population or may be formulated in such a way as to 
contribute to ignorance regarding those outside of this group. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
perspective informing traditional Western science and epistemology, Harding contends that 
social identities of knowers have always mattered for epistemic practices. 
 The difference between mainstream Western science and epistemology and feminist 
approaches, according to Harding, is that feminist standpoint theorists are more aware of the 
ways that the social positions of members of an epistemic community may facilitate or hinder 
knowledge production. She states:  
[T]he fact that feminist knowledge claims are socially situated does not in practice 
distinguish them from any other knowledge claims that have ever been made inside or 
outside the history of Western thought and the disciplines today; all bear the fingerprints 
of the communities that produce them (Harding 1993, 57).  
 
The reflexivity of feminist knowers is the reason that strong objectivity values pluralism.  
 
The notion of a feminist standpoint, which informs Harding’s concept of strong 
objectivity, should not be understood as implying either that women’s perspectives provide 
unmediated access to reality that should be accepted uncritically or that men ought to be 
excluded. On the first point, Harding asserts, “To start thought from marginal lives is not to take 
as incorrigible—as the irrefutable ground for knowledge—what marginal people say or 
interpretations of their experiences” (1992, 583). Although she advocates beginning research 
with the concerns of marginalized people, she does not think this is sufficient for attaining strong 
objectivity. On the second point, Harding says that men have not only the ability but also an 
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imperative to develop “distinctive forms of specifically feminist knowledge from their particular 
social situation” (1993, 67).39 She points out that John Stuart Mill, Marx, and Engels contributed 
to understanding of the social situations of marginalized groups of which they were not 
themselves members (1992, 583). 
In response to the concern that members of dominant groups may take her 
recommendation as providing one more means for silencing members of marginalized groups, 
Harding clarifies:  
Far from licensing European-Americans to appropriate African-American thought or men 
to appropriate women’s thought, this approach challenges members of dominant groups 
to make themselves “fit” to engage in collaborative, democratic, community enterprises 
with marginalized peoples. Such a project requires listening attentively to marginalized 
people; it requires educating oneself about their histories, achievements, preferred social 
relations, and hopes for the future; it requires putting one’s body on the line for “their” 
causes until they feel like “our” causes; it requires critical examination of the dominant 
institutional beliefs and practices that systematically disadvantage them; it requires 
critical self-examination to discover how one unwittingly participates in generating 
disadvantage to them…and more [ellipses in original] (1993, 68). 
 
Because it is informed by a concern for just epistemic practices, strong objectivity is much more 
demanding than objectivity as neutrality. Members of dominant groups cannot simply claim to 
speak for others; rather they must transform themselves in order to have a greater understanding 
of the ways that they are implicated in sustaining oppression as well as of marginalized people’s 
lives. In this way, knowers move toward the ideal of strong objectivity and become deserving of 
trust.    
 
2.1.3.3 Objectivity as trustworthiness 
 
In Shifting Ground: Knowledge and Reality, Transgression and Trustworthiness Naomi 
Scheman explores the question “what does objectivity do?” She contends that if we call 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See Harding (1998). See also Larry May (1998) for additional arguments in favor of this position and 
practical suggestions for how men might go about this task. 
	   	   	  
76 
something “objective” we are suggesting that it should be regarded as credible by the wider 
community, regardless of differences in perspectives and interests from those who produced the 
claim under consideration (2011, 209-21). She maintains, “If objectivity is an instrumental good, 
then it has actually to function so as to produce the good it promises; what we label ‘objective’ 
has actually to be worthy of our trust and the trust of a diverse range of others” (2011, 210). 
Scheman notes that her concern with trust as a central epistemological issue is aligned with 
social epistemology (214). Knowledge production and its accompanying attempt to attain 
objectivity is not a solipsistic activity.  
In line with Harding’s call for democratization of epistemic practices, Scheman states: 
liberatory politics such as feminism are intrinsically related to objectivity in their 
commitment to struggling for social institutions that are worthy of trust on the part of all 
those whose lives are affected by them: A “bias” in favor of such struggles is a bias in 
favor of the conditions that would make objectivity a real possibility, rather than a merely 
theoretical gesture (2011, 211). 
 
Although Scheman does not define objectivity, her characterization of how it might be achieved 
is very much in line with the methods required by Harding’s strong objectivity. Rather than 
detracting from the possibility of objectivity, epistemic practices that are informed by liberatory 
politics enhance their trustworthiness.  
Scheman says that trustworthiness is characterized by “competence and integrity” (2011, 
219). Her concern with trustworthiness is not restricted to individuals; rather, she focuses on “the 
systematically trust-eroding effects of various forms of social, political, and economic injustice” 
(219). Given that scientific and other epistemic practices are conducted within a socio-historical 
context, it is essential to guard against incorporating values and interests that reinforce these 
types of injustice. This is what makes the results of research trustworthy. Scheman suggests that 
it is important that those without expert status have the possibility of being recognized as 
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competent knowers who may be able to offer critiques and supplement the accounts of 
“authoritative knowledge producers” (210). 
Scheman thinks that the disagreement between what she calls “feminist objectivity 
theorists” and their critics hinges on whether they endorse an internalist or externalist account of 
objectivity (2011, 219). These accounts are in line with Harding’s distinction between objectivity 
as neutrality versus strong objectivity, respectively. In other words, an internalist account 
assumes it is possible to prevent social values and interests from impacting epistemic practices, 
while an externalist account rejects this stance and instead advocates careful identification and 
evaluation of the impact of social values and interests. Scheman states that, “the question is 
whether the norms that are meant to yield objectivity are narrowly epistemic or also broadly 
moral and political” (220). Critics of feminist objectivity theorists accuse them of “endangering” 
objectivity, while feminist objectivity theorists contend that objectivity needs to be strengthened 
through consideration of context, not abandoned (207). 
According to Scheman, who endorses an externalist account, objectivity is something that 
we achieve in degrees. She asserts: “Objectivity on an externalist account is not an all or nothing 
matter, settled by rules laid down in advance; it is, rather, a rolling horizon we move toward as 
we increasingly democratize our epistemic practices” (2011, 230). Here again, Scheman’s 
characterization of the type of objectivity we ought to work toward is very much in line with 
Harding’s description of strong objectivity. Both recognize objectivity as an ongoing process 
requiring conscientious participation and pluralism; it is not something that can be attained once 
and for all.  
 Appeals to objectivity as neutrality within biomedical ethics often serve to legitimate 
ableist ideologies. According to Scheman’s consideration of the function objectivity should have, 
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this use of objectivity is illegitimate because such claims are not “worthy of our trust and the 
trust of a diverse range of others” (2011, 214). She states, “Charges of irrationality are oddly 
directed at those who point out—correctly, from their perspective—that they do not have good 
reason to believe what experts say” (2011, 230). Some disability advocates have expressed 
distrust of bioethicists. As a result, bioethicists have sometimes dismissed them as irrational or 
biased, though this distrust has often been warranted.  
Objectivity as neutrality works against the interests of disabled people and maintains 
ignorance under the guise of knowledge. Epistemologies of ignorance are useful for considering 
how this occurs. In section 2, I will explain the framework of epistemologies of ignorance, 
focusing on Mills’ notion of white ignorance. I will also recount Pohlhaus’ notions of wrongful 
requests to understand and strategic refusals to understand. In section 3, I will demonstrate the 
usefulness of epistemologies of ignorance as well as wrongful requests and strategic refusals to 
understand for examining epistemic practices within biomedical ethics. In particular, I will 
clarify the ways that appeals to objectivity as neutrality make it more difficult to identify and 
challenge the ableist assumptions underlying discussions of QOL. 
2.2 Epistemologies of Ignorance and Wrongful Requests to Understand 	  
Linda Martín Alcoff explains the novelty of epistemologies of ignorance in the following: “Even 
in mainstream epistemology, the topic of ignorance as a species of bad epistemic practice is not 
new, but what is new is the idea of explaining ignorance not as a feature of neglectful epistemic 
practice but as a substantive epistemic practice in itself” (2007, 39). In contrast to prior 
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approaches within mainstream epistemology, epistemologies of ignorance consider the ways 
ignorance is produced and the values and interests it serves.40  
 
2.2.1 Against “race-neutral” social epistemology 	  
In his 2007 essay “White Ignorance,” Mills forcefully demonstrates ways that systematic 
production of ignorance has been used to create and maintain inequality on the basis of race.41 
Colonization, racism, and white domination produce epistemic injustices including denial of 
epistemic authority and hermeneutic resources to racialized others. The first results in people of 
color not being taken seriously as knowers and the second means that they have limited 
conceptual tools for understanding their own experiences outside of dominant narratives. Thus, 
the experiences of people of color are marginalized as sources of knowledge.  
As Mills notes, epistemology has traditionally been concerned with the individual knower 
and has assumed that particularities of the knower do not (or at least, should not) matter for 
knowledge. However, Quine’s call to naturalize epistemology was one factor that made it 
possible to theorize actual knowledge formation of embodied, socially and historically located 
subjects. According to Mills, regardless of his own intentions and commitments regarding the 
possibility of apolitical knowledge, Quine’s work “opened Pandora’s box” (2007, 14). In spite of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 A note on terminology is warranted. Theorists interested in the systematic production of ignorance use 
the terms “epistemology of ignorance” and “agnotology” as a label for their work. For an excellent 
discussion of the coining of the term “agnotology” see Robert Proctor’s 2008 “Agnotology: A Missing 
Term to Describe the Cultural Production of Ignorance (and Its Study).” Groundbreaking anthologies in 
these areas include Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance (2007) edited by Nancy Tuana and Shannon 
Sullivan and Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (2008) edited by Robert Proctor and 
Londa Schiebinger. The terms “epistemology of ignorance” and “agnotology” are roughly 
interchangeable; indeed, a couple of essays are included in both of these texts. I will use the term 
“epistemology of ignorance” in order to be consistent with the authors I am drawing on here. 
41 This is an idea Mills begins to cultivate in The Racial Contract (1997) where he states:  
 One could say then, as a general rule, that white misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, 
 and self-deception on matters related to race are among the most pervasive mental phenomena of 
 the past few hundred years, a cognitive and moral economy psychically required for conquest, 
 colonization, and enslavement (19). 
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the increasing philosophical acceptance of work on social epistemology, Mills expresses the 
concern that mainstream epistemology has not been transformed to the extent he believes is 
desirable. In particular, he highlights the lack of consideration of Marxist, feminist, and 
especially racial critiques within mainstream epistemology (2007, 15). 
Mills begins his essay by asking the reader to imagine an ignorance “presenting itself 
unblushingly as knowledge [italics in original]” (2007, 13). As this quotation makes clear, the 
ignorance with which he is concerned is not a simple lack of knowledge. Mills conceptualizes 
ignorance as “both false belief and absence of true belief” (2007, 16). He focuses on ignorance 
that is produced systematically, often accepted as the default, and typically overcome with 
difficulty.42 Mills contends that this type of [social] ignorance is implied by standpoint theory. 
The basic idea is that if members of oppressed groups have a privileged standpoint in regard to 
knowledge about how things are, in virtue of social location, then members of privileged groups 
are at an epistemic disadvantage. The former are more likely than the latter to be able to identify 
ignorance as ignorance rather than mistaking it for knowledge. 
Mills maintains that social epistemology has not addressed oppression. He reports that 
authors such as Alvin Goldman have not considered racism and sexism to be fundamental 
considerations because they view them as exceptions. Conversely, Mills claims that, “Sexism 
and racism, patriarchy and white supremacy, have not been the exception but the norm” (2007, 
17). White racial domination has given rise to and sustains a type of social ignorance Mills terms 
white ignorance. He makes ten points to clarify this concept. Though all of these aspects are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Here I have in mind Lu-in Wang’s notion of discrimination by default. Though her project is not 
specifically focused on epistemology, I think her claim that the systematic nature of unjust discrimination 
makes it possible for us to participate in problematic practices without intending to do so is how white 
ignorance functions. See Discrimination by Default: How Racism becomes Routine (2008). 
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important, due to space limitations within the current project, I will discuss a few of these 
assertions. Mills states: 
racialized causality can give rise to what I am calling white ignorance, straightforwardly 
for a racist cognizer, but also indirectly for a nonracist cognizer who may form mistaken 
beliefs (e.g., that after the abolition of slavery in the United States, blacks generally had 
opportunities equal to whites) because of the social suppression of the pertinent 
knowledge, though without prejudice himself (2007, 21).    
 
Here Mills notes that the cognitive phenomenon of white ignorance is not limited to those who 
have racist intentions or would identify themselves as racists; rather it can affect anyone in virtue 
of being located within a racist society. Thus, he takes the issue of racism to be central for social 
epistemology. 
 In spite of the name white ignorance, Mills is not claiming either that all white people fall 
prey to this phenomenon or that people of color (his focus is on black people, specifically) are 
immune to it. He contends “speaking generally about white ignorance does not commit one to 
the claim that it is uniform across the white population” (2007, 22). Mills suggests that we think 
of white ignorance as a “cognitive tendency” that whites and blacks alike must overcome in 
order to have knowledge. While any member of an oppressive society may be ignorant in ways 
that are caused by racism, those in marginalized positions are more likely as a result of their 
lived experiences to recognize that dominant narratives are distorted. 
 Finally, Mills suggests that just as traditional epistemology has been normative in the 
sense of seeking to understand and ultimately avoid “cognitive processes that typically produce 
false belief,” so too, the point of understanding white ignorance through social epistemology is in 
order to elucidate how it is sustained and how it might be avoided (2007, 23). In his words: 
For a social epistemology, where the focus is on supra-individual processes, and the 
individual’s interaction with them, the aim is to understand how certain social structures 
tend to promote these crucially flawed processes, how to extricate oneself from them 
(insofar as that is possible), and to do one’s part in undermining them in the broader 
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cognitive sphere. So the idea is that there are typical ways of going wrong that need to be 
adverted to in light of the social structure and specific group characteristics, and one has a 
better chance of getting things right through a self-conscious recognition of their 
existence, and corresponding self-distancing from them (2007, 23). 
 
For Mills, we should stop behaving as if our epistemological practices are neutral in regard to 
race. Indeed, doing so has prevented mainstream and social epistemology from recognizing 
white ignorance. Failure to acknowledge the relevance of social position in epistemic practices 
also allows other types of social ignorance to go unnoticed. In addition, there is little impetus to 
know, and one may even have social incentives to maintain ignorance because, as Mills puts the 
point, it is “functional.” Yet, when we examine the concrete effects that systematic forms of 
ignorance such as white ignorance have on oppressed people, it is clear that people in privileged 
positions have not only an epistemic but also an ethical imperative to resist the allure of ignorant 
complacency in favor of pursuing knowledge. 
 
2.2.2 Wrongful requests and strategic refusals to understand  	  
In “Wrongful Requests and Strategic Refusals to Understand” Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. argues that 
there are cases in which it is wrong to expect people in marginalized social positions to take on 
the dominant perspective. After explaining her position, I will demonstrate in section 3 that she 
provides concepts that are useful for clarifying ways that the status of disabled people as 
knowers is diminished through claims of neutrality within biomedical ethics and as well as in 
clinical encounters between disabled people and medical professionals. 
 Pohlhaus notes that in most instances it is “ethically and epistemically virtuous” to 
understand others (2011, 224). She states, “[b]y ‘understanding others’ I mean attending to the 
sense of another’s reasoning so that one is able to follow and to feel the possible force of that 
reasoning” (224). This also requires taking on their starting assumptions. In the majority of cases, 
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we should attempt to understand others and rightly expect them to do the same. However, 
Pohlhaus argues that there are situations in which it is wrong to ask a person in a marginalized 
social position to understand from the dominant perspective. Doing so may compromise that 
individual’s agency, both as a knower and more generally. To be clear, Pohlhaus is not finding 
fault with members of marginalized groups who do understand from dominant perspectives; she 
points out that it may be necessary to do in order to ensure one’s safety. Her focus is on those 
who request “that type of understanding from others” (237).  
 Pohlhaus uses an example from legal scholar Patricia Williams’ 1992 The Alchemy of 
Race and Rights to illustrate how requests to understand may cause harm. Williams shares her 
experience of being denied entry to a Benetton clothing store in New York City in the 1980s due 
to a judgment based on her racialized appearance as black when buzzer systems were in effect to 
allow employees to decide whether or not individuals should be allowed to enter stores. She 
notes that there were “repeated public urgings that blacks understand the buzzer system by 
putting themselves in the shoes of white storeowners—that, in effect, blacks look into the mirror 
of frightened white faces for the reality of their undesirability” (Williams 1992, 46; quoted in 
Pohlhaus 2011, 224). The assumption was that black people should take on the perspectives of 
white storeowners and then they would affirm that the buzzer system was a rational response to 
the threat of blacks suspected of having criminal intentions. Furthermore, it is claimed that 
(presumably white) employees will be able to distinguish between potential customers and 
criminals based upon appearance alone. Thus, Williams is implored to accept the reasonableness 
of racial profiling, and the act of assuming this as well as the actual racial profiling both 
unjustifiably limit her agency. 
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 Context and social position are very important for considering whether a request to 
understand is problematic or not. In the previous example, the request to understand is wrongful 
because it undermines the agency of Williams and other black people, but there are other cases in 
which requests to understand should be honored. Pohlhaus clarifies “my argument does not 
imply a condemnation of requests for understanding others who have something to say that we 
simply do not want to hear” (2011, 236). In the case of the buzzer system at the Benetton store, 
she contends that the white storeowner has a responsibility to understand why others hold that 
his actions are unjust, even though understanding this may be difficult or painful for him (236). 
This understanding may contribute to a change in his self-perception, but it does not unfairly 
constrict his agency. To ask the white storeowner to understand is not a wrongful request. Indeed, 
it seems that there is a moral obligation for him to understand the harm his actions and the 
underlying reasoning cause, regardless of his intention.   
 When Williams attempts to have an essay published that recounts her experience at the 
Benetton store and resists the dominant perspective blacks are implored to adopt, she is met with 
resistance from a law review journal because she insists on discussing race. The journal had a 
“‘race neutral’ policy that forbade reference to one’s race” (Pohlhaus 2011, 235). Williams wants 
to articulate and disrupt the narrative that gives sense to use of the buzzer system, but she is 
rendered unable to do so, given this requirement. Pohlhaus remarks: 
As William’s essay reveals, in the case she describes, persons are being called to 
understand something that only makes sense from within patterns and practices that hold 
oppressive power relations firmly in place and that actively prevent those asked to 
understand from calling attention to this fact (231). 
 
While black people are expected to understand a perspective sustained by asymmetrical power 
relations, Williams is prevented from presenting her perspective in a way that might instead lead 
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readers to understand that the practice of using the buzzer system contributes to the oppression of 
people of color.  
 Pohlhaus points out that the epistemic harm that may result from practices of institutions 
and individuals in dominant social locations need not be intended to harm (2011, 236). Indeed, 
these practices may be intended to be inclusive. She states, “[s]pecifically, one of the main 
insights conveyed by the [Williams’] essay is that the call for neutrality and for ‘understanding 
all sides’ in our communication with one another is anything but neutral and can make certain 
‘sides’ of the situation invisible without appearing to do so” (Pohlhaus 2011, 232).43 In this case, 
the demand for neutrality regarding race precludes identification and examination of racist 
practices. Claims to be neutral do not solve the problem at hand; worse, they obscure the power 
relations at play and create obstacles to addressing the problem. 
There is nothing neutral about the assumptions made about people on the basis of race.  
While whiteness is generally treated as being neutral or normative, meaning it tends not to hinder 
perception of white people as individuals, blackness is homogenized, which leads to perception 
of black individuals through racist stereotypes.44 In the context of thinking about the racism 
informing buzzer systems, Pohlhaus asserts, “Williams reveals the public debate to be grounded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 James Hamblin provides another type of example in which calling for “understanding all sides” 
functions as a barrier to productive discussion of an issue in the following:  
The serious structural problems that most conceptions of rape culture describe—under-
persecution of rapists, limited education and understanding with regard to what constitutes 
consent, lacking resources for victims, male entitlement, female objectification, social power 
dynamics, misinformation among both men and women about what constitutes rape, traditions of 
looking the other way, etc.—are productive to address. When the media makes an effort to 
“present both sides” and one of the sides involves denying the importance of these factors in 
sexual assault, it undermines productive discourse (2014). 
44 As Alcoff states, “A fear of African Americans or a condescension toward Latinos is seen as simple 
perception of the real, justified by the nature of things in themselves without need of an interpretive 
intermediary of historico-cultural schemas of meaning” (2006, 188). 
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in white privilege in ways that reduce Black persons to types of bodies considered nothing more 
than potential criminals” (2011, 234). She goes on to say: 
Within a world that is oriented in this way, those whose bodies are identified as Black 
cannot simply move through the world as those whose bodies remain unmarked (in their 
whiteness) can, but must anticipate and negotiate within a context that already finds them 
suspect. Moreover, because these assumptions are built into the sense of the debate, it 
curtails the ability of people of color to convey this fact from within the debate (Pohlhaus 
2011, 234). 
 
Williams and other people of color are forced to deal with being interpreted through negative 
stereotypes, and they are prevented from pointing out the injustice of this situation because the 
terms of the dominant narrative do not allow for this. Neither the assumptions of the dominant 
narrative nor the effects are neutral.  
Williams draws attention to the ways in which the terms of the debate about buzzer 
systems attempt to diffuse the concrete effects of this practice on individuals by focusing on 
abstract individuals. She notes that those who support buzzer systems go so far as to deny that 
they would prevent her from entering a store; the practice purportedly has nothing to do with 
Williams (2011, 233). Pohlhaus adds, “[o]f course, every person barred from entry to a store is a 
‘me,’ but this point is actively discounted in the public debate by figuring the one profiled as an 
abstract individual whose defining characteristic is to be either a purchaser or a criminal” (233). 
Even the suggestion that William is an exception to the norm insofar as she is not who those who 
support the buzzer system have in mind is quite problematic. The move toward abstract 
individuals ignores the fact that Williams was denied entry to a store on the basis of being 
categorized as a member of an oppressed group based on her appearance.  
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Pohlhaus suggests that “strategic refusals to understand” may be a useful response to 
mitigate, if not prevent, these harms (2011, 224).45 She cites Susan Brison’s experience of telling 
people that a man attempted to murder her. When pressed for more information about what 
happened, she added that he sexually assaulted her prior to strangling her. Upon learning this 
detail, Brison says that, “most inquirers were satisfied with that as an explanation” (2001, 3 as 
quoted in Pohlhaus 2011, 224). She expresses confusion, suggesting that it seems to her that the 
combination of attempted murder and sexual assault should require more of an explanation, 
rather than making sense. Pohlhaus notes that Brison’s confusion may be “feigned or unfeigned” 
(238). For this reason, I am not sure it is accurate to call Brison’s response a “strategic” refusal to 
understand, as she may simply not have understood. Regardless, her confusion stems from a 
divergence with how others are making sense of what was done to her and thus, it has the 
potential to invite others to question their own understanding.    
Strategic refusals to understand and even moments of not understanding call into question 
the sense of a way of reasoning, by refusing to accept it as the neutral default. According to 
Pohlhaus: 
a strategic refusal to understand can help us to illuminate how those institutions and 
practices work by bringing them out of the background and to the fore. Moreover, such 
refusals affirm that oppression is not necessary, but actively maintained by our 
interactions with each other, even at the most basic level of how we approach the world 
(238).   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 In “Vulnerability, Ignorance, and Oppression,” Erinn Gilson makes a similar point. Where Pohlhaus 
refers to “understanding others,” Gilson uses the term “epistemic vulnerability.” Becoming epistemically 
vulnerable requires recognition that one does not know as well as recognition of one’s epistemic 
dependence on others. Gilson suggests that avoiding epistemic vulnerability—being closed off to being 
affected and altered—may be an act of resistance among members of oppressed groups. On this point, she 
states, “we must distinguish between invulnerability as a constitutive attitude that is practiced as willful 
ignorance—as it is for those aspiring to the position of ‘master’ subject—and a knowingly undertaken 
refusal of vulnerability through which one seeks to protect the self” (2011, 321). 
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These responses refuse to accept oppressive practices as unremarkable and present their effects 
on concrete individuals’ lives. They invite others not only to recognize that what is treated as 
neutral is not but also to consider alternatives. 
When people in dominant positions are closed off to being affected and altered by 
members of oppressed groups through refusing to understand their claims, this is ethically and 
epistemologically problematic. However, when members of oppressed groups refuse to 
understand dominant perspectives, there are cases in which this is a defense against epistemic 
harm. Thus, both understanding and refusing to understand can serve oppressive or liberatory 
aims, depending on the purpose and social situation of the person adopting them. 
In the past two sections, I have shown that Harding, Scheman, Mills, and Pohlhaus all 
argue that assertions of neutrality serve as a screen for the interests and values of dominant 
groups—whether this is intentional or not. This hinders accountability and can lead to distrust 
among members of oppressed groups who are cognizant of the ways that purportedly neutral 
assumptions undermine their interests and epistemic standing. In contrast, strong objectivity, 
which requires transparency about the values and interests that inform our epistemic and other 
practices, has the potential to recognize members of oppressed groups as having cognitive 
authority and to increase the trustworthiness of experts.  
In the following section, I will begin by examining the role that objectivity as neutrality 
plays in biomedical ethics. I will apply insights from epistemologies of ignorance as well as 
Pohlhaus’ notions of wrongful requests and strategic refusals to understand in order to clarify the 
problematic epistemic effects of appeals to objectivity as neutrality. While there are many sorts 
of harm that may result from dismissal of disabled people’s perspectives, I will attend 
specifically to epistemic harms occurring when disabled people are denied epistemic authority 
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and expected to make sense of others’ claims through the lens of dominant narratives regarding 
disability. 
2.3 Objectivity as Neutrality, Nondisabled Ignorance, and Wrongful Requests and 
Strategic Refusals to Understand in Biomedical Ethics 
 
Much of the literature within biomedical ethics is premised on the ideal of objectivity as 
neutrality. This purported objectivity is derived explicitly or implicitly from two sources: 
biology/biomedicine and ethical theory—especially those influenced by ideal theory in the vein 
of John Rawls. I will highlight the latter here. In this section, I will begin by examining how 
objectivity as neutrality functions within biomedical ethics, including ways that objectivity as 
neutrality and ignorance are mutually sustaining. I argue that this ideal disadvantages disabled 
people by normalizing ableism as apolitical, which allows the concerns of disabled people and 
advocates to be dismissed as unreasonable and/or political. I will focus on the problem of 
bioethicists dismissing the claims of disabled people regarding their own reports on their QOL in 
favor of the projections of nondisabled people and suggest that this is best described through the 
framework of epistemologies of ignorance. What might be termed nondisabled ignorance 
contributes to the continuing divide between a number of bioethicists and disability advocates.46 
I use this phrase with the understanding that everyone in an ableist society—not just nondisabled 
people and not even uniformly among members of this group—is susceptible to it as a cognitive 
tendency. The problems with objectivity as neutrality that Harding identifies in scientific 
practices are present within biomedical ethics as well. I contend that strong objectivity is 
necessary in order to first make explicit which values and interests shape the epistemic and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 While there are ways that race and disability are disanalogous and the categories intersect within 
experience, I hope to show that there are parallels in the epistemic effects of racism and ableism. 
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ethical practices within biomedical ethics and then to shift to incorporation of values and 
interests arising from a critical disability standpoint. 
 
3.3.1 Objectivity as neutrality in biomedical ethics 
 
Mimicking appeals to objectivity as neutrality within the sciences, political theorists and ethicists 
have sought to prevent localized interests and values from impacting their theories. As Jaggar 
states:  
John Rawls has tried to guarantee objectivity in a somewhat similar way [to science] by 
stipulating that the imaginary individuals who formulate his principles of justice should 
be ignorant of their own particular interests and their place in society to be regulated by 
those principles. By concealing their particular interests behind a “veil of ignorance,” 
Rawls believes himself to have guaranteed the impartiality of his imaginary political 
theorists and to have established an “Archimedean point,” outside the society, from 
which the justice of that society’s basic institutions can be evaluated objectively (Jaggar 
1983, 357). 
 
Rawls’ approach remains widely influential within normative ethics, and this is especially 
apparent within mainstream biomedical ethics.47 For instance, Singer claims that reflective 
equilibrium is central not only to contract theory but also to ethics tout court. He states, “Ethics 
requires us to go beyond ‘I’ and ‘you’ to the universal law, the universalisable judgment, the 
standpoint of the impartial spectator or ideal observer, or whatever we choose to call it” (1993, 
12). By moving from the viewpoints, concerns, and interests of concrete individuals to those of 
an abstract “impartial spectator,” Singer thinks it is possible to achieve objectivity as neutrality 
within ethics.48 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, feminist philosophers have called into question the 
ideal of objectivity as neutrality and the method of reflective equilibrium because theorists have 
tended to unreflectively generalize their own perspectives, including their interests, values, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 It is beyond the scope of my project to delve into the relationship between Rawlsian theories of justice 
and the rights of disabled people. See Silvers and Francis 2005. 
48 Here he is specifically concerned with practical ethics, of which biomedical ethics is one area. 
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prejudices. Furthermore, there is much evidence that epistemic credibility is not strictly 
determined by reliability or competence. Nancy Tuana eloquently captures this critique in the 
following:  
What feminist epistemologists and social studies theorists have carefully demonstrated is 
that our theories of knowledge and knowledge practices are far from democratic, 
maintaining criteria of credibility that favor members of privileged groups. Cognitive 
authority is determined by many factors, including the character of a speaker, her or his 
intellectual capacity, his or her reasonableness, and so on—criteria that feminists have 
demonstrated to be imbued with the prejudices of sexism, androcentricism, racism, 
classism, ageism, and ableism (Tuana 2006, 13). 
 
Social identities impact how credible knowers are perceived to be.49 The claim that epistemic 
practices are neutral makes it difficult to draw attention to this as a pervasive phenomenon rather 
than an episodic failure. 
Kuczweski highlights the lack of democracy in knowledge production within biomedical 
ethics. He claims that concerns related to disability have been peripheral within the literature of 
biomedical ethics and, in part, this is due to bioethicists’ “overidentification with the medical 
profession” (2001, 37). On his account, this has resulted in a disproportionate amount of 
attention being focused on acute care and issues that are likely to receive funding and media 
attention. As a corrective, he maintains that, “the field of bioethics must itself develop a 
conscience and dedicate itself to advocacy for those who have no money or power to offer this 
new profession” (37). He concentrates specifically on disabled people as a group without money 
or power to offer bioethics, and he contends that bioethicists should engage with and learn about 
their lives. Kuczewski does not think that disabled people will be the sole beneficiaries of this 
shift; he conceives of engagement between bioethicists and disabled people as being mutually 
beneficial. For example, he suggests that such engagement will lead bioethicists to more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 See Addelson 1983; Alcoff 2000; Fricker 2007; Medina, 2013. 
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carefully examine the values related to disability and visions of the good life that influence their 
claims (42). 
In his “Response to Mark Kuczewski” Singer asserts:  
Bioethics, as a field or discipline, should not dedicate itself to advocacy for anyone. Its 
only commitment, as a field, is to pursue knowledge and understanding with integrity and 
respect for the views of other scholars in the field…Individual bioethicists who come 
across something that they regard as wrong may choose to dedicate themselves to 
advocacy for the cause of those who they see as wronged, but if they become mere 
partisans, dismissing without adequate consideration the views of others who are not 
advocates for the same group, they risk becoming propagandists rather than scholars. The 
difference lies in the readiness to consider and perhaps even be moved by good 
arguments that count against a position one has previously held (2001, 55).  
 
 
When the prospect of including critical disability standpoints is considered, bioethicists such as 
Singer are quick to point out the dangers of introducing politics into bioethics and engaging in 
propaganda.50 However, they fail to notice that bioethics already serves particular agendas and is 
thoroughly political. They also lack the reflexivity to identify their own failure to “consider and 
perhaps even be moved by good arguments” and evidence (Singer 2001, 55). By claiming to be 
neutral while dismissing the claims of disabled people regarding their experiences, Singer and 
other bioethicists risk becoming propagandists rather than scholars. The guise of objectivity as 
neutrality prevents reflexivity about the impact of social values and interests on knowledge 
production within biomedical ethics and allows for continued nondisabled ignorance. 
Although the factors Kuczewski identifies may have a role in shaping bioethicists’ 
epistemic practices (especially what areas are worth knowing about), he does not develop ways 
that bioethicists’ social positions and nondisabled ignorance are relevant. Kuczewski does note 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 In response to the Washington Protection and Advocacy System’s recommendation that disability 
advocates be included in ethics committees at Seattle Children’s Hospital, physician Douglas Diekema 
states, “ethics committees are not for people with political agendas” (Kafer 2013, 60). Kafer suggests that 
Diekema “positions people living with disability—family members, disability advocates, and disabled 
people…as political actors in ways that doctors and bioethicists are not” (Ibid.). 
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that the failure of bioethicists to engage with disabled people is akin to a research community 
composed of white males that only does research on white males (2001, 42). However, his 
account neither explores the reasons that bioethicists have had minimal engagement with 
disabled people (other than those noted above) nor the failure of this engagement to substantially 
impact most bioethicists’ claims about disability. While Kuczewski’s recognition of some of the 
ways that social values and interests impact research within biomedical ethics is an important 
contribution, these additional factors also need to be examined.  
 
3.3.2 Nondisabled ignorance and quality of life 	  
Because bioethicists such as Dan Brock, Norman Daniels, Jeff McMahan, and Peter Singer are 
so certain that they know the relationship between disability and quality of life (QOL), not only 
do they think of empirical research as unnecessary, they dismiss the credibility of such research 
in various ways when they are forced to contend with it. Amundson critiques bioethicists who 
take this approach, maintaining that their judgments about disability are shaped by social stigma 
and ignorance rather than objectivity (2005, 110-113). He asks, when the topic is the QOL of 
disabled people, “Why should the opinions of nondisabled people be epistemologically 
privileged over those of disabled people?” (2005, 112) In the following, I will build on 
Amundson’s work in order to further develop an understanding of the influence of ableism and 
ways that ignorance about disabled people’s experiences is sustained and treated as knowledge 
within biomedical ethics.  
Nondisabled ignorance is manifested in bioethicists’ discussions of the QOL of disabled 
people. As discussed in chapter 1, bioethicists are likely to endorse what Amundson terms the 
standard view, “that disabilities [impairments] have very strong impacts on the quality of life of 
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the individuals who have them” (Amundson 2005, 103).51 The idea is that the biomedical 
conditions of individuals necessarily reduce QOL, apart from social factors. In fact, nondisabled 
people estimate that the QOL of disabled people is significantly lower than disabled people 
themselves report (Amundson 2005, 103; Silvers 2005, 58). On average, disabled people rate 
their QOL as only slightly lower than nondisabled people rate their own QOL (Amundson 2005, 
103; Amundson 2010a). Yet, bioethicists commonly characterize impairments as inevitably 
significantly reducing opportunities and QOL.  
The assumptions that bioethicists tend to make regarding disability conflict with the 
perspectives and interests of disability rights advocates and disabled people. The problem is not 
that bioethicists are unfamiliar with these perspectives; i.e., a simple lack of knowledge that 
could be corrected once they are provided with testimonies of disabled people. Some bioethicists 
who hold the standard view explicitly engage with perspectives that ought to lead them to 
question this view. Instead, countervailing evidence is typically mischaracterized or dismissed 
altogether. Evidence contrary to the standard view is abundant in narratives of disabled people 
and in psychological studies on the effect of impairments such as spinal cord injuries on QOL 
(Albrecht and Devlieger 1999; Amundson 2010; Gerhart et al. 1994). Yet, many bioethicists 
ignore or dismiss this evidence in two ways: 1) by calling into question the credibility of disabled 
people and 2) by continuing to equate an impairment with a person with an impairment’s life as a 
whole. Bioethicists sometimes attempt to justify the former approach by claiming that disabled 
people lack the ability to be objective about the quality of their own lives, while nondisabled 
people are able to perceive the quality of disabled people’s lives objectively (Amundson 2005). 
As Silvers puts it, “It is, further, epistemologically aberrant to grant precedence about anomalous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 As discussed in chapter one, the standard view is in line with what Elizabeth Barnes terms the “bad-
difference view of impairment” (2014). 
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health states made by species-typical people over those made by individuals actually 
experiencing those health states. Ordinarily we defer to first-person reports of subjective states” 
(2005, 60). The phenomenon with which I am concerned is the practice of privileging the 
dominant narrative of the standard view and refusing to grant epistemic authority to disabled 
people. The pervasiveness of bad epistemological practices among bioethicists, whom we expect 
to know better, demands explanation.  
Amundson provides examples of bioethicists’ claims to objectivity in regard to disabled 
people’s QOL. Dan Brock claims that serious disabilities usually lower a person’s QOL and cites 
the Americans with Disabilities Act’s (ADA) definition of disability as limiting at least one 
major life activity. Amundson notes that, “It might be argued that it is a matter of empirical fact 
that limitations in walking and seeing [examples of major life activities] are associated with 
lower QOL. This would require empirical data about the correlation. Brock offers no data of this 
sort” (2005, 108). Sometimes Brock attempts to narrow the scope of this claim by saying that he 
is referring to health-related aspects of QOL (Amundson 2005, 108). Regarding the concept of 
health-related quality of life (HRQOL) as opposed to QOL, Amundson suggests that it can be 
used for “gerrymandering of social problems into medical ones” (2005, 117). He argues that the 
Health Status Index (HSI)—an instrument designed to measure HRQOL and endorsed by 
Brock—demonstrates how this occurs. Even the supposedly objective (in the sense of being 
neutral) measures for “physical activity” and “mobility” privilege typical modes of function 
rather than attending to level of function and evaluating the accessibility of the built environment 
rather than bodily capacities (2013, 484; 2005, 109-110). In addition, there is a conceptual jump 
from biomedical limitations to judgments about QOL.    
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Brock demonstrates awareness that disabled people, on average, report an only slightly 
lower QOL than nondisabled people and a much higher QOL than nondisabled people estimate 
they have (2005, 108). Rather than questioning the correctness of the standard view, Brock 
makes a distinction between subjective and objective QOL. Amundson states, “Subjective QOL 
is how happy or satisfied one is with one’s life. Objective QOL is how well one’s life is really 
going” (2005, 109). Brock’s move to discredit the reports of disabled people fits into a larger 
pattern of epistemic practices in which the perspectives of nondisabled people are taken to be 
objective, while disabled people’s perspectives are thought be deluded or merely subjective.  
Singer goes so far as to claim that the lives of disabled people are less worth living than 
the lives of nondisabled people, stating:  
It may still be objected that to replace either a fetus or a newborn infant is wrong because 
it suggests to disabled people living today that their lives are less worth living than the 
lives of people who are not disabled. Yet it is surely flying in the face of reality to deny 
that, on average, this is so. That is the only way to make sense of actions that we all take 
for granted [my emphasis] (1993, 188-189). 
 
Singer fails to recognize that endorsement of the ableist assumption that the lives of disabled 
people are less worth living is sufficient for social practices such as selective abortion to make 
sense. He contends that when disabled people report a QOL that is comparable to that reported 
by nondisabled people, we should not take this “at face value” (2009, 207). He agrees with the 
suggestion that people with severe impairments “ ‘adjust their expectations’ or ‘lower their 
expectations in life’” (Cowen 2009, 208). For Singer, if disabled people report similar levels of 
QOL to nondisabled people, the definition of QOL must differ and not measure up to that of 
nondisabled people.  
Similarly, Norman Daniels states that, “ ‘people with long-standing disabilities will often 
rank their welfare higher than would other people who are merely imagining life with such 
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disabilities’ and he speculates that ‘perhaps people with disabilities accommodate by adjusting 
their goals and expectations’” (Silvers 2005, 58). Daniels contends that disabled people “lack the 
objectively fair share of opportunity that normal or species-typical functioning would provide” 
(2005, 58). Apparently, nondisabled people are the only ones capable of noticing that disabled 
people lack the opportunities that species-typical function provides. Daniels grants the 
imaginations of nondisabled people about what it is like to live as a disabled people more 
credibility than the reports of disabled people.5253 Silvers compares this approach to a Chinese 
woman reporting being satisfied with Chinese haute cuisine. In this analogy, she may be telling 
the truth, but the researcher who views French cuisine as the gold standard thinks she is wrong 
not to be upset that French cuisine is unavailable to her. Silvers asserts, “It would, of course, be 
odd to say that the subject has adapted because she reports being eminently satisfied by Chinese 
haute cuisine, and odd as well to say that she is mistaken in being so satisfied” (Silvers 2005, 59). 
So, too, Silvers thinks it is problematic to take normal health and species-typical functioning to 
be the objective standard that everyone should desire. 
Even while claiming to have the interests of disabled people in mind, many bioethicists 
undermine the claims of disabled people and dismiss disability rights perspectives. Buchanan et 
al. state, “disabilities as such diminish opportunities and welfare” (2001, 278). In From Chance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Singer advocates “empathetic imagination” as a method for figuring out the interests of disabled people 
rather than engaging with actual disabled people (1993, 53). I discuss and critique this approach in “A 
Philosophical Investigation: Interrogating Practices and Beliefs about Disability” (2012). In short, I claim 
that when a nondisabled person tries to imagine the interests and what it is like to live as a disabled person 
without consulting disabled people, “her main ‘resources’ for doing so will likely be stereotypes of 
disability and her own fears. Iris Marion Young warns, ‘The perspective of the other can too easily be 
represented as the self’s other represented to itself-fantasies, desires, and fears’ (1997, 347)” (2012, 38). 53	  Larry May notes, “as one gets further and further removed from the actual experience, and as the pool 
of experiences upon which one draws is less and less analogous to the actual experience, the powers of 
imagination are more and more strained” (1998, 341). His position is that while it is not impossible to 
gain understanding based upon other people’s experiences, this requires engagement with those who have 
had the relevant experience as well as examination of one’s own biases (338).	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to Choice, Buchanan et al. appeal to the notion of fair share of opportunities in order to provide 
justification for their position that there is a moral duty to provide health care in order to 
maintain, restore, or achieve the normal functioning of individuals when possible. Prima facie, 
this may seem unproblematic. After all, disability advocates argue that disabled people have a 
right to appropriate health care. However, in addition to premising their argument on a necessary 
causal relationship between impairment and reduced opportunities, Buchanan et al. imply that 
disabled people have a responsibility to avail themselves of normalizing medical interventions.  
In regard to research on QOL, Silvers notes that there is a difference between discussing 
the “burden of blindness” versus the “burden of life with blindness” (2005, 54). This way of 
discussing blindness acknowledges that blindness can pose a burden without necessitating that 
life with blindness itself is a burden.54 She states, “It is consistent to think that being blind is a 
burden, an obstacle that one must constantly work to overcome, but that being alive while blind 
is not a burden, regardless of the challenges associated with being blind” (2005, 54). The 
distinction between the effects of an impairment and the overall life of a person with an 
impairment is elided in much of the literature within biomedical ethics.55 Adrienne Asch’s term 
“synecdoche” provides a useful descriptor for this trend. She states that her use of this term 
refers not to “the literary device, in which the part stands in for the whole, but the characteristic 
response to a stigmatized trait, in which the part obscures or effaces the whole” (Asch and 
Wasserman 2005, 173). Bioethicists often engage in synecdoche in the context of discussing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 It should be noted that not everyone thinks that blindness is a burden at all. At the very least, it must be 
acknowledged that there is likely to be a tremendous difference in the experience of a person who lives 
with blindness from birth in contrast to a person who acquires this impairment.  
55 For example,	  Singer claims that it is not bias that leads nondisabled people to assume that the lives of 
disabled people are worse than their own. “He hypothesizes that most people who use wheelchairs would 
prefer to ‘have full use of their legs’ and cites this as evidence that the claim that the lives of people with 
disabilities are inferior to the lives of those without disabilities is not a mere prejudice” (Wieseler 2012, 
39). 	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genetic and prenatal testing, selective abortion, healthcare rationing, physician-assisted suicide, 
and euthanasia. Acknowledging that there is a distinction between an impairment and a person 
with an impairment’s life as a whole is necessary for understanding how it is that a person can 
have atypical function or morphology and a high QOL.  
Bioethicists who endorse the standard view often misunderstand or dismiss the claims of 
disabled people because of this tendency to engage in synecdoche. For example, McMahan 
seems to conflate Harriet McBryde Johnson’s claim that the assumption that disabled people 
have a lower QOL than nondisabled people with the claim that impairments are neutral traits in 
the following: 
many people, especially among the disabled themselves, contend that it is no worse to be 
disabled than not to be. They claim that disabilities are “neutral” traits. So, for example, 
Harriet McBryde Johnson (2003), a disabled lawyer, emphatically repudiates the   
“‘unexamined assumption that disabled people are inherently ‘worse off,’ that we ‘suffer,’ 
that we have lesser ‘prospects of a happy life’” (McMahan 2013, 551).  
 
Although disability rights advocates do sometimes make the claim that impairments are neutral, 
it seems clear that this is not the claim Johnson is making here. Rather, she is suggesting that 
ableist assumptions often remain unexamined and that it is false that “disabled people are 
inherently ‘worse off’” than nondisabled people (2013, 551). Elsewhere, McMahan seems to 
comprehend that it is possible to maintain both that impairments may cause difficulties in 
themselves and that people with impairments need not have a lower QOL than nondisabled 
people.56 Yet, he defends the preference for a nondisabled child to a disabled child on the 
assumption that “her quality of life would be higher than that of a disabled child” (2005, 148). 
McMahan seems to assume that parental acceptance of their disabled child means that rather than 
wishing they had a different non-disabled child, they “focus their hopes on the possibility of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 McMahan even concedes, “Some disabled people, indeed, have lives that go conspicuously better than 
the lives of most people without disabilities” (2005, 143-144).	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cure” (2013, 552). Many bioethicists have a difficult time taking disabled people’s claims 
seriously. Even if they succeed momentarily, they are prone to nondisabled ignorance as a 
cognitive tendency. 
 To situate epistemically problematic practices within biomedical ethics, it is useful to 
consider the broader social context that reinforces nondisabled ignorance and presents it as 
knowledge. For example, many disability theorists have noted that the media tend to represent 
disabled people in dichotomous terms: as tragic or heroic figures (Clare 2009; Kafer 2013; 
Longmore 2013; Johnson 2005; Riley 2005; Wendell 2008). The notion of disabled people as 
tragic, helpless figures—victims—is prevalent within films, television shows, books, magazine 
and newspaper articles, and fundraising campaigns. In discussing the technique of renowned 
screenwriting teacher Syd Field of using visible impairments to convey character flaws, 
Amundson asserts that he might as well have said, “Physical impairment is popularly associated 
with character flaws. Like other social prejudices, this stigma can be usefully exploited in 
constructing screen plays” (2010a, 173). Amundson notes that when this ideology is adopted, a 
disabled person is typically presented as “bitter and angry at the world because of their 
impairment,” as deserving to have acquired the impairment because of a character flaw, or as 
having a character flaw that is “symbolically reflected in their impairment” (173). An alternative 
to these types of presentation is the poster child, typically a young child with a visible 
impairment, representing “innocent suffering” (Longmore 2013, 35). The Jerry Lewis telethon 
run by the Muscular Dystrophy Association, which ran from 1956 through 2015, is probably the 
most famous fundraising campaign on behalf of disabled people; Charles Riley claims it was 
“the primary source of media exposure for most nondisabled Americans” (2005, 13). In addition 
to evoking pity and motivating viewers to make donations, this type of portrayal of disabled 
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people also urges nondisabled people to “be grateful for what they have” and to recognize that no 
matter how badly things are going for them, at least they aren’t disabled!57 Paul Longmore adds 
“charity images portrayed them [Americans with disabilities] as dependent objects of 
beneficence whose most important needs were medical” (38). The medical model’s influence is 
readily apparent as well as the view that addressing the needs of (deserving) disabled people is a 
matter of charity rather than justice (Kittay 2002, 271). Underlying these portrayals is the 
longstanding practice of attempting to sort out the disabled people who deserve charity from 
those who do not. 
 Another popular way to portray disabled people is through the overcoming narrative. To 
clarify this notion, I turn to Simi Linton’s explanation:  
 One interpretation of the phrase [overcoming a disability] might be that the individual’s 
 disability no longer limits her or him, that sheer strength of willpower has brought the 
 person to the point where the disability is no longer a hindrance. Another implication of 
 the phrase may be that the person has risen above society’s expectation for someone with 
 those characteristics. Because it is physically impossible to overcome a disability, it 
 seems that what is overcome is the social stigma of having a disability (Linton 1998, 17). 
 
This type of narrative might be thought of as the opposite of the tragic narrative. Rather than 
evoking pity, the overcoming narrative provides members of the audience—whether they are 
viewers or readers—the opportunity to rejoice in a disabled person’s triumph over difficult 
circumstances through adoption of a positive attitude. It tends to decontextualize people with 
impairments and to focus only on impairment-related aspects of their lives. 
 Wendell suggests that the primary purpose of overcoming narratives—which are also 
referred to as “supercrip narratives”—is to bolster the myth that it is possible to control the body 
(Clare 2009, 2). She states, “some disabled people also become symbols of heroic control against 
all odds; these are the ‘disabled heroes,’ who are comforting to the able-bodied because they re-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 This idea is succinctly captured in the phrase “I cried because I had no shoes until I met a man who had 
no feet” (variously attributed).  
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affirm the possibility of overcoming the body” (Wendell 2008, 835). Of course disabled people 
are also problematically inundated with this narrative and expected to fulfill the role of disabled 
heroes. Regarding this, Wendell remarks:  
 While disabled heroes can be inspiring and heartening to the disabled, they may give the 
 able-bodied the false impression that anyone can “overcome” a disability. Disabled 
 heroes usually have extraordinary social, economic and physical resources that are not 
 available to most people with those disabilities (2008, 835).  
 
Social factors are generally not taken into consideration in such cases—individual effort is the 
primary focus. Amputee athletes and models, in particular, have received a great deal of attention 
in the media for being “disabled heroes.”58 Wendell points out that they are exceptions insofar as 
they tend to be “in better health than most disabled people” (2008, 835). 
 One of the problems with both tragic and overcoming narratives of impairment is that 
they fail to provide realistic accounts of the everyday experiences of disabled people. Eli Clare 
asserts, “[t]he dominant story about disability should be about ableism, not the inspirational 
supercrip crap, the believe-it-or-not disability story” (2009, 3). This framing of the issue 
conceives of disability as an individual, biomedical condition rather than considering the role of 
social factors in supporting atypical function or creating obstacles for people with impairments 
including lack of accessible housing and transportation as well as a much higher poverty rate 
than the nondisabled population. In addition, disabled people are likely to face problematic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 For instance, Charles Riley remarks:  
 Every time Aimee Mullins sees her name in the papers she braces herself for some 
 predictable version of the same headline followed by the same old story. Paralympian, actress, 
 and fashion model, Mullins is a bilateral, below-the-knee amputee, who sprints a hundred meters 
 in less than sixteen seconds on a set of prostheses called Cheetahs because they were fashioned 
 after the leg form of the world’s fastest animal. First, there are the headlines: “Overcoming All 
 Hurdles” (she is not a hurdler, although she is a long jumper) or “Running Her Own Race,” 
 “Nothing Stops Her,” or the dreaded and overused “Profile in Courage.” Then come the clichés 
 and stock scenes, from the prosthetist’s office to the winner podium. (…) Mullins’s “inspiring” 
 saga is recycled almost verbatim by well-meaning journalists for audiences who never seem to 
 get enough of its feel-good message even if they never actually find out who Mullins is (2005; 
 ix). 	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attitudes that are pervasive within society about what it is like to be disabled, how disabled 
people ought to look and behave, and the related notion that nondisabled laypeople are 
authorities on impairment (Samuels 2014, 130-140). When bioethicists reduce disability to the 
medical condition of an individual, they fail to recognize the impact of power relations between 
disabled and nondisabled people and the ways that disabled people have been and continue to be 
oppressed through lack of accessibility, forced sterilization, institutionalization, stigmatization, 
and being judged globally incapable, regardless of actual abilities. When the attitude and efforts 
of the individual are portrayed as the sole causes of success or failure, then the individual alone 
is praised or blamed for how well she is able to negotiate the world. Disability is medicalized and 
de-politicized. Silvers states, “Because people with chronic pathologies have been a powerless 
minority, the political pressure to acknowledge their standpoints heretofore has not been great” 
(2005, 63). Nondisabled ignorance is the status quo in the context of societies that marginalize 
disabled people, and it also tends to be the starting point within biomedical ethics.  
To this point, the current section has discussed the tendency of bioethicists to sustain 
ignorance about the lives of disabled people, which I have termed nondisabled ignorance. 
Bioethicists commonly dismiss the reports of disabled people about their own QOL, if these 
accounts are referenced at all. I have suggested that ignorance of disabled people’s lives is not a 
simple lack of knowledge, but rather a phenomenon that must be understood within a broader 
social context in which disabled people are marginalized. Brock, Singer, Daniels, Buchanan et al., 
and McMahan start from the assumption that the lives of disabled people must be of a lower 
quality than the lives of nondisabled people, and this prevents them from taking the reports of 
disabled people seriously. 
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3.3.3 Wrongful requests and strategic refusals to understand in biomedical ethics 
 
In this portion of the chapter, I turn to bioethicists’ expectation that disabled people understand 
the standard view of disability, which fits Pohlhaus’ description of wrongful requests due to the 
effects on disabled people’s epistemic agency. When the standard view of disability is accepted 
as the neutral given, this undermines the claims of disabled people while making it difficult to 
draw attention to this harm. In addition, when bioethicists refuse to understand the claims of 
disabled people about their own experiences, they treat nondisabled ignorance as knowledge, 
rather than questioning their presuppositions.  
There are important parallels between Williams’ experiences of attempting to point out 
the racism and harm inherent in the practice of having buzzer systems at stores in New York City 
and the attempts of disabled people to point out the ableism and harm inherent in epistemic 
practices of many bioethicists. Like those who focus on abstract individuals in discussion of the 
buzzer systems, bioethicists such as Singer attempt to distance their support of social practices 
from the effects on concrete disabled people and potential parents. Just as Williams refused to 
allow others to claim that the buzzer systems wouldn’t affect her, Johnson draws out the 
implications of Singer’s arguments in favor of selective abortion and infanticide on the basis of 
potential or actual impairment. She states: 
He insists he doesn't want to kill me. He simply thinks it would have been better, all 
things considered, to have given my parents the option of killing the baby I once was, and 
to let other parents kill similar babies as they come along and thereby avoid the suffering 
that comes with lives like mine and satisfy the reasonable preferences of parents for a 
different kind of child. It has nothing to do with me. I should not feel threatened (Johnson 
2009, 291). 
 
While it is true that Singer makes a distinction between persons, who are capable of having an 
interest in continuing to live, and fetuses and babies, to say that his position has nothing to do 
with Johnson seems disingenuous. As she points out, he does think that lives like hers entail so 
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much suffering that it is better to prevent such lives from continuing through selective abortion 
or infanticide. Singer says this in the face of concrete disabled people, including Johnson, telling 
him that their lives are worthwhile and cannot be reduced to suffering. He claims to be simply 
reporting the truth about disabled people’s lives, when he is actually promulgating ignorance and 
making it more likely that practices such as selective abortion will be perceived as the only 
reasonable choice. Singer does this in the name of objectivity as neutrality, but his position is 
clearly value-laden. His appeals to abstraction do not erase the effects that his nondisabled 
ignorance has on concrete individuals.   
 Singer expects disabled people to understand that nondisabled people think that their 
lives are less worth living than their own. He thinks that if disabled people were being objective 
they would realize the truth of this claim. Once again, I turn to Johnson’s response to interacting 
with Singer in person and reading his work. She muses:  
How can he put so much value on [nonhuman] animal life and so little value on human 
life? 
 
That last question is the only one I avoid. I used to say I don’t know; it doesn’t make 
sense. But now I’ve read some of Singer’s writing, and I admit it does make sense—
within the conceptual world of Peter Singer. But I don’t want to go there. Or at least not 
for long (Johnson 2009, 293). 
 
Singer invites us into his “conceptual world” in which the empathetic imaginations of 
nondisabled people carry more weight than the testimonies of disabled people and in which it is 
speciesist to value people with severe impairments more than nonhuman animals. Within the 
terms of Singer’s conceptual world, one is unable to make sense of how his position could be 
harmful; after all, his goal is to prevent harm by preventing people with severe impairments from 
existing. However, his reasoning actually relies on a number of assumptions that create harm—
epistemic and otherwise. Through her resistance to Singer’s narrative, Johnson clarifies the 
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wrongness of his request to understand. By refusing to understand, by refusing to take on his 
ableist assumptions and follow his reasoning, it is possible to conceive of other ways of 
understanding that preserve the epistemic agency of Johnson and other disabled people.  
 If Singer alone engaged in wrongfully requesting that disabled people understand, it 
would be possible to chalk this up to idiosyncrasy and the harmful effects would be minimal. 
However, as the preceding examples of nondisabled ignorance show, this practice pervades 
discussions of QOL within biomedical ethics. Worse, since bioethicists’ assumptions about 
disability reflect the prevailing assumptions within the broader society, disabled people are 
confronted with requests—often quite unwelcome demands—to understand that nondisabled 
people view their lives as burdensome. Again, I turn to Johnson’s poignant words to illustrate. 
She states: 
Strangers on the street are moved to comment: 
 
I admire you for being out; most people would give up. 
God bless you! I’ll pray for you. 
You don’t let the pain hold you back, do you? 
If I had to live like you, I think I’d kill myself (Johnson 2009, 294). 
 
This is where the empathetic imaginations of nondisabled people lead, when unaided by 
knowledge of actual disabled people’s experiences and perspectives. We might think that 
scholars would be more careful in examining their assumptions, but, in many cases, they are only 
better at disguising their reasoning proceeding from these assumptions as wholly rational, value-
free assessment rather than value-laden responses informed by ignorance.59 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Though beyond the scope of the current project, it is important to examine ways that such social values 
and assumptions impact epistemic practices in medicine as well. Appeals to objectivity as neutrality may 
serve to undermine the epistemic agency of disabled people in the context of engaging with healthcare 
professionals, as Wendell observes in the following: “[b]ecause almost everyone accepts the cognitive 
authority of medicine, the person whose bodily experience is radically different from medical descriptions 
of her/his condition is invalidated as a knower” (Wendell 2008, 838). Likewise, Anita Ho contends “when 
a value-laden process that often has negative impact on people with impairments is disguised as 
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 Barnes provides an eloquent testimony of her experiences in philosophy classes of being 
asked to understand that the lives of disabled people—including her own—are less valuable than 
the lives of nondisabled people. She states: 
I have sat in philosophy seminars where it was asserted that I should be left to die on a 
desert island if the choice was between saving me and saving an arbitrary non-disabled 
person. I have been told it would be wrong for me to have my biological children because 
of my disability. I have been told that, while it isn’t bad for me to exist, it would’ve been 
better if my mother could’ve had a non-disabled child instead. I’ve even been told that it 
would’ve been better, had she known, for my mother to have an abortion and try again in 
hopes of conceiving a non-disabled child. I have been told that it is obvious that my life is 
less valuable when compared to the lives of arbitrary non-disabled people. And these 
things weren’t said as the conclusions of careful, extended argument. They were casual 
assertions. They were the kind of thing you skip over without pause because it’s the 
uncontroversial part of your talk [emphasis added]. 
 
Now, of course, no one has said these things to me specifically. They haven’t said “Hey, 
Elizabeth Barnes, this is what we think about you!” But they’ve said them about disabled 
people in general, and I’m a disabled person. Even just thinking about statements like 
these, as I write this, I feel so much – sadness, rage, and more than a little shame. It’s an 
odd thing, a hard thing, to try to take these emotions and turn them into interesting 
philosophy and careful arguments. (…) It’s a strange thing – an almost unnatural thing – 
to construct careful, analytically rigorous arguments for the value of your own life, or for 
the bare intelligibility of the claims made by an entire civil rights movement (Barnes, 
2015). 
 
Because ableism sets the terms of the discussion and involves an asymmetrical power relation 
between disabled and nondisabled people, it is difficult for disabled people to call into question 
the devaluing of their lives. Just being put in the position of trying to convince others that your 
life and the lives of people like you are worthwhile constitutes harm, which is compounded when 
pervasive ableism prevents them from taking you to be credible. Strategic refusals to understand 
have the potential to facilitate a shift in ableist assumptions, but it is important to point out that 
disabled people are under no obligation to engage in this epistemic work. The primary 
responsibility ought to be on nondisabled people to overcome nondisabled ignorance. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
scientifically objective, patients’ ability to negotiate appropriate responses to their concerns can be limited” 
(Ho 2011, 111). 	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In the following section, I consider Silvers’ response to the “growing contentiousness 
between disability and bioethics communities” (2003, 473). She argues it is necessary to 
eliminate interests and values from conceptualizations of disability. Although Silvers does not 
use the term “objectivity” in either of her essays discussing a neutral conception of disability, the 
method she recommends for developing three types of conceptual neutrality is akin to procedures 
meant to ensure objectivity as neutrality within ethics as well as scientific, historical, and 
sociological research.  
2.4 Conceptual Neutrality and Disability 	  
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Silvers advocates developing a “neutral conception 
of disability” in order to facilitate dialogue between bioethicists and disability advocates. She 
states that one of her goals is to dispel the “conceptual underbrush that makes us think our idea 
of disability must be value-laden” (2003, 473). Silvers claims that her method of analyzing 
prevalent positions on the side of bioethicists and disability advocates in turn and then making 
recommendations for each side leads to value-free ways of thinking about disability. She 
recommends three types of conceptual neutrality: neutrality in valuing disability, neutrality in 
modeling disability, and neutrality in adopting a cooperative social framework (2003, 475). 
Although my conclusions apply to all of these types of conceptual neutrality, I will limit my 
discussion to neutrality in valuing disability in order to illustrate that Silvers’ approach is value-
laden. Rather than constituting a shortcoming, I argue that, with the appropriate level of 
reflexivity, this is a strength. 
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2.4.1 Neutrality in valuing disability 	  
Central to this aspect of conceptual neutrality is beginning with “a neutral stance in regard to the 
intrinsic value of being disabled” (Silvers 2003, 475). Silvers maintains that bioethicists must set 
aside their assumption that impairments are inherently bad and reducing its incidence is 
“unquestionably good” (2003, 475). She notes that medical interventions intended to normalize 
function or appearance can cause harm and reduced level of functionality. Elsewhere, Silvers 
makes a distinction between mode and level of function, which is helpful for clarifying her point 
here. A mode of function is “the way it [a task] is accomplished,” while level of function is a 
measure of how well it is performed (1998, 101). Thus, a person could perform a function at a 
typical level using an atypical mode or she could perform a function at a low level using a typical 
mode. Silvers is concerned with the second scenario, which has at times been judged by medical 
professionals to be a better outcome than the first scenario.60 
Furthermore, she suggests that medicine’s preference for normalcy leads physicians to 
underestimate the risks of medical interventions meant to normalize (2003, 476). It is sometimes 
assumed that patients should want to eliminate or reduce the effects—whether related to 
appearance or function—of impairment at all costs. This way of thinking can make the risks of 
medical intervention seem minimal compared to the “risk” of living with the limitations of 
impairment. As a result, Silvers recommends empirical research to discover if a given medical 
intervention actually improves the lives of disabled people rather than assuming it is superior to 
living with an atypical appearance or mode of functioning.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Silvers gives the following example:  
adults with upper limb phocomelia (congenitally anomalous arms), such as are occasioned by pre-
natal exposure to thalidomide, often believe themselves to have been injured as children by 
having had their natural digits amputated, been fitted with ineffective artificial arms, and 
forbidden to use the much more functional method of manipulating objects with their feet (2003, 
475).   
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Silvers’ recommendations are not value-free or disinterested. The value of 
normalcy/typical mode of function is put into question in order to consider the priority that 
disabled people may place on level of function. While she asks bioethicists (and presumably 
medical professionals) to examine their assumptions about impairment, the motivation is to serve 
the best interests of disabled people. Empirical research is meant to test some of these ableist 
assumptions and would constitute a challenge to cultural imperialism insofar as it includes 
disabled people’s accounts. Thus, it seems that Silvers’ desideratum is for the inclusion of 
disabled people’s interests in valuing disability rather than a disinterested and value-free account. 
 Silvers calls on disability advocates to: 1) be open to acknowledging that being disabled 
is contingently harmful, 2) cease their categorical insistence “that life with a disability is always 
worth living,” and 3) stop assuming that all medical interventions intended to eliminate 
disabilities “express bias against disabled people” (2003, 476). This third assumption is 
sometimes referred to as the “expressivist argument” within the biomedical ethics literature and 
is often discussed in the context of genetic and other prenatal testing and selective abortion (Kass 
[1973]2013; Buchanan et al. 2000; McMahan 2005; Singer 2006; Asch and Parens 2012).   
Regarding the first point, it is important to understand why disability advocates have 
sometimes avoided acknowledging that impairment is contingently harmful (2003, 476).61 When 
disability advocates make this claim, they are attempting to counter the influence of the bad-
difference view of impairment, the tendency to assume that if a person has an impairment they 
are wholly incapable in ways that have nothing to do with the impairment, and the pervasive 
notion that people with impairments ought to be pitied (Wendell 1996; Kafer 2013; Barnes 2014). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 I use the term “impairment” here rather than Silvers’ phrase “being disabled” because disability 
advocates have consistently recognized that being disabled is harmful. Because Silvers doesn’t 
consistently use the terms “impairment” and “disability” as the social model prescribes, I think my 
substitution is justified. Based on the context, I think use of “impairment” captures what she means here.  
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They have had success in showing that there is not a necessary link between bodies with 
impairments and an inferior status within society, but it is feared that discussion of the 
limitations and pain inherent in some impairments will negatively affect the tenuous progress 
that has been made in social understandings and policies.  
 The factors that have lead disability advocates to avoid acknowledging that impairment is 
contingently harmful are even more salient when we consider the “insistence that life with a 
disability is always worth living” (Silvers 2003, 476). This is a strong, but I think, 
understandable response to the view that it is better not to be born or to be dead than disabled. As 
Kuczewski puts the point, “Behind the right to refuse life-sustaining treatments, the disabled hear 
a voice saying ‘I would rather be dead than live like you’” (2001, 42). Some disability advocates 
distrust the broader community, especially bioethicists, to the extent that they do not want to 
concede anything that may serve to bolster agendas contrary to their interests. Historically, this 
distrust has been warranted. It seems that the onus is on bioethicists to demonstrate 
trustworthiness by taking the accounts of disabled people and their advocates seriously.  
Third, Silvers considers debates around the so-called expressivist argument to be 
especially unproductive, stating that neither side has been “fully coherent” (2003, 476). She cites 
the response of Buchanan et al. that only disabilities are devalued within medicine and among 
bioethicists, not people with disabilities.62 Silvers points out that the two are often inseparable in 
practice, stating “Treating disabilities means treating patients. So where medical practice 
devalues disability, patients with disabilities are made vulnerable by medicine’s fatal attraction 
to normalcy” (476). On the other side, she charges disability advocates with inconsistency when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 McMahan makes a similar claim in the context of discussing the preference for a nondisabled child, 
stating “We have to acknowledge that some people’s [nondisabled people’s] lives go better than others’ 
[disabled people’s]. This is a judgment about the contents of people’s lives, not about the people 
themselves” (2005, 148). 
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they claim that attempts to prevent impairment express bias and also seek medical interventions 
in order to prevent impairment. She judges that it is implausible that medical procedures 
themselves “are the cause of disregard for disability” and suggests that we should consider the 
influence of broader social attitudes on medicine that recommend procedures such as selective 
abortion and sterilization of disabled people (2003, 476).  
All three of Silvers’ recommendations for disability advocates in regard to valuing 
disability call for greater inclusion of diverse experiences of impairment and critique of the 
assumptions made by bioethicists and disability advocates. I would argue that the goals are to 
serve the interests of disabled people and to develop a more honest and comprehensive concept 
of disability [impairment]. Her suggestions are more congruent with strong objectivity than 
neutrality. In spite of her call for conceptual neutrality regarding disability, her recommendations 
clearly involve considerations of values and interests. I would characterize her approach as 
involving interrogation of views that are common among bioethicists as well as the opposing 
views articulated by members of the disability rights community. She considers why each side 
considers its position to support the interests of disabled people and suggests that both sides need 
to set aside rigid generalizations (e,g. “life with an impairment is always inferior to life without 
one” or “life with an impairment is always worth living”). Though she doesn’t frame her 
discussion in this way, Silvers demonstrates that she is, ultimately, concerned with developing 
ways of conceptualizing disability that incorporate the concerns and interests of disabled people. 
I would suggest that one of the reasons disability advocates’ perspectives are not well-
integrated within the literature of biomedical ethics is that bioethicists who think their 
conceptions of disability are value-free and apolitical consider it epistemically egregious to 
incorporate views that they consider value-laden and political. Silvers underestimates the 
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obstacles that prevent many bioethicists from questioning their assumptions about disability and 
taking the perspectives of disabled people and their advocates seriously—including the view that 
their conceptions are already neutral and that they know better than disabled people. 
2.5 Conclusion 	  
Disabled people as a group and their allies have a privileged epistemic vantage point on their 
own lives. Ultimately their accounts ought to serve to fundamentally alter the terrain of 
discussions within biomedical ethics. The burden of proof regarding claims about the QOL of 
disabled people ought to be on those whose positions are in line with social prejudices rather 
than on those who have knowledge of disability based on experience. 
 Amundson remarks, “When our ‘objective’ judgments happen to match our own social 
prejudices, that coincidence alone should make us wary of our own objectivity” (2005, 113). Of 
course, the lack of recognition that one has social prejudices—especially when these prejudices 
are commonly endorsed—is a substantial obstacle to identification of this coincidence. This is 
exactly why strong objectivity is needed within biomedical ethics. It is only through the 
identification and uprooting of dominant prejudices currently maintained under the guise of 
objectivity that epistemic practices within biomedical ethics can become more trustworthy and 
work toward alleviating rather than perpetuating oppression of disabled people.   
 Just epistemic practices involve humility on the part of knowers, and I have suggested 
that they also require taking the knowledge and experiences of others seriously. In chapter three, 
I will examine debates within feminist theory on the epistemic value of experience because they 
are informative for thinking about the status of experience and the body within disability theory. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPAIRMENT/DISABILITY DISTINCTION, THE BODY, 
AND THE STATUS OF EXPERIENCE 
Experience is then not a series of data with transparent meaning, and does not provide 
“incontestable evidence” for a single interpretation. However, it is and must be the basis 
of explanation. There is no conceivable alternative basis or ultimate justification other 
than experience of my body in the world (Alcoff 2000, 262). 
 	  	  
In chapter two, I argued that epistemic practices within biomedical ethics regarding disability 
ought to start from the experiences and concerns of disabled people. This assumes that first-
person experience has some degree of epistemic legitimacy, a claim some feminist theorists 
reject and one for which I have not provided an argument. It is necessary to flesh out an 
argument in favor of the theoretical importance of experience since, if experience in general is 
epistemically worthless—or worse, only demonstrates how thoroughly one has been duped by 
ideology—then there is no reason to value the experiences of disabled people. In regard to 
feminist theory, Linda Martín Alcoff asserts that, “If women are to have epistemic credibility and 
authority, we need to reconfigure the role of bodily experience in the development of knowledge” 
(2000, 251). Like feminist theory, disability theory has had a complicated relationship with the 
body. I argue that it is just as essential for disability theorists to conceptualize bodily experience 
in such a way that it allows for disabled people to have epistemic credibility and authority. 
 In section one, I will examine reasons that disability theorists have been hesitant to 
include the body, and I show that when they do, this often entails conceptualizing the body in 
terms of impairment. I will focus on two types of approaches disability theorists have taken to 
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the impairment/disability distinction and theorizing the body. The first type of approach, 
exemplified in the work of Liz Crow, conceives of impairment as a value-free description of 
bodies. In section two, I discuss the second type of approach, which builds on Judith Butler’s 
work on sex/gender, contends that discourse creates the illusion that impairment is pre-discursive 
and exists apart from its performance. According to Shelley Tremain, disability produces 
impairment, and impairment ought to be understood as performative in nature. Although Crow 
and Tremain advocate for inclusion of embodied experiences within disability theory, I will 
show that neither approach is sufficient to allow for this aim. In section three, I will recount 
debates within feminist theory surrounding experience since they are instructive for disability 
theory. I will discuss Joan Scott’s momentous 1991 essay “Experience as Evidence” because it 
has been central within these debates. I will then turn to Alcoff’s response to Scott, Larry May’s 
remarks on learning from the experiences of others, and disability theorist Tobin Sieber’s reply 
to Scott’s position. Alcoff, May, and Siebers clearly consider embodiment and social narratives 
about bodily particularities to influence the types of experiences one has, which, in turn, serves 
as an epistemic resource. In light of my agreement with this position, I contend that embodied 
experiences ought to be central within disability theory.   
3.1 The Social Model of Disability and the Body 	  
3.1.1 The Impairment/Disability Distinction and the Body within Disability Theory 	  
As discussed in chapter 1, many accounts of disability, such as those premised on the medical or 
social model of disability, tend to emphasize one side of the biological/social dichotomy as 
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constituting disability63 and, thus, as the set of factors we ought to focus on/eliminate. In either 
case, there does not seem to be room for embodied subjectivity, agency, or disability pride as 
disabled people are identified by disadvantages of some sort and reduced to products of nature or 
culture. As Linton puts it, “the relationship between disability and its ‘owner’ has not been 
adequately studied (1998, 74).”64 Both the social and the medical model exclude the subjective 
experiences and knowledge of disabled people. I will begin by exploring some of the reasons that 
disability theory has had an ambivalent relationship with the body as well as the role of the 
impairment/disability distinction. 
Disability theorists tend to focus on the contingent disadvantages that people with 
impairments face as a result of oppression. As discussed in chapter one, the social model of 
disability, which has been hugely influential within disability theory and activism, makes a 
distinction between the biomedical condition of an individual and the disadvantages created by 
social obstacles. Within this model, the former is termed “impairment,” and the latter is called 
“disability.” The medical and social models both assume that the bodily and social are separate 
factors, rather than comprising a unified phenomenon.65 Within the social model, the 
impairment/disability distinction is a manifestation of this assumption. I will focus on the social 
model because I am interested in the ways it has influenced resistance to theorizing the body. 
Whether and how bodies ought to be theorized is a controversial issue within disability theory. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 As I mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, Amundson notes that it may be the case that the 
divide between the medical and social models presents a false dichotomy by each attending to only one 
component of “disability” (2005, 102).  
64 Although I take Linton’s point to be that disabled people’s experiences have been neglected, it is worth 
pointing out that this way of referring to the disabled subject might be read as implying that the subject is 
something other than his or her body, which is “owned” by the subject. Similarly, Simo Vehmas and 
Pekka Mäkelä speak of “owners” of properties classified as impairments (2009, 53).  
65 While it is possible to focus on ostensively “bodily” or “social” aspects of disability, they are always 
inextricably intertwined. Rather than thinking of “impairment” and “disability” as separate phenomena, I 
would suggest that we ought to recognize this distinction as one that we make for particular purposes. 
	   	   	  
117 
This makes sense if we consider the assumptions and conditions that the social model was 
developed to challenge, namely, the claim that functional limitations and structural abnormalities 
inevitably directly cause any disadvantages disabled people may have, including but not limited 
to lack of employment, inability to use public transportation, and poverty. In short, the 
impairment/disability distinction has tended to frame discussion of bodies within disability 
studies as, at best, irrelevant, or at worst, taboo. 
 Colin Barnes attempts to dismiss the need to theorize bodies by stating that it is 
consistent with the social model to acknowledge “disabled people have illnesses at various points 
in their lives and that appropriate medical interventions are necessary” (2012, 22). Barnes 
dichotomizes approaches to disability theory that focus on “constructions of the body” and those 
that concern “social relations of capitalism” (22). He holds that disability theorists ought to take 
the latter approach, without considering that there may be connections between them. While I 
agree that there is much work in and beyond theory to be done in order to address social 
obstacles, including economic concerns, I disagree that the best way to do this is by focusing on 
“social relations of capitalism” to the exclusion of embodiment (22). In addition, Barnes seems 
to equate embodiment with impairment.  
 Barnes is not alone in thinking that theorizing the body means theorizing impairment. 
Michael Oliver asserts, “[T]he social model does not deny that impairment is closely related to 
the physical body. Impairment is, in fact, nothing less than a description of the physical body” 
(1996, 35). He goes on to state, “it [leaving impairment out] has been a pragmatic attempt to 
identify and address issues that can be changed through collective action rather than medical or 
professional treatment” (1996, 38). The social model has had success in disputing that there is a 
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necessary link between bodies with impairments and disability. Thus, it is feared that theorizing 
the body, i.e., impairment, will lead to a return to previous understandings and policies.  
 Tom Shakespeare articulates this concern in the following: 
 The achievement of the disability movement has been to break the link between our 
 bodies and our social situation, and to focus on the real cause of disability, i.e.. 
 discrimination and prejudice. To mention biology, to admit pain, to confront our 
 impairments has been to risk the oppressors seizing on evidence that disability is “really” 
 about physical limitation after all (Shakespeare 1992, 40).         
 
This quotation captures the fear that seems to inform much of the resistance to theorizing bodies 
within disability theory. The social model has been effective politically and theoretically in 
shifting attention away from the notion that disability is solely an individual problem; it contests 
the assumptions that disability is an asocial phenomenon and that impairments is inevitably a 
problem. However, the strategy of focusing on social issues also leaves the arguments of 
disability theorists vulnerable to the suggestion that, if it is the case that disability is unrelated to 
the biomedical conditions of individuals, then medical professionals and researchers should not 
address impairment.66  
 In his critique of the social model, Shakespeare states, “[w]hile doctors and professionals 
allied to medicine seek to remedy impairment, the real priority is to accept impairment and to 
remove disability [emphasis added]” (2013, 216). This seems to be Oliver’s position. He 
contends that medical treatment for people with impairments often does more harm than good. 
While he does recognize that doctors should have a limited role in the lives of people with 
impairments “stabilising their initial condition, treating any illnesses which may arise,” he 
charges that beyond this they “impose” treatment on disabled people in an attempt to return them 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 For instance, Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, and Wikler assert: 
if taken literally the slogan “change society, not individuals” does not merely insist that we try to 
make the social world more accessible to those whose impairments cannot be corrected; it would 
require accommodating those with impairments rather than using medical science to prevent or 
correct impairments (2014, 281). 
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to normality67 or as close of an approximation as possible (1996, 36.) He contends that “many 
disabled people experience much medical intervention as, at best, inappropriate, and, at worst, 
oppressive” (36). Oliver is especially critical of medical fields such as physical, speech, and 
occupational therapy, which he terms “pseudo-professions” (37). While I do think there is much 
to be done within medical practice to improve treatment for disabled people, I worry that 
comments such as these may suggest that medicine is not something disabled people should avail 
themselves of in order to address issues related to impairment. This position may imply that 
disabled people suffer a sort of false consciousness or disloyalty to the cause of addressing 
disability if they desire medical treatment related to their impairments, e.g. to increase 
functionality or reduce pain. 
 Shakespeare suggests that the social model may “be interpreted as rejecting medical 
prevention, rehabilitation or cure of impairment” (2013, 218). Comments such as Oliver’s can 
easily be read in this way. Shakespeare goes on to say: 
 For individuals with static impairments, which do not degenerate or cause medical 
 complications, it may be possible to regard disability as entirely socially created. For 
 those who have degenerative conditions which may cause premature death, or any 
 condition which involves pain and discomfort, it is harder to ignore the negative aspects 
 of impairment” (218).  
 
Here Shakespeare reminds us that there are a wide variety of biomedical conditions that are 
classified as impairments. While some may not require medical treatment, it is clearly 
wrongheaded to assume that all disabled people can bracket their impairments to focus on 
disability.  
 One of the tensions for disability theorists is how to acknowledge that people do 
sometimes suffer as a result of their impairments and do desire medical interventions and cures 
while attempting to wrest the authority to shape narratives about impairment from those with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See Silvers 1998 for further discussion of this important concern. 
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greater cognitive authority.68 Though it entails its own risks, it is necessary for disability theorists 
to include embodied experiences in order to challenge the medical model and bad-difference 
views of impairment in favor of mere-difference or good-difference views. In what follows, I 
will discuss the approaches of a few of the theorists who advocate increased attention to the body 
within disability theory.  
 
3.1.2 Impairment as Value-Free Description 	  
In “Including All of Our Lives: Renewing the Social Model of Disability” Crow argues that we 
should “bring back impairment” (1996, 206-226). While she acknowledges the worry that taking 
account of impairment will reaffirm the prejudice that the lives of people with impairments are 
not worth living, she holds that the benefits outweigh the risks. For Crow, it is essential to 
continue to stress the distinction between disability and impairment in order to avoid collapsing 
them into each other as the medical model of disability does. She thinks it is important, however, 
to develop a more comprehensive concept of impairment.  
 In line with a mere-difference view of impairment, Crow states, “impairment at its most 
basic level, is a purely objective concept which carries no intrinsic meaning” (1996, 211). She 
holds that impairment is an objective description that acquires meaning at the individual level 
through the subjective experience of impairment as well as at the social level “in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 In response to this issue, Alison Kafer posits a model she calls “the political/social model” that draws 
on the insights of the social model, but avoids some of the problems. Of this model she states: 
 the political/social model neither opposes nor valorizes medical intervention; rather than simply 
 take such intervention for granted, it recognizes instead that medical representations, 
 diagnoses, and treatments of bodily variation are imbued with ideological biases about what 
 constitutes normalcy and deviance. In so doing, it recognizes the  possibility of simultaneously 
 desiring to be cured of chronic pain and to be identified and allied with disabled people (2013, 
 6). 
Kafer’s model attends to the context in which medicine is theorized and practiced and avoids uncritical 
acceptance or rejection of medical intervention on the basis of impairment. 	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misrepresentation, social exclusion, and discrimination combine” (213). Crow suggests that 
impairment must be considered in context in order to recognize social and economic causes 
(214). Though she acknowledges that what counts as an impairment is contingent, I worry that 
her account assumes that there is a point at which impairment is asocial or prior to a context of 
meaning. For example, although the medical model is sometimes characterized as “objective” in 
the sense of neutrality, it emerged within a social context and incorporates social values and 
interests. Nonetheless, Crow’s point that impairment need not be devalued is a salient one, with 
which I agree.  
 Crow thinks it is necessary for the social model of disability to include experiences of 
impairment both for better theory and better activism. She suggests that when disability activists 
and theorists focus on disability to the exclusion of impairment, they fail to address the 
experiences and needs of many individuals. Crow claims: 
 As individuals, most of us simply cannot pretend with any conviction that our 
 impairments are irrelevant because they influence so much of our lives. External 
 disabling barriers may create social and economic disadvantage but our subjective 
 experience of our bodies is also an integral part of our everyday reality. What we need is 
 to find a way to integrate impairment into our whole experience and sense of our selves 
 for the sake of our own physical and emotional well-being, and, subsequently, for our 
 individual and collective capacity to work against disability [emphasis added] (1996, 
 210). 
 
For example, she worries that absent discussions of the needs that impairment can bring with it, 
many people with impairments will not be able to participate in the disability rights movement. 
As Wendell points out, there is great variation within the category “disabled people” in terms of 
energy level (2008, 835). If the differences between disabled people, including the effects of 
impairment, are not acknowledged, Crow suggests that we may end up with an “elite” group of 
disabled people speaking for all disabled people. In sum, her position is that including 
impairment is necessary in order to address the varied subjective experiences of disabled people.  
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 I agree with Crow that it is essential to include disabled people’s experiences in order to 
develop better approaches to disability theory and activism. However, the concept of impairment 
is insufficient for this task insofar as it is a medical/scientific description of aspects of bodies, 
which tends to exclude subjective experiences related to impairment. For this reason, I maintain 
that disability theory needs to adopt an account of the body that is able to address the lived 
experiences of disabled people.  
 In this section, I have recounted reasons that many disability theorists who adopt the 
social model resist theorizing the body and shown examples in which the body is equated with 
impairment. I considered Crow’s suggestion that impairment needs to be incorporated into 
disability and activism in order to account for the subjective experiences of disabled people. I 
argued that theorizing the body in terms of the concept “impairment” as a value-free description 
cannot accomplish this aim. In the next section, I will evaluate Tremain’s attempt to include 
disabled people’s embodied experiences through use of a value-laden, performative concept of 
impairment.    
3.2 Performativity and Disability Theory 	  
There is a parallel between the feminist development of the sex/gender distinction as a response 
to the biologically determinist assumption that bodily attributes themselves determine social 
roles, privileges, and disadvantages (often summarized in the catchphrase “biology is destiny”), 
and disability activists’ and theorists’ adoption of the impairment/disability distinction. Some 
have turned to the Judith Butler’s work on the sex/gender distinction in order to theorize 
disability in a way that rejects the notion of impairment as prediscursive reality and attempts to 
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do away with the impairment/disability distinction.69 Tremain considers “sex” and “impairment” 
to be analogous. Thus, for Tremain, it seems obvious that it is possible to use Butler’s notion of 
“performativity” to discuss impairment. 
 
3.2.1 Performativity and the Body 	  
Locating the body within Butler’s work can be challenging insofar as there seems to be slippage 
between bodies and concepts/discursive practices related to bodies. Although there is ambiguity 
on this matter within all of the essays and books I discuss here, there is a progression in which 
the body has a clear role within the performativity of gender in her 1988 essay, but the 
relationship between the body and sex/gender is much more obscure by the time we get to her 
1993 book Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.”70 
 In “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and 
Feminist Theory” (1988) Butler draws on the phenomenological accounts of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir as well as John Searle’s theory of speech acts. Her stated goal in 
this essay is to analyze the ways that specific corporeal acts construct gender and to explore 
“what possibilities exist for the cultural transformation of gender through such acts” (521). 
Rather than existing prediscursively as something that is expressed, Butler claims that, “gender is 
instituted through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane 
way in which bodily gestures, movements, and enactments of various kinds constitute the 
illusion of an abiding gendered self” (519). Gender emerges through significant and minute 
bodily activities alike, which are often assumed to express a fixed essence or gender identity.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See Samuels 2011 for several examples. An examination of the legitimacy of substituting 
impairment/disability for sex/gender is beyond the scope of this chapter. Samuels critiques this approach.  
70 Providing a thorough account of Butler’s treatment of the body within her corpus is beyond the scope 
of the current project. 
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 In this same essay, Butler attributes the following claim to Merleau-Ponty: “the body is 
‘an historical idea’ rather than ‘a natural species’” (520). The French is “L’homme est une idée 
historique et non pas une espèce naturelle,” which Donald Landes translates as “Man is an 
historical idea, not a natural species” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 174). This is an interesting 
misattribution, which hints at the slippage in Butler’s work as to whether “the body” refers to an 
idea or a material-discursive entity rather than portraying Merleau-Ponty’s view, given that he 
explicitly rejects the position that the body is an idea. Speaking of one of the aspects of 
intellectualism he finds problematic, he states: 
 I take flight from my experience and I pass over to the idea. Like the object, the idea 
 claims to be the same for everyone, valid for all times and for all places, and the 
 individuation of the object at an objective point of time and space appears, in the end, as 
 the expression of a universal positing power. I no longer pay attention to my body, to 
 time, or to the world as such as I live them in pre-predicative knowledge, that is, in the 
 inner communication I have with them. I only speak of my body as an idea, of the 
 universe as an idea, and of the idea of space and time (2012, 73-74).  
 
Merleau-Ponty adopts Gabriel Marcel’s conception of the relationship between the self and the 
body in the formulation “I am my body” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, xxxiii). He also claims that 
humans are necessarily rather than contingently embodied. “Man” as an historical idea is not 
interchangeable with “the body” as an historical idea.  
 To return to Butler, her main point here is that Merleau-Ponty opposes phenomenological 
accounts of human embodiment that make a distinction between physiological causalities and the 
ways that meanings are taken up through embodied existence (1988, 520). I am not sure that it is 
the case that he opposes any distinction at all; rather, it seems that Merleau-Ponty recognizes that 
physiological causalities and meanings taken up by the embodied subject are always intertwined. 
Butler contends that any phenomenological theory that wants to describe “the gendered body” 
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must conceptualize an act as both “that which constitutes meaning and that through which 
meaning is performed or enacted” (521).  
 In “Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions” (1989b) Butler further articulates 
her position on the body by responding to Michel Foucault’s characterization of the body in a 
number of texts. She argues that Foucault equivocates on the ontological status of the body. In 
spite of emphasizing the cultural production of bodies and denying that there can be bodies prior 
to or outside of discourse, Butler claims that he also implicitly endorses a pre-discursive 
ontology of the body. She states: 
 Indeed, I shall try to show that, for Foucault, not unlike for Kafka in The Penal Colony, 
 the cultural construction of the body is effected through the figuration of “history” as a 
 writing instrument that produces cultural significations—language—through the 
 disfiguration and distortion of the body, where the body is figured as a ready surface or 
 blank page available for inscription, awaiting the “imprint” (ibid., 148) of history itself 
 (603). 
 
This is a view Butler disavows. In the course of her critique, she asks, “How would ‘the’ body as 
cultural or discursive practice be described?” (607). Although she does not explicitly state this, I 
would suggest that answering this question became one of the tasks of her work following this 
essay.  
 Butler’s notion of performativity was initially meant to challenge the sex/gender 
distinction and to show that human bodies are historical (ideas?). Within the sex/gender 
distinction, sex refers to biological characteristics used to differentiate males and females, 
whereas gender refers to social roles typically imposed on each person, according to sex (Rubin 
1975). Sexual dimorphism—the belief that there are two and only two sexes—is commonly 
adopted, although there are exceptions.71 Butler argues that the formulation of gender in the 
sex/gender distinction is problematic insofar as it serves the “heterosexual imperative,” provides 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 See Fausto-Sterling 2000. 
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the illusion of a stable gendered self, and uncritically accepts sex as a given (1993, 15). Butler 
asserts that, “gender proves to be performative—that is constituting the identity it is purported to 
be” (2006, 34). She claims that gender produces sexed bodies and gives rise to the idea that sex 
exists prior to social practices. Butler elaborates her position as follows, “gender is not to culture 
as sex is to nature; gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which ‘sexed nature’ or ‘a 
natural sex’ is produced and established as ‘prediscursive,’ prior to culture, a politically neutral 
surface on which culture acts” (Butler 1990, 10).  
 Butler opens the introduction of Bodies that Matter by asking: “Is there a way to link the 
question of the materiality of the body to the performativity of gender? And how does ‘sex’ 
figure within such a relationship?” (1993, 1). According to Butler, the claim that sexual 
difference is never reducible to material differences that are not, “in some way both marked and 
formed by discursive practices” is not equivalent to “claiming that discourse causes sexual 
difference” (1). While it is true that bodily traits that are taken to be indicative of sex are never 
the only factors involved in the practice of determining sex, Butler’s claim is stronger than this; 
material differences are themselves “marked” or “formed” by discursive practices. This stance 
seems to rule out the possibility that discourse and material characteristics could be co-
constitutive of sex and makes biological and physiological aspects of sex products of the ongoing 
process of gender performativity. 
 Although Butler discusses bodies throughout Bodies that Matter, she does not flesh out 
an answer to the question of how their material characteristics are relevant for performativity. 
Indeed, this task may be fundamentally incompatible with her approach insofar as she contends 
that discursive practices produce rather than function in relation to bodily particularities. Of 
course, Butler would reject taking what might be referred to as “biological reality” as a given. In 
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her words: “To claim that discourse is formative is not to claim that it originates, causes, or 
exhaustively composes that which it concedes; rather, it is to claim that there is no reference to a 
pure body which is not at the same time a formation of that body” (1999, 10). On this account, 
“descriptions” of bodies are always performative—they discursively produce what is claimed to 
be prediscursive. While it is vital to consider the ways in which discursive practices shape 
knowledge and lived experiences of bodies, her approach goes further than this; anything we 
would want to call a body is a product of discursive practices rather than an entity with anything 
to contribute to the process of being gendered.72  
 Butler’s discussion of race raises additional questions about the roles of bodies in 
performativity. While race is a contingent, scientifically illegitimate way of classifying people, it 
nonetheless remains tied to visible features of people’s bodies and has real social consequences 
(Alcoff 2006). Butler draws on Nella Larsen’s Passing in order to consider ways that sexuality 
and race are “articulated and assumed” (1993, 168). Here I will discuss an excerpt from Butler’s 
examination of the relationship between race and visible aspects of bodies within this novel. She 
states: 
 Blackness is not primarily a visual mark in Larsen’s story, not only because Irene and 
 Clare are both light-skinned, but because what can be seen, what qualifies as a visible 
 marking, is a matter of being able to read a marked body in relation to unmarked bodies, 
 where unmarked bodies constitute the currency of normative whiteness (1993, 170-171). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 In Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body Susan Bordo critiques Butler’s 
treatment of bodies, stating, “When bodies are made into mere products of social discourse, they remain 
bodies in name only” (2004, 35). In The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability 
Wendell maintains that in feminist poststructuralist and postmodernist criticism, “ ‘the body’ is often 
discussed as a cultural construction, and the body or body parts are taken to be symbolic. In this latter 
development, experience of the body is at best left out of the discussion, and at worst precluded by the 
theory” (1996, 168). While purporting to revalue and attend to bodies, postmodern accounts of 
embodiment, including Butler’s, have the potential to continue the trend dominant throughout Western 
philosophy of dismissing the importance of embodiment for knowledge and experience.  
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Here Butler acknowledges that skin tone is relevant for the ability of Irene and Clare to pass as 
white. This is the only place in Bodies that Matter in which the appearance of a body is 
recognized as relevant for how one is read racially. Yet, even in this discussion, Butler fails to 
fully appreciate that having particular visible bodily features is equiprimordial with racial 
discourse as a condition for being able to perform a particular race or gender, in this case, 
whiteness. 
 
3.2.2 Performativity, Impairment, and Disability 	  
As disability theorists have begun to question the possibility of maintaining a clear-cut 
distinction between impairment and disability, many have turned to Butler’s work in an attempt 
to understand how power relations are invested in bodies. Tremain rejects the 
impairment/disability distinction and draws on Butler and Foucault in order to problematize the 
notion that impairment is a value-neutral description of bodies. She states, “Most of the 
materialist analyses in disability studies assume a realist ontology, in whose terms ‘real’ objects 
with transhistorical and transcultural identities exist in Nature apart from any contingent 
signifying practice” (2002, 32). In response to the claim of Bill Hughes and Kevin Paterson that 
Tremain’s approach “entails the ‘theoretical elimination of the material body,’” she states, “the 
materiality of the ‘impaired body’ is precisely that which ought to be contested” (Hughes and 
Paterson 1997, 332; Tremain 2002, 34). There are three issues I will focus on within her work: 
her application of performativity to impairment, how she conceptualizes the connection (or lack 
thereof) between impairment and the body, and her call for inclusion of disabled people’s 
accounts of lived experiences of corporeality.  
 Referencing Butler’s discussion of sex/gender, Tremain asserts: “If the category of sex is 
itself a gendered category – that is, politically invested and naturalized, but not natural – then 
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there really is no ontological distinction between sex and gender” (Tremain 2002, 41). She 
maintains that there is similarly no ontological distinction between impairment and disability. 
Tremain claims, “only people who have, or are presumed to have, an impairment are counted as 
disabled. Thus, the strict division between the categories of impairment and disability which the 
social model is claimed to institute is in fact a chimera” (2002, 42). While I would grant the 
former claim, the latter does not follow. Impairment and disability are not coextensive; it is 
possible to have an impairment without being disabled.    
 Just as Butler claims that it is wrong to think of sex as prediscursive, Tremain maintains 
that “natural impairment” is wrongly conceived to be prediscursive (2002, 34). She states: 
 impairment has been disability all along, Disciplinary practices in which the subject is 
 inducted and divided from others produce the illusion of impairment as their 
 ‘prediscursive’ antecedent in order to multiply, divide, and expand their regulatory 
 effects. The testimonials, acts, and enactments of the disabled subject are performative in 
 so far as the ‘prediscursive’ impairment which they are purported to manifest has no 
 existence prior to, or apart from, those very constitutive performances (42).  
 
According to Tremain, impairment would not exist without disability. In other words, if  
 
disabling social practices had not developed, impairment would not have come into being. 
Presumably, if these practices cease in the future, impairment will no longer exist. It is through 
the performative act of identifying as having an impairment—for example, describing the ways 
in which physical limitations in relation to social practices affect an individual’s daily life—that 
impairment is continually produced and made to seem real.  
 Drawing on Foucault, Tremain asserts that in the late eighteenth century “the modern 
body was created as an effect and object of medical examination, which could be used abused, 
transformed and subjugated” (2002, 35). On her account, the emergence of the modern body, 
joined with “dividing practices”—“modes of manipulation through which a science (or pseudo-
science) is combined with practices of segregation and social exclusion” (35). Disciplinary 
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practices that produce impairment are used in order to govern and classify subjects that Tremain 
claims:  
 are initially drawn from a rather undifferentiated mass of people. Through these practices, 
 subjects become objectivized as (for instance) mad or sane, sick of healthy, criminal or 
 good. Through these practices of division, classification, and ordering, furthermore, 
 subjects become tied to an identity and come to understand themselves scientifically 
 (2001, 619).  
 
The slippage between the body and concepts of the body within Butler’s discussions of 
performativity is also present in Tremain’s work, which makes it difficult to distinguish whether 
she is referring to the concept of impairment or bodies with impairments.  
 On Tremain’s account, the ideology of normality produces subjects and their experiences. 
Thus, the social model is counterproductive insofar as it affirms the identities of people with 
impairments. She suggests:  
 if the identity of the subject of the social model – people with impairments – is actually 
 produced in accordance with requirements of the political configuration which that 
 model was designed to contest, then a political movement which ground its claims to 
 entitlement in that identity will inadvertently extend those relations of power (2002, 42). 
 
Affirming the identity one is assigned and articulating one’s experiences both serve as evidence 
that one has been taken in, so to speak, and these actions are thus thought to be incapable of 
advancing emancipatory political projects. In this case, embodied experiences cannot be 
considered to have any sort of epistemic legitimacy, given their status as effects of discursive 
practices imbued with ideology.73   
 Although the concept of impairment, like all concepts, is socially created, Tremain’s 
account makes it seem wholly arbitrary which bodies are classified as impaired. While Oliver 
contends that “[d]isablement [disability] is nothing to do with the body,” we might draw the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Though Tremain does not discuss Joan Scott’s position on identity and experience, I would suggest that 
their views are similar insofar as both consider social identity to be a means for naturalization of ideology 
(Scott 1992, 27). 
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conclusion that for Tremain, impairment has nothing to do with the body, or, at most, the 
category of impairment impacts bodies unilaterally (1996, 35). She contends, “impairment and 
its materiality are naturalized effects of disciplinary knowledge/power” (2002, 34). I would 
concede that many aspects of impairment are contingent, such as the ways any given society 
conceptualizes impairment, the level of social obstacles to people with impairments, and whether 
or where a line is drawn between “normal” and “abnormal.” Nonetheless, although the ways that 
individuals with impairments relate to the societal category of impairment are fluid to an extent, 
the bodily aspects of impairment matter. They can neither be produced by discourse nor can they 
be deconstructed away; the body contributes to the materialization of impairment.  
 Tremain claims that “those of us involved in disability studies and the disabled people’s 
movement must continue to expand discursive space by articulating our lived experiences, 
including our experiences of corporeality” (2002, 45). I agree with Tremain that this is how 
disability theory—including philosophy of disability—and activism should proceed. However, 
her adoption of Butler’s notion of performativity seems incompatible with the idea that 
articulating lived experiences of corporeality could be valuable, since bodies are produced by 
discourse. Furthermore, it is unclear how, if impairment is performative, it is possible to 
articulate lived experiences of corporeality without reifying impairment as “real.” Within this 
view, subjects and their experiences are products of ideology, which seems to largely rule out the 
possibility that they can be sources of knowledge.    
 If first-person accounts of lived experiences of impairment/disability are performative, 
then they can only reify, not transform, our understandings of the importance of bodily 
particularities for identity and subjectivity. In Alcoff’s words, “[t]he bottom line for the 
postmodern approach to identity is that identities are subjugating and cannot be a cornerstone of 
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progressive politics” (2006, 79). What is needed is a way to take contributions of bodily 
particularities into account that neither makes them a product of discourse nor assumes that they 
necessarily determine one’s quality of life and opportunities.  
 Like “sex” and “materiality,” more generally, on Butler’s account, “impairment” is 
enacted through disciplinary norms and practices and made to appear natural or given. However, 
in wanting to avoid the dualism of the sex/gender distinction, Butler emphasizes social norms too 
much, making bodies into products of discourse. It is unclear if/how bodies contribute to the 
process of performing gender. If bodily particularities are products of discourse, it is not possible 
to account for the ways that they matter for the process of becoming a subject and for experience, 
more generally. This conclusion is problematic and should, thus, be rejected. In sum, while 
Butler and Tremain articulate insights that are important for theorizing embodiment, they do not 
explain how particularities of bodies matter in performativity of gender or disability, rendering 
them unable to account for embodied experience.  
3.3 The Status of Experience in Feminist Theory  	  
As discussed in chapter two, feminist theorists such as Nancy Hartsock and Sandra Harding have 
found knowledge derived from women’s experiences to provide an important corrective to 
approaches to political theory and epistemology that claim identity ought to be irrelevant to 
knowledge while centering men’s experiences. Charles Mills (1988), among others, makes the 
point that black women critiqued feminist analyses of rape that were developed primarily by 
white women for missing the “particular historical significance of rape accusations made against 
black men by white women” (258). White women’s critiques of male theorists’ positions and 
subsequent critiques women of color developed of white women’s theories led to accounts that 
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were epistemically better, according to Hartsock, Harding, and Mills.74 In other words, 
experiences that were related to (although not determined by) social identity served as an 
important epistemic resource for feminist theory. This does not mean that social identities 
inevitably lead to knowledge regarding social issues—recall the distinction Hartsock makes 
between a viewpoint and a standpoint—but it does mean that experiences, which are to some 
extent correlated with social location, make certain people more likely than others to have 
insights on social reality. 
 Drawing on women’s experiences in this way seems to be the approach to feminist theory 
Alcoff has in mind in noting:  
 Although feminist work in the academy began with the project of “making women’s 
 experience visible” in light of phallocentric distortions and erasures, since the 1980s this 
 project has been largely displaced out of a concern that experience itself is the site of 
 ideology rather than the source of truth (2000, 251). 
 
While Alcoff herself acknowledges the importance of identifying the ways in which gender 
ideology impacts women’s experiences, this passage indicates the dilemma feminists were 
purported to face: accept experience as the source of truth or omit experience out of concern for 
the insidious effects of ideology. Many feminist theorists chose the latter option. 
 Johanna Oksala asserts that Scott’s essay “Experience as Evidence”75 “has arguably been 
one of the most influential contributions to the dismissal of first-person accounts of experience in 
feminist theory and politics in the recent decades” (2016, 36). Scott considers experience 
primarily in the context of the discipline of history, but her argument against the epistemic value 
of experience—especially for emancipatory projects—has had a profound impact within feminist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 See Collins 2000; hooks 1984. 
75 “The Evidence of Experience” was originally published in Critical Inquiry in 1991 and a substantial 
portion of it was reprinted as “Experience” in the 1992 Feminists Theorize the Political. Since the 
commentators I am drawing on cite the 1992 reprint, I cite the latter version. 
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theory. In this section, I will explain Scott’s position before turning to responses to her claims 
within feminist and disability theory. 
 Although Scott cites multiple theorists’ definitions of experience, I will limit my 
consideration to brief remarks on two of them. My purpose is not to assess her claims about these 
authors; rather, I am seeking to clarify her position. According to Scott, Raymond Williams 
describes experience in the sense of “subjective witness,” as authentic truth that serves as the 
ground for analytic projects and reasoning (1992, 27). In this case, a subject has an experience, 
which is characterized as truth-revealing and foundational. She notes that Williams also focuses 
on another usage of “experience,” which signifies “influences external to individuals—social 
conditions, institutions, forms of belief or perception—‘real’ things outside them that they react 
to, and it does not include their thought or consideration” (27). In either case, it seems that it is a 
necessary condition for the individual to be attentive in order to have experience, but in the 
second instance, attending to external influences is also sufficient.   
 Scott raises concerns about historian John Toews’s assumptions about experience as well. 
Namely, she claims he takes the position that experience and meaning must be separated in order 
to enable explanation—experience is “reality which demands meaningful response” (32). Insofar 
as it is initially separate from meaning, experience is a “shared object” that requires 
interpretation (32). Scott contends “Toews’s ‘experience’ thus provides an object for historians 
that can be known apart from their own role as meaning makers and it then guarantees not only 
the objectivity of their knowledge, but their ability to persuade others of its importance” (32). On 
Scott’s account, this portrayal of experience serves to shore up the authority of historians, while 
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precluding identification of the ways in which this approach establishes and excludes 
difference.76  
 Scott raises the concern that when experience is uncritically accepted as the “bedrock of 
evidence,” then the ways in which ideology shapes experience and subjectivity cannot be 
critiqued (1992, 25). In her words: “The project of making experience visible precludes analysis 
of the working of the system and of its historicity; instead it reproduces its terms” (25). When 
she refers to the “project of making experience visible,” Scott has in mind the ways in which 
subjects previously excluded from what she calls “normative history” articulate their experiences 
in order to challenge the accuracy and completeness of orthodox accounts. She contends that this 
type of approach adopts a problematic account of knowledge and has the effect of presenting 
social categories as “fixed immutable identities,” rather than critically evaluating how these 
categories are formed and how they function (25). Scott holds that experience constitutes 
contingent identities; when subjects recount their experiences, this serves to make it seems as 
though they are simply expressing their identities, understood as pre-discursive and essential.77  
 Since the relationship between experience and subjectivity is central for understanding 
Scott’s position, it is important to elucidate her account of their connection. She holds that:  
 [i]t is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through 
 experience. Experience in this definition then becomes not the origin of our explanation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Expanding on this point, Scott asserts:  
 The unifying aspect of experience excludes whole realms of human activity by simply not 
 counting them as experience at least with any consequences for social organization or politics. 
 When class becomes an overriding identity, other subject positions are subsumed by it, those of 
 gender for example (or, in other instances of this kind of history, race, ethnicity, and sexuality) 
 (30). 
Of course this is a legitimate concern, which tends to arise when a particular type of experience is 
generalized beyond its applicability. However, as discussed in the opening of the current section, it is not 
inevitable that analyses centered on class will exclude considerations related to gender and other subject 
positions.  
77 Her position is in line with that of Butler in this regard. 
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 not the authoritative (because seen or felt) evidence that grounds what is known, but 
 rather that which we seek to explain, that about which knowledge is produced (25-26).  
 
On this conception, experience has no explanatory value—it is, rather, in need of explanation. 
This passage makes it seem as though there is a unidirectional relationship between experience 
and subjects; the former constitutes the later while subjects have no active role in constituting 
experience. Scott repeatedly makes assertions similar to this one. Nonetheless, lest we should 
draw the conclusion that she denies subjects agency entirely, she states “subjects have agency. 
They are not unified, autonomous individuals exercising free will, but rather subjects whose 
agency is created through situations and statuses conferred on them” (34). Although she grants 
that subjects have agency, it still does not seem as though they have a role in constituting their 
experiences or social identities.78  
 Scott specifies her view of experience, subjectivity, and language further in the 
following: “Subjects are constituted discursively, experience is a linguistic event (it doesn’t 
happen outside established meanings), but neither is it confined to a fixed order of meaning” (34). 
Although she conceives of experience as a linguistic event, Scott does allow for the order of 
meaning that constitutes subjects and experience to change. She claims that historians need to 
engage in analysis of language in order to understand how subjects and experiences are produced 
(34-36).  
 On Scott’s account, it is tempting to stop using the word “experience” altogether because 
of its role in essentializing identities and reifying subjects, but she maintains that this is an 
unrealistic approach because it is too intertwined in our language and narratives (37). She 
suggests that we ought to: “analyze its operations and to redefine its meaning. This entails 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Oksala contends that Scott conflates identity and experience (2016, 38). While there is a great deal of 
overlap between identity and experience within Scott’s account, I am not sure that she treats them as 
entirely equivalent. 
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focusing on processes of identity production, insisting on the discursive nature of ‘experience’ 
and on the politics of its construction. Experience is at once always already an interpretation and 
in need of interpretation” (37). Although Scott would prefer to expel “experience” from our 
vocabulary altogether, she settles for advocating for a change in how we treat experience, namely, 
rather than allowing experience to serve as a source of knowledge it is now an indicator of the 
ways ideology functions in the lives of individuals and communities. 
 I agree with Scott on some central points, but I do not think that all aspects of her 
conclusion regarding experience are warranted. Most importantly, I do not think that the choices 
are limited to uncritical acceptance of experience or entirely rejecting the epistemic value of 
experience. Scott claims that, “[t]he evidence of experience works as a foundation providing 
both a starting point and a conclusive kind of explanation, beyond which few questions need to or 
can be asked” [emphasis added] (32-33). Indeed, this is an undesirable outcome; I would 
concede that it is problematic to conceive of experience as transparent access to truth. My 
position is also in line with hers in regard to the need to attend to both the role of ideology in 
experience and the impact that the social identities of theorists have on knowledge production. If 
social identities can only be fixed and oppressive and experience is solely a means for ideological 
reinforcement of social identities as Scott asserts, then there is good reason to focus attention on 
ideology rather than experience and social identity. However, I deny that either of these claims is 
correct. Social identities and experience can serve as resources for opposing oppressive 
ideologies. I agree that we should not think about social identities as fixed, but I disagree that 
this means we should cease referring to social identity at all for fear of naturalizing social 
categories. We need to be critical of experience—our own and others’—but this does not mean 
that experience is epistemically worthless or simply the product of ideology. In this regard, my 
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position is in line with Alcoff’s stance as she articulates it in “Merleau-Ponty and Feminist 
Theory on Experience” (2000), to which I now turn. 
 Alcoff contends that feminist theorists have gone too far in rejecting the value of 
experience. She maintains, “[f]eminist theory has swung from the extreme of taking personal 
experience as the foundation of knowledge to discrediting experience as the product of 
phallogocentrism” (Alcoff 2000, 253). Like Oksala, she focuses on the contribution of Scott’s 
work in this shift. Alcoff is especially interested in how Scott’s position—along with 
misunderstandings regarding phenomenology—has been a significant factor in limiting the 
uptake of Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology within feminist theory. Alcoff agrees 
with Scott’s contention that uncritical acceptance of experience as unmediated access to truth is 
problematic. She states: 
 Complex social structures construct subjectivities as sets of habitual practices that create 
 dispositions toward certain affects and interpretations of experience. Subjective 
 experiences, or women’s own accounts of our lives and its meaning, cannot be accepted 
 uncritically without relinquishing our ability to challenge the gender ideologies 
 embedded in these structures (253). 
 
As this passage makes clear, Alcoff recognizes that social structures—including gender 
ideologies—play a role in subjectivity as well as experience. On this point, her position aligns 
with that of Scott. However, Alcoff takes issue with a number of Scott’s claims. I consider the 
most central of these to be the following: 1) the suggestion that we must either accept experience 
uncritically or not at all, 2) the claim that we cannot challenge ideology if we grant experience 
epistemic standing, 3) the position that experience is a linguistic event, and 4) the assumption 
that all discussion of experiences related to social identity contributes to thinking of identity as 
fixed and immutable. I will discuss each of these themes, combining Alcoff’s responses to the 
	   	   	  
139 
second and third claim, prior to turning to her position on the fruitfulness of Merleau-Ponty’s 
work for feminist theory.  
 
3.3.1 We must either accept experience uncritically or not at all. 	  
Alcoff conceptualizes the relationship between experience and knowledge differently than 
theorists whom Scott critiques, such as Williams and Toews. She contends: 
 acknowledging the cognitive centrality of experience, far from producing pretensions of 
 indubitability as in naive realism, actually has the reverse effect (…) Bringing bodily 
 experience into the center of epistemology has the precise effect of dislodging any hope 
 of certainty or an indubitable foundation (Alcoff 2000, 258). 
 
Because knowers are embodied and socio-historically located, knowledge is situated and partial. 
Alcoff suggests that as an alternative to Scott’s characterization of experience, we should 
understand “experience as epistemically indispensable but never epistemically self-sufficient” 
(254). She advocates adopting Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology, which she claims 
“shifts emphasis away from a foundationalist project and toward acknowledging the fact that 
knowledge is always unfinished and incomplete, precisely because of the open-ended nature of 
experience and of meaning” (258). Contra Scott, to start with experience need not entail treating 
experience as “a conclusive kind of explanation, beyond which few questions need to or can be 
asked” (Scott 1992, 33). Experience can and should be questioned, and it is open to re-
interpretation. The choice of accepting experience uncritically or rejecting it altogether proves to 
be a false dichotomy (Alcoff 2000, 254). 
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3.3.2 We cannot challenge ideology if we grant experience epistemic standing. Experience is a 
linguistic event. 
I will address these two claims in conjunction since Alcoff’s response to the claim that 
experience is a linguistic event is closely related to her response to Scott’s contention that we 
cannot challenge ideology if we grant experience epistemic standing. Against Scott’s view that 
appealing to experience can only strengthen the hold of ideology rather than challenging it, she 
contends, “the experience of ‘making experience visible’ has sometimes had the effect of 
disrupting dominant discursive formations” (2000, 255). For Alcoff, thinking of experience as 
coextensive with discourse can lead to problematic outcomes, such as the idea that it is not 
possible to have experiences one cannot adequately describe. According to her, experience is not 
simply a linguistic event—it may be unarticulated or even inarticulate. If experience is 
necessarily a linguistic event, then she suggests that Scott would be correct in focusing on 
discourse analysis rather than phenomena (259).79 However, although Alcoff concedes, 
“discourse permeates and affects experience,” she maintains that experience cannot be reduced 
to linguistic practices (256). Thus, if we only engage in discourse analysis, she maintains that we 
miss experience as it is actually lived. Alcoff turns to bodily experiences that cannot be fully 
conveyed in words in order to illustrate this point.   
 Alcoff provides the example of the terms “date rape” and “marital rape,” noting that these 
experiences occurred before it was possible to articulate them with these terms. She expresses 
the concern that tying experience too closely to discourse would deny that it is possible to have 
certain types of experience. She notes that this view lends credibility to claims such as the 
following: “date rape is said to be a fiction invented by feminists that is now having material 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Oksala goes one step further than Alcoff, arguing that even if we assume the correctness of Scott’s 
claim that all experience is linguistic “her dismissal of the epistemic value of first-person experiential 
accounts is unwarranted” (2016, 40). 
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effects in needlessly traumatizing young impressionable women” (256). Contra this claim, 
Alcoff maintains: “Experience sometimes exceeds language; it is at times inarticulate. Feminism 
has not invented sexism out of whole cloth; it has provided new language by which to describe 
and understand old experiences and that then alters present and future experience” (256). Rather 
than considering experience to be a straightforward product of language, she focuses on ways 
that experience and language interact. On her account, granting experience epistemic standing 
has the potential to contribute to development of new ways of understanding and challenging 
ideology by changing discursive practices. 
 
3.3.3 All discussion of experiences related to social identity contributes to thinking of identity as 
fixed and immutable. 
Alcoff characterizes social identity as loosely correlated to the types of experiences one is likely 
to have. However, this is not equivalent to the claim that identity is fixed or inevitably 
oppressive.80 Indeed, Alcoff suggests that the possibility of transforming identities and the 
likelihood of sharing certain kinds of experience are reasons that social identity can be politically 
useful (2006, 85; 2000, 253). In her words: “The focus on identity itself, politically manifested in 
identity politics, is not justified on the grounds of an intrinsic significance of identity but on the 
belief that identity is a marker, however imperfect, for a certain body of shared experiences” 
(2000, 253). Although it is not inevitable that experiences related to social identity will lead 
members of social groups to engage in political action, Alcoff considers this to be a productive 
starting point.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Alcoff queries: “But why assume that the source and effect of identity claims are nefarious? Why 
assume that the parent/community/society or the discourse/episteme/socius is, in every case and 
necessarily, psychically pernicious and enabling only at the cost of a more profound subordination?” 
(2006, 81) Although she does not raise these questions specifically in response to Scott, these are 
questions that would appropriately be addressed to her.   
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 Alcoff contends that social identities “are hermeneutic locations attached to historical 
experiences that are also concrete sites of interpretation and understanding” (2006, 195). She not 
only considers the importance of social identity as a marker “for a certain body of shared 
experiences” but also the relevance of visible features of bodies for experience and how one is 
socially identified. In Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self, Alcoff emphasizes the 
connection between visible features of bodies and race and gender; she maintains that the 
assumption that race and gender can be visually identified is one of the reasons practices related 
to these categories have continued and seemed natural. She contends that the relationship 
between raced and gendered identities and the body is “intimate” and involves physiological 
features that are difficult to alter (2006, 86). In her words:  
 race and sex are social kinds of entities in the sense that their meaning is constructed 
 through culturally available concepts, values, and experiences. But to say that they are 
 social is not to say that they are some kind of linguistic rather than physical thing or to 
 imply that meanings are conceptual items pasted over physical items. They are most 
 definitely physical, marked on and through the body, lived as a material experience, 
 visible as surface phenomena, and determinant of economic and political status (102).  
 
Descriptions of experience require inclusion of social identity, which is often closely connected 
with how one’s body is perceived and lived. For example, on Alcoff’s account, to claim “color-
blindness” in regard to race or to stop referring to racial categories and identities while race 
continues to impact our lives is to give up a powerful conceptual tool for understanding and 
changing racializing practices and experiences.81   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Alcoff mentions disability but does not develop an account of its significance for lived experience. She 
states, “the markings that signify age, disability, and sex are qualitatively different in significance from 
those signifying race, ethnicity, and culture” (2006, 165). She notes that the status of disability is 
contested. Alcoff remarks that visible features that are seen as indicative of race are “almost laughably 
insignificant” (2006, 199). She implies that this is not the case in regard to age, disability, and sex. One 
point I would make is that not all impairments are visibly identifiable and whether or not one’s 
impairment is visible or not will greatly impact one’s experience. 
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 Alcoff’s stance on the relationship between social identity, embodied experiences, and 
knowledge informs her position on feminist theory. She asserts: “Meaning and knowledge are 
not locked into language, but emerge at the intersection between gesture, bodily experience, and 
linguistic practice” (Alcoff 2000, 261). Although Merleau-Ponty is less attentive than Alcoff to 
the role of social identity, he emphasizes the importance of understanding meaning as emerging 
through gesture, bodily experience, and linguistic practice, and this is one of the reasons she 
considers his work to be promising for feminist theory. 
 
3.3.4 Merleau-Ponty and Feminist Theory 	  
As mentioned above, the second reason Alcoff cites for the limited influence of Merleau-Ponty’s 
work on feminist theory is a mischaracterization of his phenomenology as “developing 
metaphysical accounts of experience outside of culture and history” (2000, 252). In addition, she 
suggests that feminists have been unconvinced that “phenomenology’s belief in the epistemic 
centrality of experience can incorporate or be made compatible with the critique of the 
ideological content of corporeal experience that has been the cornerstone of feminist social 
criticism” (251). These concerns assume a notion of experience in line with those Scott criticizes. 
In addition, although Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology contains oversights regarding 
assumptions about the relationship between socio-historical context and what counts as typical or 
“normal” experience—a point that will be developed in chapter four—it is certainly unfair to 
claim he wholly disregards the relevance of cultural and historical context for experience. 
 Alcoff raises the concern that phenomenological descriptions related to race may 
reinforce “racist perception and experience.” I would add that the same could be suggested 
regarding gender, sexuality, and ability (2006, 194). However, she argues that “critical 
phenomenological description” can facilitate reorientation of habitual ways that we perceive and 
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embody racialized and gendered ideologies (194). Significantly, such an endeavor has a much 
broader reach than discourse analysis insofar as it includes bodily experience. Alcoff contends: 
 Feminist theory needs a better account of the relationship between theory and experience, 
 one in which theory is understood as itself embodied rather than simply formative of, 
 without being formed by, bodily experience. We need also to start from descriptions of 
 specific bodies, with their specific individual histories and inscriptions, rather than an 
 abstract concept of the body or one that exists only in textual representation (2000, 256-
 257). 
 
She maintains that Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology provides an important 
corrective to the trend in feminist theory of discrediting the epistemic and political value of 
experience.  
 
3.3.5 Taking Experience as Evidence 	  
We might wonder, if experience contributes to knowledge, is it necessary to have particular 
personal experiences in order to gain this knowledge? In “A Progressive Male Standpoint” Larry 
May suggests:  
 If experience is intimately connected to understanding, then those who have not had the 
 relevant experience will have to work harder to attain the understanding, in most cases, 
 than those who have had the relevant experience. Any person should be able to gain 
 understanding as long as he or she could at least imagine experiencing the relevant 
 phenomenon. But in most cases, the task of imagination needs to be guided by someone 
 who has had the relevant experience (1998, 338). 
 
Like Alcoff, he contends that experience contributes to knowledge in spite of being fallible. May 
acknowledges that there are limitations in regard to recounting experiences—such as having a 
faulty memory or the role of medication (e.g. painkillers) on the experience (340). He also notes 
that there are limitations to imagining experiences—notably, lack of related experiences and 
difficulty imagining “temporally extended experiences” such as consistently using a wheelchair 
(341). This is why it is so important, on May’s account, to check with others—both those who 
have had similar experiences to our own (in order to compare interpretations and identify 
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patterns) as well as people who have had experiences that are very different from our own. I find 
it interesting that May uses the example of nondisabled people attempting to imagine living with 
an impairment, given the pervasive influence of ableism on the imaginations of bioethicists and 
others of this experience and how seldom disabled people are taken to be credible in regard to 
their own lived experiences.  
 In “Disability Experience on Trial” disability theorist Tobin Siebers expresses the 
concern that dismissing experience as epistemically worthless is counterproductive in regard to 
making society more inclusive for disabled people. Responding to Scott’s “Experience,” he asks, 
“Is the banishment of experience, for example, radical or reactionary?” He endorses the latter 
answer, arguing that, “disability experience has the potential both to augment social critique and 
to advance emancipatory political goals” (2008, 293). Siebers uses the example of the 2004 
Supreme Court case Tennessee v. Lane in which the experiences of two plaintiffs who use 
wheelchairs were taken to provide credible evidence that the Polk County Tennessee 
Courthouse’s inaccessibility was in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
George Lane recounted his experience of being called to make an appearance in court for a 
minor traffic violation in Polk County. Upon arrival, he found there was no elevator and 
proceeded to “crawl up two flights of stairs to the courtroom as the judge and other court 
employees stood at the top of the stairs and laughed at him” (291). Beverly Jones, the second 
plaintiff in the case, was unable to accept twenty-three positions at Tennessee courthouses as a 
court reporter because they were not wheelchair accessible.  
 Regarding the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, Siebers remarks, “We 
witnessed an orthodox Court apparently led out of orthodoxy by the power of disability 
experience” (293). Scott does not consider the role of experiences that go against what ideology 
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would lead us to expect. Siebers asserts, “[c]onstructions are built with certain social bodies in 
mind, and when a different body appears, the lack of fit reveals the ideological assumptions 
controlling the space” (296). If one endorses the view that the disadvantages disabled people face 
directly caused by their physical limitations, it is possible to affirm this position even in light of 
the experiences of Lane and Jones only by ignoring obvious social factors. One could say that 
the reason Lane and Jones could not easy access courthouses in Tennessee is that they have 
limited mobility (and this is, in a limited sense true), but this is not the best interpretation of their 
experiences, especially given the legal imperative to reduce inaccessibility. 
 According to Siebers, attending to experience is necessary in order to understand how 
oppression occurs in everyday life. Like Alcoff, he conceives of identity as being socially 
constructed while also being related to the types of experiences one is likely to have (2008, 296). 
Siebers asserts, “[t]he belief seems to be that oppression will end as soon as minority identities 
vanish, but without a theory that can verify how social identities are embodied in lived 
experience, how they become real, it is not clear that we can understand what oppression is and 
how it works” (297). Like Scott, he contends that it is essential to attend to ways that social 
identities are formed, but he does not think this approach is mutually exclusive with taking 
experiences related to those identities seriously. Siebers thinks that drawing on lived experiences 
of those with marginalized social identities is important not only for understanding oppression, 
but also for changing the status of members of marginalized groups.  
 In sum, in this section I have recounted and critiqued Scott’s position on experience. I 
have shown that we need not think of experience or social identity as hindrances to contesting 
dominant narratives; indeed, I have provided examples cited by Alcoff and Siebers in which they 
serve as valuable resources for challenging these narratives. Rather than disavowing the body, 
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disability theory needs to center bodily experience in order to be effective in continuing to work 
for improvement of the epistemic and social status of disabled people.   
3.4 Conclusion 	  
The debates within feminist theory about whether and how bodily experience should be included 
have some commonalities with debates within disability theory about how and whether the body 
ought to be included. In this chapter, I have discussed arguments for and against inclusion of the 
body within disability theory prior to focusing on two types of approaches to theorizing the 
disabled body. In spite of some fundamental disagreements—e.g., whether or not the material 
can be separated from the discursive and whether or not values impact descriptions of bodily 
characteristics—both approaches address the body in terms of impairment, even when striving to 
include embodied experiences. 
 I have argued that although it should not be accepted uncritically, experience ought to be 
granted epistemic legitimacy. My position contrasts with Scott’s insofar as she assumes that 
experience can only be the product of ideology and thus can only serve to reify identities and 
sustain oppression. Scott’s characterization of experience as a “linguistic event” serves to direct 
attention away from bodily aspects of experience (1992, 34). Alcoff and Siebers both provide 
counterexamples in which the embodied experiences of people in marginalized groups served to 
challenge ideology and to change discursive practices. 
 However impairment is characterized, it remains tied to scientific/medical discourse that 
objectifies the body. Although impairment is inadequate for addressing embodied subjectivity, 
importantly, bodily particularities do have a role in shaping how one is in the world—including 
how one thinks about oneself as well as how one is perceived and treated by others. Thus, it is 
necessary to be able to provide an account that can allow for bodily particularities or changes to 
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impact being in the world. In chapter four, I will demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty’s approach is 
the best starting point insofar as he centers embodied experiences rather than reducing the body 
to scientific descriptions or a product of ideology.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: THEORIZING EMBODIED SUBJECTIVITY: MERLEAU-PONTY, 
DISABILITY, AND SOCIAL IDENTITY 
Every day, in the banal, minute interactions with members of society, one’s body sets the 
parameters for what constitutes the reasonable response from others (Lee 2014, 2).  
 
One of the privileges of being normal and ordinary is a certain unconsciousness. When one is 
that which is taken as the norm in one’s social environment, one does not have to think about it. 
Often, in discussions about prejudice and discrimination I hear statements like these: “I don’t 
think of myself as heterosexual”; “I don’t think of myself as white”; “I don’t think of myself as a 
man”; “I’m just a person, I just think of myself as a person.” If one is the norm, one does not 
have to know what one is. If one is marginal, one does not have the privilege of not noticing 
what one is (Marilyn Frye 1983, 146-147).  
 	  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty conceives of subjectivity as embodied. He not only maintains that 
embodiment is necessary for “the things themselves” to appear at all but also attempts to develop 
an account of the relationship between embodiment and temporality, spatiality, motility, 
sexuality, and language. In Phenomenology of Perception he cites case studies to show that 
events that affect one’s body can radically alter one’s structures of experience. Most of the 
individuals he considers are affected by illnesses of an episodic nature or traumatic injuries. 
However, these types of life-changing events are not the only ones that shape embodied 
subjectivity and experience. Bodily particularities,82 more generally, and the ways in which they 
are given meaning play a significant role. For example, although Merleau-Ponty does not 
consider how race and gender function as structures of experience, philosophers have drawn on 
his work in order to develop the importance of bodily particularities for one’s experiences within 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 By “particularities,” I mean characteristics (e.g. qualities such as height, weight, skin color, facial 
features, and hair texture). 
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a milieu saturated with norms related to race and gender (Alcoff 2000, 2006; Fanon 2008; Lee 
2014; Salamon 2010; Yancy 2008; and Young 2006). His phenomenology has been the starting 
point for numerous theorists concerned with various types of marginalized embodiment, and this 
work greatly enriches our understanding of the relevance of bodies for lived experiences of race 
and gender without engaging in biological or cultural determinism. Theoretical approaches that 
draw on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights are equally useful for understanding how 
bodies shape experience in relation to dominant narratives about dis/ability, but this area of 
inquiry has not yet been fully developed within philosophy (Carel 2011; Carel 2013; Diedrich 
2001; Salamon 2012; Toombs 1988; 1992; Weiss 2015). Although Merleau-Ponty’s concerns 
differ from those of disability theorists, his approach to phenomenology offers rich resources for 
theorizing disabled bodies, especially when supplemented with the analytical tools of feminist 
philosophy and philosophy of race.  
Merleau-Ponty is treated as a sort of “patron saint” for philosophers and other theorists 
concerned with the body (Shusterman 2005, 151). This is certainly true within disability studies. 
Yet, many of the central assumptions and goals that disability theorists share differ from those of 
Merleau-Ponty. I would argue that one of the primary aims and effects of Phenomenology of 
Perception was to clarify “normal” (read non-disabled heterosexual white male) being in the 
world83 by contrasting it with “disordered” ways of being, rather than to consider the richness of 
other ways of being. I am far from the first to suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s approach is 
androcentric and heteronormative (Butler 1988; 1989a; Alcoff 2000; Grosz 1994; Young 2006) 
and white normative (Fanon 2008; Weiss 2015). However, little attention has been devoted to the 
ableism inherent in his approach, by which I mean that he “privilege[s] able-bodied people by 
centering their needs and experiences” (Wieseler, 2013). Jackie Leach Scully, a molecular 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 I will explain Merleau-Ponty’s use of this concept momentarily. 
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biologist and disability theorist, is the only author I have encountered who raises this concern 
(2008). With the exception of Scully, disability theorists from disciplines other than philosophy 
often cite Merleau-Ponty, but they seldom develop any sort of sustained engagement with, much 
less critiques of, his work (Iwakuma 2002; LaCom 2013; Siebers 2008; Sullivan 2014a). In 
addition to privileging nondisabled people’s experiences, Merleau-Ponty implies that a particular 
privileged type of racialized and gendered embodied experience is “normal.” This assumption is 
also present in the work of some philosophers who build upon his work, such as Shaun Gallagher. 
Theorists who adapt Merleau-Ponty’s approach in order to think about lived experiences of 
disability tend not to simultaneously take into consideration the differences that gender and race 
make. Likewise, theorists focusing on race and/or gender typically concentrate on the 
experiences of nondisabled people. 
In section one, I will begin by briefly explaining some of the key concepts that are 
necessary for my examination of the role of examples and case studies of people with 
impairments and illnesses in Phenomenology of Perception. As this discussion will show, 
embodiment is central for all of these concepts. In the course of discussing one case study in 
particular, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty has two primary aims, which are interconnected. He 
seeks to clarify “normal” experience and to demonstrate the limitations of empiricism and 
intellectualism. Section two considers ways that work within disability studies serves to highlight 
ableist assumptions within Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s 
notions of “material anonymity,” “fits,” and “misfits” provide vocabulary that is helpful for 
clarifying both the benefits and shortcomings of his approach. I engage with Gail Weiss’ 
discussion of the relationship between the work of Garland-Thomson and Merleau-Ponty, and I 
respond to Weiss’ claims about: 1) Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of “normality” and 2) the function 
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of a case study within Phenomenology of Perception. Section three applies Garland-Thomson’s 
notion of material anonymity in order to draw attention to the experience of being enabled 
through the physical environment and social expectations that Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher, 
among others, implicitly take as a given for “normal” subjects. I also suggest that her concepts 
are useful for bridging philosophical work on disabled embodiment with work on bodies 
marginalized along other axes, namely gender and race.  
4.1 Key Concepts and Merleau-Ponty’s use of the Case of Schneider in Phenomenology of 
Perception 
 
In order to attend to Merleau-Ponty’s use of case studies84 in Phenomenology of Perception, we 
must understand his stance on the body as well as some of the concepts that are central within 
this text. Indeed, these tasks are intertwined insofar as embodiment is implicated in Merleau-
Ponty’s characterization of being in the world, sedimentation and spontaneity, intentionality, and 
multiple types of ambiguity. In what follows, I will provide a brief explanation of these concepts.  
 Merleau-Ponty speaks of being in the world in many contexts—from a number of 
different angles, so to speak. Donald Landes, the translator of the 2012 edition of 
Phenomenology of Perception, notes “[b]y presenting Heidegger’s notion [of being-in-the-world] 
with the French preposition à rather than dans Merleau-Ponty introduces a rich collection of 
relational modalities, including ‘directed toward,’ ‘in,’ ‘with,’ ‘at,’ and ‘belonging to,’ all of 
which should be heard in his être au monde” (493n22). Importantly, being in the world cannot be 
reduced to the “sum of reflexes” or “an act of consciousness” as empiricism and intellectualism, 
respectively, would have it (80). Rather, reflexes and acts of consciousness are predicated upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 I will focus most of my discussion on one case study, but I contend that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the 
other case studies and examples serves the same purposes. 
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being in the world, which Merleau-Ponty calls “a pre-objective perspective” (81). Furthermore, 
he notes that the notion of being in the world applies to non-human animals as well as humans 
insofar as the world elicits responses from both (80-81). 
 Often Merleau-Ponty clarifies the concept of being in the world negatively, by stating 
what it is not. For example, he asserts: 
 We are not saying that the notion of the world is inseparable from the notion of the 
 subject, nor that the subject thinks himself to be inseparable from the idea of the body and 
 the idea of the world, for if it were merely a relation in thought, this very fact would 
 preserve the absolute independence of the subject as a thinker and the subject would not 
 be situated. If the subject is in a situation, or even if the subject is nothing other than a 
 possibility of situations, this is because he only achieves his ipseity by actually being a 
 body and by entering into the world through his body. If I find, while reflecting upon the 
 essence of the body, that it is tied to the essence of the world, this is because my 
 existence as subjectivity is identical with my existence as a body and with the existence 
 of the world, and because, ultimately, the subject that I am, understood concretely, is 
 inseparable from this particular body and this particular world (2012, 430-431).  
 
Throughout Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty seeks to undermine the subject/object 
distinction. In the preceding quotation, he shows that he does not think this is simply a 
conceptual issue; rather he contends that, ontologically, we are initially involved in the world as 
embodied beings. It is only after we subscribe to the subject/object distinction that it appears that 
subjects are primarily independent of their worlds and secondarily related to them. Subjectivity is 
necessarily embodied and situated within a world, and the specific characteristics of both are 
relevant for how and who one is. These particularities are contingent in the sense that they are 
not determined, but they are not contingent in the sense that they are necessary for me to be the 
subject I am. Elsewhere, Merleau-Ponty refers to the body as “the vehicle of being in the world” 
and “our anchorage in the world” (84, 146). 
 Sedimentation is essential for this anchorage in the world. Merleau-Ponty claims that 
there is “a sedimentation of our mental operations, which allows us to count upon the things that 
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are there and that are given as a whole, without our having to repeat their synthesis at each 
moment” (2012, 131). Clearly, he is suggesting that our mental operations allow for a stable 
sense of things. However, it would be a mistake to understand sedimentation in narrowly mental 
or epistemic terms. Merleau-Ponty maintains,  
 [T]he responses [to that which solicits action] themselves must no longer require, each 
 time, a unique position-taking and must rather be sketched out once and for all in their 
 generality. Thus, by renouncing a part of his spontaneity, by engaging in the world 
 through stable organs and preestablished circuits, man can acquire the mental and 
 practical space that will free him, in principle, from his milieu and thereby allow him to 
 see it (89).  
 
He cautions against understanding sedimentation as involving consciousness rather than the 
body; because consciousness is embodied, sedimentation necessarily involves the body. To 
illustrate, Merleau-Ponty provides the example of sedimentation in a friendship wherein a 
current conversation between friends refers back to previous words and gestures exchanged 
between them without requiring them to make this explicit (131). He also discusses 
sedimentation in the context of his apartment, which he says is “not a series of strongly 
connected images” (131). Rather, “[i]t only remains around me as my familiar domain if I still 
hold ‘in my hands’ or ‘in my legs’ its principle distances and directions, and only if a multitude 
of intentional threads run out toward it from my body” (131-132). The intentional threads of our 
bodies are what anchor us in the world. Being situated through sedimentation enables one to 
respond to novel occurrences as well as to engage in creative activities such as painting and 
writing poetry. 
 Use of Merleau-Ponty’s term “intentional threads” requires clarification of what he 
means by intentionality. In the introduction to Phenomenology of Perception, he references 
Husserl’s distinction between 
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 act intentionality—which is the intentionality of our judgments and of our voluntary 
 decisions (and is the only intentionality discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason)—and 
 operative intentionality (fungierende Intentionalität), the intentionality that establishes 
 the natural and pre-predicative unity of the world and of our life, the intentionality that 
 appears in our desires, our evaluations, and our landscape more clearly than it does in 
 objective knowledge (lxxxii). 
 
Merleau-Ponty does not use Husserl’s terminology—opting most of the time to simply use the 
term intentionality. Occasionally, he is more specific, using the terms “motor intentionality” and 
“original intentionality” as well as referring to sexuality as “an intentionality” (113, 407, 156). 
However, it seems clear that his primary interest is in what Husserl calls operative intentionality, 
and it is for this reason that he focuses on areas of subjective experience such as perception, 
sexual desire, and love that cannot be reduced to voluntary decisions. He seeks to develop an 
account of the aspects of intentionality that philosophers have tended to neglect or refer to by 
other names. Merleau-Ponty asserts, “[b]odily movement can only play a role in the perception 
of the world if it is itself an original intentionality, a manner of being related to the object that is 
distinct from knowledge” (407). He emphasizes the embodied nature of intentionality, which is 
also less apparent in objective knowledge than other domains upon which it is predicated.  
 For Merleau-Ponty, intentionality may thus be described as ambiguous. Indeed, 
ambiguity, which is at times used interchangeably with indeterminacy, is another central concept 
within Phenomenology of Perception. Rather than considering ambiguity as something to be 
dispelled, he contends that it should be embraced as fundamental to human existence. He asserts: 
 For man, everything is constructed and everything is natural, in the sense that there is no 
 single word or behavior that does not owe something to mere biological being—and, at 
 the same time, there is no word or behavior that does not break free from animal life, that 
 does not deflect vital behaviors from their direction [sens] through a sort of escape and a 
 genius for ambiguity that might well serve to define man (195). 
 
For humans, biological being and cultural being are at play in everything we do. Merleau-Ponty 
discusses a number of types of ambiguity, including ambiguities spanning: the natural and 
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cultural world, impersonal and personal time, objective and erotic perception, the actual and 
habitual body, as well as impersonal (or anonymous) and personal existence. 
 Impersonal (or anonymous) and personal existence are intertwined with bodily and 
temporal ambiguity. To paraphrase Merleau-Ponty, the ambiguity of time helps us to understand 
the ambiguity of the body, which is an expression of the ambiguity of being in the world (87). 
Embodiment is central to being in the world and both are irreducibly ambiguous. Importantly, 
Merleau-Ponty asserts the agency of the body, rather than treating it as a sort of tabula rasa only 
given direction through culture and the individual inhabiting it. 
 …so too can we say that my organism—as a pre-personal adhesion to the general form of 
 the world, as an anonymous and general existence—plays the role of an innate complex 
 beneath the level of my personal life. My organism is not like some inert thing, it itself 
 sketches out the movement of existence (86). 
 
On this account the body has its own sens, which is to say, its own meaning, knowledge, and 
direction prior to our decisions and to our epistemic relation to the world. 
 Merleau-Ponty makes a distinction between the objective body and one’s own body.85 
The first notion refers to the body as it can be measured and described in scientific terms. The 
second refers to one’s body as it is lived. Theorists drawing on Merleau-Ponty have often 
adopted the terminology of the lived body to capture this second sense of the body (Alcoff 2000; 
2006; Diedrich 2001; Lee 2014; Young 2005). This bodily ambiguity is important within 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of anosognosia and phantom limbs, wherein the actual body and 
one’s own body are out of accord with each other. I turn to a footnote within Phenomenology of 
Perception by Landes for further clarification on his translation of the French le corps propre as 
“one’s own body.” He states, “In general, Merleau-Ponty means ‘the body that is necessarily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Merleau-Ponty uses a number of different terms for these two ways of referring to the body. He also 
calls the first (the objective body) the actual body and the second (one’s own body) the phenomenal body, 
and the habit body. For clarity’s sake, I will use objective body and one’s own body, except in cases in 
which Merleau-Ponty and other philosophers use different terms. 
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lived as mine,’ rather than a body that I possess contingently or the body considered from a third 
person perspective as a simple object in the world” (Landes 2012, 512n6).  
 Regarding movement and the distinction between the objective and one’s own body, 
Merleau-Ponty remarks: “We never move our objective body, we move our phenomenal body, 
and we do so without mystery, since it is our body as a power of various regions of the world 
that already rises up toward the objects to grasp and perceive them” (108). Embodied 
subjectivity always exists in relation to objects and others. He goes on the say:  
 just as the phenomenal forces at work in my visual field obtain from me, without any 
 calculation, the motor reactions that will establish between those forces the optimum 
 equilibrium, or as the customs of our milieu or the arrangement of our listeners 
 immediately obtains from us the words, attitudes, and tone that fits them—not that we are 
 trying to disguise our thoughts or simply aiming to please, but because we literally are 
 what other think of us and we are our world (109).   
 
Here Merleau-Ponty suggests that just as one’s own body typically makes adjustments without 
calculation in order to get the best visual or motor grasp of the surroundings, so too, embodied 
subjectivity is influenced by one’s social milieu.    
 Since being in the world, sedimentation, spontaneity, intentionality, and multiple types of 
ambiguity—including ambiguity of the body—are woven together, disruptions in any of these 
impact the entire system. This is why, for Merleau-Ponty, it should not be surprising that the 
effects of a bodily injury could include bring about a shift in being in the world. His approach to 
phenomenology allows for articulation of this type of experience rather than limiting the focus to 
descriptions of the objective body, such as measurable changes in function. As I will develop in 
the following, he contends that intellectualism and empiricism mischaracterize such instances as 
well as the behavior of typical subjects because they miss the centrality of ambiguity within 
human existence. He maintains that the remedy is to adopt existential analysis, which starts from 
the perspective of being in the world. 
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4.1.1 Merleau-Ponty’s use of the Case of Johann Schneider  	  
Merleau-Ponty draws on case studies of disabled people in Phenomenology of Perception in 
order to expose the limitations of empiricism and intellectualism as well as to differentiate 
subjects with impairments from the “normal” subject. In his words, “[t]he study of a pathological 
case has thus allowed us to catch sight of a new mode of analysis—existential analysis—that 
goes beyond the classical alternatives between empiricism and intellectualism, or between 
explanation and reflection” (2012, 138). He maintains that in order to preserve the phenomena—
such as perception, movement, and language usage—philosophers and other theorists seek to 
describe, it is necessary to attend to them as we experience them.86 Merleau-Ponty contends that, 
although empiricism and intellectualism are commonly thought to be opposed to each other, they 
share some of the same problematic assumptions. The use of case studies is one way he 
highlights these assumptions and proposes alternatives.  
 There are many instances in which Merleau-Ponty contrasts the ways in which “normal” 
or “typical” subjects approach a task in distinction from those with disorders. The primary case 
study he refers to throughout Phenomenology of Perception is that of Johann Schneider, a patient 
of Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein. Schneider, a soldier in the German army, was reportedly 
injured on June 4, 1915 when shrapnel became lodged in the left parietal-occipital region of his 
brain (Marotta and Behrmann 2004, 634). While one iron splinter was surgically removed a 
couple of weeks later, X-rays revealed that others remained. Gelb and Goldstein diagnosed 
Schneider with “psychic blindness” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 105). His condition is also referred to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Merleau-Ponty develops this point further in the following: 
 Behavior can only be grasped by another type of thought—the type of thought that takes its object 
 in its nascent state, such as it appears to him who lives it, with the atmosphere of sense by which 
 it is enveloped, and that seeks to slip itself into this atmosphere in order to discover, behind the 
 dispersed facts and symptoms, the total being of the subject in the case of the normal person or 
 the fundamental disorder in the case of the patient (2012, 122). 
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as “visual agnosia,” “a disorder of visual recognition, in which a person cannot arrive at the 
meaning of some or all categories of visual stimuli, despite normal or near-normal visual 
perception and intact alertness, intelligence, and language” (Morotta and Behrmann 2004, 633).87 
Merleau-Ponty discusses a number of ways that Schneider’s condition leads him to develop 
atypical means of accomplishing tasks assigned by his doctors in an experimental setting as well 
as in everyday life. On his account, the brain damage Schneider sustained pervades his way of 
being, impacting his ability to situate himself. Merleau-Ponty uses Schneider’s experiences in 
order to develop insights into typical experiences: concluding, for example, that Schneider lacks 
ambiguity in a number of domains, and ambiguity is necessary for subjects to be fully situated in 
regard to spatiality, temporality, language, and sexuality. Although it is not possible to 
completely separate these, I will focus primarily on spatiality in order to illustrate Merleau-
Ponty’s use of this case study.  
 In his discussion of spatiality, Merleau-Ponty draws on Schneider’s atypical ways of 
orienting himself in space and engaging in movement in order to showcase the shortcomings of 
empiricism and intellectualism as theoretical explanations of “normal” subjects because the ways 
that Schneider’s mannerisms fit with aspects of these theories make clear that this is not how 
typical subjects behave. At other points, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates the inability of these 
theories to make sense of what is happening, even in Schneider’s case.  
 Merleau-Ponty is especially concerned to understand why it is that Schneider is readily 
able to move in some ways but has great difficulty with others. Schneider accomplishes the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Marotta and Behrmann note that Gelb and Goldstein’s account of Schneider is controversial. For 
example, they state, “Goldenberg claims Goldstein and Gelb invented fantastic embellishments about 
Schn [Schneider] and, in turn, Schn [Schneider] learned how to be an ideal case study” (635). My aim 
here is neither to judge whether or not Gelb and Goldstein’s reports are accurate nor to assess Merleau-
Ponty’s recounting of their reports. Rather, I am interested in the function of Schneider as an example in 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological project. 
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movements “that are necessary for life with extraordinary speed and confidence, provided that 
they are habitual movements: he takes his handkerchief from his pocket and blows his nose, or 
takes a match from a matchbox and lights a lamp” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 105). However, when 
his doctors ask Schneider to act out tasks within the context of an experimental setting, he is 
unable to do so without “preparatory movements” and without treating the tasks as if they 
actually need to be done—in Merleau-Ponty’s words, to behave as if they are “concrete” rather 
than “abstract” (105). This is the case even when the motions required for the concrete and the 
abstract task are almost identical. 
 Merleau-Ponty reports that there is a discrepancy between Schneider’s ability to point 
[Zeigen] and grasp [Greifen]; whereas pointing requires a number of prior steps, he is able to 
grasp or engage in other movements that involve touch (such as slapping a mosquito that is 
biting him) (106). This leads Merleau-Ponty to question how it is possible to know where a body 
part is when one is asked to grasp it but not when one is asked to point to it. He ascertains that it 
is necessary to conceive of knowledge of a location in multiple senses. According to Merleau-
Ponty: 
 Classical psychology does not have any concepts for expressing the varieties of the 
 consciousness of location because for it the consciousness of location is always a 
 positional consciousness, a representation, a Vor-stellung, because as such it gives us the 
 location as a determination of the objective world and because such a representation 
 either is or is not; but, if it is, then it delivers to us its object without any ambiguity and as 
 an identifiable term throughout all of its appearances. We must, on the contrary, forge 
 here the concepts necessary to express that bodily space can be given to a grasping 
 intention without being given to an epistemic one (106). 
 
Location as a determination of the objective world, i.e. objective space, does not capture the 
multiplicity of ways that it is possible to “know” where part of one’s body is located. Although it 
is possible to consider one’s body in a scientific manner and one’s relation to objects in terms of 
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constituting consciousness, these are derivative ways of knowing, whereas the body’s capacity to 
engage in habitual and practical movements is a more fundamental orientation.  
 Merleau-Ponty considers the explanation that concrete movements “depend upon firmly 
established conditioned reflexes” (124). This would imply that concrete movement is unaffected 
by Schneider’s brain injury because it bypasses consciousness—it is simply a physiological 
reaction that occurs automatically, so to speak, as a result of previous associations. He maintains 
that the physical differences between the “stimuli” and the role of Schneider’s nervous system 
and muscles in concrete and abstract movement cannot explain why one is easily accomplished 
and the other is not (124). Merleau-Ponty also contends that intellectualist psychology (reflective 
analysis) is just as inadequate as physiological (empiricist) approaches. For their part, abstract 
movements would require consciousness in order to be enacted. He suggests that if we take 
consciousness to be consciousness of something and to require engagement in “pure act[s] of 
signification,” then it must be concluded that if one is unable to meet this requirement, then one 
“falls back to the status of a thing” (123). More concisely, he asserts: “Consciousness will thus 
not admit of degrees. If the patient no longer exists as a consciousness, then he must exist as a 
thing” (124). However, Merleau-Ponty maintains that, in spite of Schneider’s limitations, this is 
obviously the wrong conclusion. He says that the difference between concrete and abstract 
movements would then be the divide between physiology and psychology (124). However, he 
finds this explanation to be untenable, stating:     
 Every physiological explanation generalizes into a mechanistic physiology, every 
 appearance of consciousness generalizes into an intellectualist psychology, and 
 mechanistic physiology or intellectualist psychology level out behavior and efface the 
 distinction between abstract movement and concrete movement, between Zeigen and 
 Greifen. The distinction can only be maintained if there are several ways for the body to 
 be a body, and several ways for consciousness to be consciousness (125).   
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As this quotation makes clear, Merleau-Ponty rejects the suggestion that it is possible to appeal 
to physiology in order to explain concrete movement while simultaneously drawing on 
psychology in order to explain abstract movement. Each approach would exclude the other, and 
neither is sufficient alone. Instead, he advocates existential analysis, an approach that starts with 
being in the world rather than objective thought, which is derivative of being in the world. 
 Merleau-Ponty claims that in order to understand the difference between these two types 
of movement, it is necessary to consider “their affective value or their biological sense,” which 
leads to the insight that Zeigen and Greifen are “two different ways of relating to the object and 
two types of being in the world” (124). For this to be possible, the body cannot be construed 
simply as a mechanism (existence in itself) or as that in which consciousness resides (pure 
existence for itself) (125). It is only when we reject this dualism and consider concrete and 
abstract movement through existential analysis, which is to say, from the starting point of being 
in the world, that it is possible to comprehend why they would elicit such divergent responses 
from Schneider. 
 Merleau-Ponty concedes that in some instances the descriptions of human behavior 
provided by intellectualism or empiricism do approximate how Schneider approaches a task. 
This demonstrates the inadequacy of these theories as explanations of the ways that typical 
humans approach tasks. For example, he shows that there are parallels between Schneider and 
the “Kantian subject” insofar as both need to make significations explicit in order to understand 
them and incorporate them into experience. When Schneider is asked about analogies (e.g. “fur 
is to the cat what feathers are to the bird”) and metaphors (e.g. “the foot of the chair”), he must 
go through intermediary conceptual steps in order to figure out their meanings (129). For 
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“normal” subjects, the meanings of analogies and metaphors are immediately apparent, but 
explaining the reasoning behind them may pose difficulties (129).  
 Merleau-Ponty contrasts the “normal” subject with the Kantian subject as follows: 
 The Kantian subject posits a world, but, in order to be able to affirm a truth, the actual 
 subject must first have a world or be in the world, that is, he must hold a system of 
 significations around himself whose correspondences, relations, and participations do not 
 need to be made explicit in order to be utilized (131). 
 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that it is possible to detect the error in the Kantian conception of the 
subject by contrasting Schneider’s way of understanding the meanings of metaphors with the 
ability of typical subjects to grasp the meanings of metaphors due to being firmly grounded in 
the world. His point here is that Schneider’s behavior shows us how typical subjects would use 
significations if the Kantian notion of the subject were correct. When Schneider is trying to 
understand metaphors, he is starting almost entirely “from scratch” so to speak; he doesn’t have 
an integrated system of significations, and this is why he has to explicitly create connections over 
and over again. Conversely, for the typical subject, having and being in the world makes these 
steps unnecessary. It is important to point out that what Schneider is missing is neither an 
adequate vocabulary nor the ability to understand what others are saying; rather it is what he is 
unable to do with words and the process he must go through in order to make sense of others’ 
remarks that differentiate him from typical subjects.88 According to Merleau-Ponty: “Another’s 
words are for him signs that he must decode one by one, whereas for the normal subject these 
words are the transparent envelope of a sense in which he could live” (134-135). Thus, the 
typical subject is not the Kantian subject, while Schneider’s behavior is akin to the Kantian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Merleau-Ponty states, “[w]hat the patient had lost, and what the normal person possessed, was not a 
certain stock of words, but rather a certain manner of using them” (180). 	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subject insofar as he must posit a world before he can make sense of words, which are initially 
opaque in their meanings.   
 Identifying one of the mistakes of intellectualism, Merleau-Ponty states:  
 For beginning from this transparent consciousness, and from this intentionality that does 
 not admit of degrees, everything that separates us from the true world—error, illness, 
 madness, and,  in short, embodiment—is reduced to the status of a mere appearance 
 (126).  
 
Merleau-Ponty contends that this approach is unable to address phenomena because it reduces 
them to epistemic errors or dishonesty. Whereas, as he points out, “Schneider’s disorder is not 
initially metaphysical, for it was a piece of shrapnel that injured him in his occipital region” 
(127). Intellectualism, in focusing on “symbolic function” and “consciousness” as disconnected 
from embodied being in the world, cannot address how it is that a brain injury could alter 
consciousness, or, indeed, even the possibility of consciousness being altered at all.  
 If we are to be able to comprehend the multiplicity of ways for “the body to be a body” 
and “consciousness to be consciousness,” it is necessary to understand them as they are lived in 
the world (125). Changes in one’s body are capable of bringing about changes in one’s world. 
Thus, atypical behavior must be examined in a way that goes beyond medical descriptions of 
one’s bodily condition and considers subjects in context. According to Merleau-Ponty:  
 The structure “world,” with its double moment of sedimentation and spontaneity, is at the 
 center of consciousness, and it is through a certain leveling out of “world” that we will be 
 able to understand Schneider’s intellectual, perceptual, and motor disorders 
 simultaneously and without thereby reducing them to each other (132). 
 
As I mentioned previously, Merleau-Ponty refers to embodied being in the world as “our 
anchorage in the world,” which maintains our inherence in the world through “intentional threads” 
(146, 132). Cognition, perception, and movement are all enabled by being in the world; thus, 
Merleau-Ponty holds that it is necessary to begin from being in the world in order to understand 
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the underlying unity that underpins the various manifestations of Schneider’s brain injury. 
Schneider has become unmoored from the world. However, this does not mean that he is entirely 
disconnected; rather it clarifies why he is able to engage in concrete/habitual movements with 
ease while abstract/novel ones pose such difficulty. To provide a proper account of Schneider’s 
behavior, it is necessary to allow for multiplicity of ways of being. However, this need not entail 
the additional claim that each of these ways of being is in some way equivalent to or 
interchangeable with any other.  
 Merleau-Ponty judges that Schneider has real, significant limitations, asserting, 
“Schneider is ‘bound’ to the actual, and he ‘lacks freedom,’ he lacks the concrete freedom that 
consists in the general power of placing oneself in a situation” (137). As this passage makes clear, 
freedom requires the power to situate oneself. According to Merleau-Ponty, ambiguity enables 
one to situate oneself in several aspects of life. So, ambiguity is necessary for freedom. Let’s 
return to Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualization of situatedness prior to turning to the role of 
ambiguity. He claims that Schneider is bound to the actual insofar as he is unable to place 
himself in a situation; this prevents him from envisioning and taking up possibilities. Insofar as 
he lacks this ability, Schneider “lacks freedom” (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 137). Merleau-Ponty 
asserts:  
 the life of consciousness—epistemic life, the life of desire, or perceptual life—is 
 underpinned by an “intentional arc” that projects around us our past, our future, our 
 human milieu, our physical situation, our ideological situation, our moral situation, or 
 rather, that ensures that we are situated within all of these relationships (137).  
 
In this passage, Merleau-Ponty contends that the intentional arc allows for knowledge, desire, 
and perception to occur within the multiple ways that one is situated. Schneider’s atypical 
intentional arc impacts all aspects of his existence.  
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 Focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Schneider in regard to spatiality, I have 
shown that use of this case study serves two main roles in Phenomenology of Perception: 1) to 
clarify the behavior of “normal” subjects by contrasting it with that of Schneider, and 2) to 
demonstrate the superiority of existential analysis over empiricism and intellectualism. Having 
established these points, we now turn to consideration of the relationship between, on the one 
hand, Merleau-Ponty’s approach to impairment and illness and, on the other, disability theory. 
 
4.1.2 Merleau-Ponty’s Use of Case Studies and Disability Theory 
 
Rather than questioning the distinction between normal and abnormal subjects, Merleau-Ponty’s 
analysis depends upon it. However, although he does not consider the role of cultural norms in 
making this determination as some disability theorists do, it should be noted that he observes a 
continuum between experiences of typical individuals and those of people with symptoms of 
mental illness. Merleau-Ponty suggests that illnesses such as aphonia and hysteria are modes of 
disengagement from others that are not radically different from the experiences of “normal” 
subjects, e.g., a husband forgetting the location of book given to him by his wife while he is 
upset with her (165). His example of aphonia involves a young woman who was unable to speak 
as a child in the aftermath of an earthquake and then later experienced aphonia after her mother 
prohibited her from seeing the man she loved (163). In Merleau-Ponty’s words:   
 Whatever can be overcome by this anonymous force must be of the same nature as it, and 
 we must then admit that indifference or aphonia, to the extent that they endure, become 
 solid like things, that they make themselves into a structure, and that the decision that 
 interrupts them comes from beneath the level of the “will” (166).  
 
He denies that the aforementioned examples involve a choice to exhibit these behaviors. 
Merleau-Ponty also compares these illnesses and this type of forgetting to sleep insofar as they 
involve something beyond personal existence. Thus, although he does not question the 
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legitimacy of the distinction between “normal” and “abnormal” nor consider the social values 
that are at play in determining this distinction, he works to show that there are parallels between 
the experiences of individuals categorized as “normal” and “abnormal.”    
 One of the illustrations Merleau-Ponty uses in order to clarify bodily habits, which he 
claims have both motor and perceptual aspects, is a blind man who is accustomed to using a cane. 
He states, “When the cane becomes a familiar instrument, the world of tactile objects expands, it 
no longer begins at the skin of the hand, but at the tip of the cane” (153). Once a blind man 
develops the habit of perceiving through use of the cane, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the cane 
“is an appendage of the body, or an extension of the bodily synthesis” (154). On this account, 
through development of habits typical subjects incorporate instruments as well as bodily 
adornments, such as hats with feathers, into their phenomenal body (144).89 Thus, Merleau-Ponty 
does not make a distinction between instances in which disabled people and nondisabled people 
experience instruments as part of one’s own body. 
 Merleau-Ponty only discusses the functional limitations of Schneider and other 
individuals he uses as examples. However, given that he considers being in the world to be a 
system in which one’s own body and the world are fundamentally intertwined, his analysis does 
go beyond the objective body in order to examine some of the implications of impairment and 
illness for being. He even recognizes that individuals may respond in different ways to the same 
impairment, stating: 
 Certain subjects can move closer to being blind without having changed “worlds.” They 
 bump into objects everywhere, but they are unaware of no longer having visual qualities, 
 and the structure of their behavior remains unaltered. Other patients, on the contrary, lose 
 their world as soon as the contents begin to slip away. They renounce their usual life even 
 before it becomes impossible, they become crippled before literally being so, and they 
 break their vital contact with it (81-82).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Merleau-Ponty also asserts, “Habit expresses the power we have of dilating our being in the world, or 
of altering our existence through incorporating new instruments” (145). 
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Here Merleau-Ponty uses the example of becoming blind in order to illustrate his claim that 
changes in the body alter being in the world. Yet, there is variation among individuals in how 
exactly one’s relation to the world changes; the objective body does not dictate one’s own body. 
Merleau-Ponty’s focus remains primarily on the individual rather than also evaluating the impact 
of social factors.  
 Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the phenomena of the phantom limb, in which a person 
feels sensation or pain in a limb they do not have,90 and anosognosia, a condition in which 
someone does not recognize a part of their body, provides additional examples in which the 
objective body does not determine one’s own body. Although he discusses these conditions in 
tandem, I will focus on the phantom limb. He assesses the limitations of psychological and 
physiological explanations before developing his own account. Merleau-Ponty remarks, “[i]f the 
phantom limb depends upon physiological conditions and is thereby the effect of a third person 
causality, then it is inconceivable how it can also result from the personal history of the patient, 
from his memories, his emotions, or his desires” (2012, 79). It seems that physiological and 
psychological explanations are mutually exclusive, yet, on his account, neither is sufficient 
independently. 
 Regarding physiological and psychological explanations of anosognosia and the phantom 
limb, Merleau-Ponty remarks:   
 A physiological explanation would interpret anosognosia and the phantom limb as the 
 mere suppression or the mere persistence of interoceptive stimulations. On this 
 hypothesis, anosognosia is the absence of a fragment of the body’s representation that 
 should be given, since the corresponding limb is in fact present; the phantom limb is the 
 presence of a part of the body’s representation that should not be given, since the 
 corresponding limb is in fact absent. If these phenomena are now given a psychological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Merleau-Ponty discusses instances in which a person’s limb was amputated. A small percentage of 
people born without a limb experience a phantom limb, and these instances would need further 
explanation. 
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 explanation, the phantom limb becomes a memory, a positive judgment, or a perception; 
 anosognosia becomes a forgetting, a negative judgment, or a non-perception. In the first 
 case, the phantom limb is the actual presence of a representation and anosognosia is the 
 actual absence of a representation. In the second case, the phantom limb is the 
 representation of an actual presence and anosognosia is the representation of an actual 
 absence (2012, 82). 
 
Merleau-Ponty continues by arguing that, “In neither case do we escape from the categories of 
the objective world where there is no middle ground between presence and absence” (82). He 
suggests that, on the contrary, the phantom limb has an ambivalent presence rather than being a 
representation (83). Although the person knows he no longer has the limb in question, there is 
another sense in which he does not know. How is this possible?   
 Merleau-Ponty suggests that having a phantom limb can be attributed to the habit body—
one is accustomed to being able to use the limb that has been amputated (84). In expecting to be 
able to engage in tasks, using a phantom arm, for instance, Merleau-Ponty states, “in the impulse 
of movement that goes toward it [this complete world in which manipulable objects still figure], 
the patient finds the certainty of his [bodily] integrity” (84). On his account, the phantom limb 
seems to remain part of the habit body insofar as the person experiencing it still has intentional 
threads directed toward the world through the limb that is objectively no longer there. Thus, 
although changes in one’s actual body have the potential to alter one’s being in the world, 
exactly how is not directly determined and cannot be known ahead of time.   
 As I will develop further in this chapter, contra Weiss, Merleau-Ponty’s focus on people 
with impairments and illnesses neither serves to trouble the distinction between “normal” and 
“abnormal” nor does it suggest that subjects with impairments do not have deficiencies. Rather, 
Merleau-Ponty’s extensive use of Schneider as a case study serves primarily to clarify normal 
experience and behavior. More generally, his inclusion of the experiences of subjects with 
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disorders serves to highlight the deficiencies of intellectualism and empiricism and the strengths 
of existential analysis.  
 If my interpretation is correct, one may wonder if Merleau-Ponty’s approach to 
phenomenology is really compatible with the concerns of disability theorists. Although his focus 
and some of his assumptions differ from those typically endorsed by disability theorists, his 
emphasis on the philosophical importance of bodies for being in the world lays the groundwork 
for theorization of the ways that bodily particularities and interpretations influence being in the 
world. Just as the body is capable of closing us off from the world, so too it is what typically 
enables us to be in situations and to be involved with others. Discussing the role of the body for 
Schneider and for “normal” subjects, Merleau-Ponty asserts: 
 For the patient we have been discussing, movement toward the future, the living present, 
 or the past, and the power to learn, to mature, and to enter into communication with 
 others are all somehow blocked by a bodily symptom; existence has become entangled 
 and the body has become “life’s hiding place.” (…) Even when the subject is normal and 
 engaged in inter-human situations, insofar as he has a body, he continuously preserves 
 the power to withdraw from it. At the very moment when I live in the world and am 
 directed toward my projects, my occupations, my friends, or my memories, I can close 
 my eyes, lie down, listen to my blood pulsing in my ears, lose myself in some pleasure or 
 pain, and lock myself up in this anonymous life that underpins my personal life. But 
 precisely because it can shut itself off from the world, my body is also what opens me up 
 to the world and puts me into a situation there (167-168).  
 
Given Merleau-Ponty’s contention that embodiment is central for being in the world and being 
with others, it is no mystery that bodily changes can impact being. Thus, his approach to 
phenomenology has obvious appeal for disability theorists concerned with the body who want to 
move past the ways that the medical and social models of disability have conceptualized the role 
of the body. As developed in chapter three, disability theorists who have advocated inclusion of 
the body have tended to focus on impairment, remaining within the terms of scientific/medical 
discourse—what Merleau-Ponty would call the objective body. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the 
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body as ambiguous allows for a much richer account of embodiment that is capable of 
incorporating subjective experiences of living in accord or discord with social expectations and 
in physical environments built according to those expectations. 
 Some disability theorists have explicitly advocated phenomenological approaches and/or 
emphasized the centrality of material relations between one’s body and one’s environment for 
lived experiences of disability. In the next two sections, I will elaborate on the positions of a few 
of these theorists. In section two, I will focus on concepts developed by Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson, along with Gail Weiss’ discussion of the relationship between the work of Garland-
Thomson and Merleau-Ponty—in order to both draw attention to the assumptions Merleau-Ponty 
makes about the “normal” subject as well as ways that developing a greater consideration of the 
social and physical environment could enrich his understanding of embodied subjectivity.  
4.2 Garland-Thomson’s Concepts and Weiss’ View of their Relationship to Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology 
 
4.2.1 Material anonymity, fitting, and misfitting 	  
I begin by turning to Garland-Thomson’s 2011 article, “Misfits: A Feminist Materialist 
Disability Concept” in order to consider in more depth the range of ways of being in the world. 
Although she is primarily concerned with disability, some of the concepts she articulates can be 
used to explore commonalities between the experiences of embodied marginalization and to 
engage in intersectional analyses.  
 According to Garland-Thomson, “[a] fit occurs when a harmonious, proper interaction 
occurs between a particularly shaped and functioning body and an environment that sustains that 
body” (2011, 594). When there is an adequate fit between a person and his or her environment, 
one has what Garland-Thomson calls “material anonymity” in which one is “suited to the 
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circumstances and conditions of the environment, of satisfying its requirements so as not to stand 
out, make a scene, or disrupt through countering expectations” (596). In other words, one does 
not experience the material aspects of the environment as hindering one’s projects, and one 
conforms to the prevailing expectations for how one should be in the world. It is important to 
note that while material anonymity involves a supportive physical environment, it also entails 
fitting with social expectations. Although Garland-Thomson describes the material and 
discursive as “entangled,” at times she seems to leave out consideration of discourse when 
discussing the material (592). Perhaps this is because she is responding to theorists such as 
Butler, who, from her perspective, emphasize the discursive at the expense of the material (592, 
594).    
 When there is a lack of fit between one’s body and her environment, the built and natural 
world stand out as obstacles to one’s projects. At the same time, the body that does not fit social 
expectations or physical constructions stands out. Garland-Thomson calls this occurrence a 
“misfit,” which she characterizes in the following: 
 A misfit, conversely, describes an incongruent relationship between two things: a square 
 peg in a round hole. The problem with a misfit, then, inheres, not in either of the two 
 things but rather in their juxtaposition, the awkward attempt to fit them together. When 
 the spatial and temporal context shifts, so does the fit, and with it meanings and 
 consequences (592-593). 
 
A misfit lies not within the characteristics of one’s body or the environment; it occurs when they 
do not mesh. However, she uses the term to indicate both this disjunction as well as the 
individual who experiences it: “to mis-fit renders one a misfit” (593).  
 In addition, Garland-Thomson seeks to enact a shift from thinking about disability as a 
discursive event or identity performance to thinking about the ways that physical aspects of 
disability (bodies and their physical environments) matter. She states, “the concept of misfit 
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emphasizes the particularity of varying lived embodiments and avoids a theoretical generic 
disabled body that can dematerialize if social and architectural barriers no longer disabled it” 
(592). Here Garland-Thomson indicates similar concerns to those discussed in chapter three 
regarding approaches to disability informed by Butler’s work on gender performativity, such as 
that of Tremain. Limiting theorization of bodies within disability theory to the biomedical 
conditions of individuals or discursive products means that either the body is inevitably a 
problem (bodily particularities are all that matters) or the body is discursively constructed as a 
problem (bodily particularities do not matter except insofar as discourse makes them matter). 
While recognizing that misfits occur in relation to “social oppression encoded in attitudes and 
practices,” Garland-Thomson’s focus is on the material encounters between humans and their 
surroundings (594).  
 As advocates of the social model of disability have tended to do, Garland-Thomson 
overemphasizes the need for physical access, leaving to the side the experiences of those whose 
impairments and illnesses—especially but not only those involving cognitive limitations—will 
greatly limit their options regardless of the physical environment.91 The notions of fitting and 
misfitting are more useful for some types of impairments than for others. For instance, in “When 
Caring Is Just and Justice Is Caring: Justice and Mental Retardation,” Eva Kittay notes that 
people with severe cognitive impairments have benefitted the least from the disability 
community’s advocacy. Historically, the focus within this community has primarily been on 
physical accessibility and has tended to assume disabled people who are cognitively typical, i.e. 
capable of making their own decisions and participating in the workforce if given a supportive 
environment. According to Kittay:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 This is not to say that the continued focus on physical accessibility is unwarranted; however, there need 
to be additional priorities. 
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 They have argued that their impairments are only disabling in an environment that is 
 hostile to their differences and that has been constructed to exclude them. Yet, the 
 impairment of mental retardation is not easily addressed by physical changes in the 
 environment (2002, 258).     
 
Although social understandings of severe cognitive impairments are malleable and could help to 
create better living conditions for individuals with cognitive impairments (including adequate 
funding for appropriate education and care), physical changes in the environment are minimally 
effective.  
 It is also important to note that the notion of a misfit may be appropriated in the service 
of interventions that are rejected by disability advocates in order to create a fit. For instance, in 
the case of a girl referred to in the biomedical ethics literature as Ashley X, who was diagnosed 
with “static encephalopathy,” radical measures were taken in order to alter her body in order to 
create what was purported to be a better fit physically and in terms of social expectations. At the 
age of six, Ashley’s cognitive development remained at the level typical of an infant; she was 
unable to ambulate, sit up, or use language (Kafer 2013, 47). The etiology of her condition is 
unknown (Kittay 2011, 611). In 2004, when Ashley was seven or eight years of age, her parents 
opted to have physicians begin growth attenuation therapy (also referred to as “the Ashley 
treatment”) on her. This involved three types of surgical interventions: a hysterectomy, bilateral 
mastectomy, and appendectomy, followed by two and a half years of “high doses of estrogen in 
an attempt to stunt her growth” (Kafer 2013, 49). The primary aim cited by the parents as well as 
the main physician and pediatric bioethicist involved in her case was to facilitate the provision of 
care for her in the family’s home. They maintain that if Ashley remains approximately the height 
and weight of an average nine-year-old girl, then her parents—and possibly others in the 
future—will be able to move her around easily and include her in more activities than they would 
otherwise be able. They claim that growth attenuation will prevent the need to institutionalize her. 
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These types of support may be thought to be responses to a type of misfit between Ashley, if she 
were allowed to grow, and her physical environment. To create a better fit, either her 
surroundings need to be accessible and the family must obtain and use equipment to lift and 
transfer her for activities of daily living or physicians must employ surgical and hormonal 
intervention in order to facilitate moving Ashley with little or no reliance on such equipment.92 
One of the reasons some people within the disability rights community have voiced opposition to 
growth attenuation therapy is that it drastically changes the body of a child who is unable to give 
consent when changes could be made to her environment to allow her to receive the care that she 
needs in her parents’ home.  
 Regardless of the merit of these arguments in favor of the “Ashley treatment,” it is 
important to note that there are other types of rationales provided. They frame the effects of 
Ashley’s static encephalopathy, namely the low level of cognitive development, as entailing a 
type of misfit that is seen as in need of correction. In an interview with Christopher Mims in 
Scientific American bioethicist Norman Fost remarks:  
 [H]aving her size be more appropriate to her developmental level will make her less of a 
 “freak.” …I have long thought that part of the discomfort we feel in looking at 
 profoundly retarded adults is the aesthetic disconnect between their development and 
 their bodies. There is nothing repulsive about a 2 month old infant, despite its limited 
 cognitive, motor, and social skills. But when the 2 month old baby is put into a 20 year 
 old body, the disconnect is jarring (2007).93  
 
Fost seems to assume that the discomfort some feel in the presence of adults with severe 
cognitive impairments is appropriate, and that, rather than working to change this, it would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Additional arguments are made for the hysterectomy and double mastectomy. The potential for uterine 
bleeding as a result of the high doses of estrogen is cited as a justification for the hysterectomy. Removal 
of Ashley’s “breast buds” is said to eliminate the risk that she would experience pain or discomfort from 
developing large breasts, cancer, or fibrocystic growth—all of which are present in her family (Kafer, 52). 
I will not evaluate these claims here. For further discussion of the arguments for and against the “Ashley 
treatment,” see Gunther and Diekema 2006; Kittay 2011; and Kafer 2013. 
93 As quoted by Kafer (2013, 55).  
	   	   	  
176 
best to alter the appearance of such adults so that their developmental level will be readily 
apparent to observers. In the same article, he goes on to state: “If children like Ashley could 
magically retain the appearance of an infant, they would not only be easier to care for in the 
physical sense, but the emotional reaction to them would probably be more favorable” (Mims 
2007). Lest the reader should think Fost is the only one who holds this position, I turn to a 
related remark made by bioethicist George Dvorsky: “The estrogen treatment is not what is 
grotesque here. Rather, it is the prospect of having a full-grown and fertile woman endowed with 
the mind of a baby” (2006).94 It is unclear what harm being full-grown and fertile could cause 
Ashley. However, Dvorsky reveals concerns for the dissonance others may experience upon 
encountering her (perhaps as a result of finding her sexually attractive). Neither of these authors 
considers that the degree to which Ashley and others like her are deemed misfits could be 
decreased if social expectations were to shift. 
 Of course, as Garland-Thomson articulates it, misfitting occurs when a body and 
environment are not suitable in relation to each other. She wants to distance her conception from 
ones that would consider bodies themselves to be misfits. Fost and Dvorsky fail to identify their 
own reactions as well as the possible reactions of the public as a component of the misfit, which 
means that they do not consider whether that is the problem that needs to be addressed rather 
than changing Ashley’s body.  
 Garland-Thomson does not hold that the goal should be to eliminate all misfits or that the 
effects of misfitting are only negative. She suggests that misfitting may lead to a burgeoning 
awareness of social injustice and the formation of activist communities (597). According to 
Garland-Thomson, misfits may facilitate novel ways of negotiating unsupportive environments. 
She holds, “[a]cquiring or being born with the traits we call disabilities fosters an adaptability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Also quoted by Kafer (2013, 55). 
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and resourcefulness that often is underdeveloped in those whose bodies fit smoothly into the 
prevailing, sustaining environment” (2011, 604). As mentioned in chapter two, Garland-
Thomson endorses what she terms “feminist sitpoint theory,” a feminist standpoint informed by 
the experiences of disabled people. She supports reduction in the frequency of misfits through 
development of more sustaining environments characterized by “accessibly designed built public 
spaces, welcoming natural surroundings, communication devices, tools, and implements, as well 
as other people,” some of which have been made more likely through civil rights legislation 
(594). However, she contends that the imperative to decrease the number of misfits is harmful 
when it is taken as a mandate to eliminate “the particularities of embodiment we think of as 
disability” through technological means such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis, prenatal 
testing and selective abortion, and medical normalization (602). Thus, on Garland-Thomson’s 
account, not only are misfits not always something to be prevented, but they also provide 
potential epistemic resources.  
 The notion of misfitting does not answer a priori whether or how a misfit should be 
resolved or even than it can be. Yet, it is significant that Garland-Thomson gestures at something 
that theorists such as Tremain seem to miss—the fact that the materiality of bodies and the social 
meanings given to bodily particularities in conjunction with the physical environment are 
relevant for experiences of being enabled or disabled. Not all bodies considered to have 
impairments misfit. It is equally clear that although social norms are an important aspect of 
misfits, they are not the only cause of misfits.  
 Being marginalized on the basis of race and gender may be considered a type of misfit. 
Garland-Thomson explicitly suggests that her notion of misfitting may be used more broadly 
than has been discussed to this point in the following:  
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 Although misfit is associated with disability and arises from disability theory, its critical 
 application extends beyond disability as a cultural category and social identity toward a 
 universalizing of misfitting as a contingent and fundamental fact of human embodiment 
 (598).  
 
I take her claim to be that misfitting is always a possibility, even if, I would add, misfits are more 
likely for some people than others. This is consistent with the examples Garland-Thomson 
provides in the following: “A misfit occurs when world fails flesh in the environment one 
encounters—whether it is a flight of stairs, a boardroom full of misogynists, an illness or injury, 
a whites-only country club, subzero temperatures, or a natural disaster” (600). Her primary focus 
is on vulnerability—the potential for suffering—that she claims manifests when the environment 
is not sustaining. These types of misfits are difficult to ignore.      
 Garland-Thomson suggests that fitting as a nondisabled person is similar to being in a 
dominant position in terms of race and gender insofar as material anonymity is attained. She 
contends, “[l]ike the dominant subject positions such as male, white, or heterosexual, fitting is a 
comfortable and unremarkable majority experience of material anonymity, an unmarked subject 
position that most of us occupy at some points in life and that often goes unrecognized [emphasis 
added]” (2011, 597). Her description of material anonymity or fitting applies to bodily features 
beyond typical structure, function, and health that have social significance. This implies that one 
can also experience material anonymity if one’s body and environment are an adequate fit in 
regard to social expectations related to gender, race, and sexuality. It is difficult to notice one’s 
own material anonymity. Often those who are privileged in this way, in fact, do not notice until 
those experiencing misfits draw attention to the phenomenon of material anonymity. For 
example, a white person may not think about race because the effects of race on her life are not 
readily apparent to her. One manifestation of inhabiting a privileged social identity is that one 
may not be required to think about the effects of social categories. 
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 Without elaborating on precisely what she means, Garland-Thomson claims “[m]isfit 
moves this idea of dissonance [when others’ identifications of us differ from our own] from 
epistemology into phenomenology” (601). It is clear that she seeks to center lived experiences, 
but she claims that the concept of misfit deemphasizes “being” in favor of “location” (604). 
Given the reading of Merleau-Ponty developed in this chapter, it makes little sense to position 
these as opposed to each other. However, it appears that Garland-Thomson conceives of being as 
static rather than dynamic, as acontextual/atemporal rather than situated, and this is why she 
thinks of being as opposed to location. To elaborate on the relationship between Garland-
Thomson’s notions of fitting and misfitting and Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology, I 
will now turn to Weiss’ discussion of this topic. I will also critique Weiss’ position on Merleau-
Ponty’s assumptions about disability and his use of Schneider specifically. 
 
4.2.2 Weiss on Garland-Thomson, Merleau-Ponty, and normality 	  
Although Garland-Thomson does not reference Merleau-Ponty in her 2011 article,95 Weiss 
suggests in “The Normal, the Natural, and the Normative” (2015) that her notions of fitting and 
misfitting are phenomenological and in line with his discussion of being in the world. She also 
suggests that Garland-Thomson’s approach to critiquing the medical and social models of 
disability parallels Merleau-Ponty’s approach to empiricism and intellectualism. Weiss states:   
just as Merleau-Ponty argues that both the empiricist and the intellectualist go astray in 
the same way, despite their opposition to one another, because both are committed to a 
one-sided, active/passive model that does not accurately describe our experience, so 
Garland-Thomson argues that whether disability is seen as a function of a deficient body 
or a deficient environment, we are not doing justice to the lived experience of disability 
(Weiss 2015, 90). 
 
Yet, just as Merleau-Ponty finds aspects of empiricism and intellectualism to be valuable, so too, 
there are insights within the medical and social models of disability that are worth retaining. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Garland-Thomson does reference Phenomenology of Perception in Staring: How We Look (2009). 
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However, it is a mistake to consider impairment (or scientific descriptions of bodies more 
generally) to be “the” way to treat bodies in theory and practice. In addition, social context must 
be considered in order to understand the ways people with impairments are enabled or disabled. 
The problem arises when either model or even an attempt to combine these models is represented 
as an adequate description of disability. Just as empiricism and intellectualism omit being in the 
world while being premised on it, so too the medical and social models of disability, which 
conceptualize disability as “a function of a deficient body or a deficient environment,” 
respectively, leave out being in the world (one’s own body) while resting on it (90). Embodied 
subjectivity is left out, and the phenomenon of disability escapes theorization.       
I agree with Weiss that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of embodiment, with 
adaptations, is a productive starting point for theorizing experiences related to gender, race, and 
disability. However, I think that Weiss gives Merleau-Ponty credit for being attuned to the 
concerns of disability activists and theorists who came after him in a way that he could not have 
been. She rightly notes that disability studies emerged as a field after his death and thus could not 
have influenced his thinking. Nonetheless, I think she misconstrues Merleau-Ponty’s rationale 
for focusing on individuals with illnesses and impairments, leading her to attribute conclusions to 
Merleau-Ponty that do not have textual support within Phenomenology of Perception.    
In the course of comparing the assumptions made by Merleau-Ponty and Garland-
Thomson, Weiss makes the following claim:  
Just as Merleau-Ponty emphasizes Schneider’s adaptability to the bodily and situational 
limitations that “normal subjects” believe make his experience profoundly deficient, so 
that they are lived as normal for him, Garland-Thomson stresses that what might look 
like a misfit to others, namely a non-normative body that engages with the world in non-
normative ways, with the right support from others and from the environment, may 
actually be lived as a fit [emphasis added] (Weiss 2015, 92). 
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Although Weiss’ attribution of the claim that it is possible in many cases for those with non-
normative bodies to attain a fit with a supportive environment to Garland-Thomson is correct, 
her suggestion that Merleau-Ponty draws the conclusion that Schneider experiences such a fit 
does not find textual support within Phenomenology of Perception. Merleau-Ponty focuses on 
Schneider’s bodily and relational limitations and the strategies he undertakes in order to 
complete certain tasks. There are a number of passages that, I would argue, should lead us to 
conclude that Schneider’s bodily and situational limitations are not, as Weiss claims, “lived as 
normal for him” (92). Schneider’s brain injury imposes limits on the degree to which he can 
experience a “fit” in any social and physical environment. He lives with the knowledge that there 
are things he would like to be able to do that he cannot, such as forming political beliefs and 
maintaining long-term friendships. I would suggest that, in this case, rather than being limited to 
the judgments “normal” subjects make about him, Schneider himself experiences a mismatch 
between his desires and his capabilities. To be clear, I am responding to Weiss’ claims here 
rather than those of Garland-Thomson, since the latter does not discuss Schneider.  
Consider the following passage from Phenomenology of Perception: 
 
Schneider rarely expands his social milieu, and, when he does establish new friendships, 
they at times end badly: upon analysis, we see that this is because they never emerge 
from a spontaneous movement, but rather from an abstract decision. He would like to be 
able to think about politics or religion, but he never even tries. He knows that these 
regions are no longer accessible to him, and we have seen that, generally speaking, he 
never executes an authentic act of thought and he substitutes the manipulation of signs 
and the technique of using “fulcra” for the intuition of number or the grasping of signs 
(Merleau-Ponty 2012, 160). 
 
Merleau-Ponty claims that Schneider’s efforts to create new friendships are often thwarted by his 
inability to connect with others in a way that is spontaneous rather than contrived. In addition, 
Schneider is said to have a desire to consider politics and religion, but he is not able to do so. He 
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experiences these limitations; they are not interpretations imposed on him by others that distort 
his own assessment.  
As developed earlier in this chapter, at the core of Schneider’s limitations is a shift in his 
situatedness as being in the world. Merleau-Ponty notes that one of the ways this manifests in his 
behavior is through a lack of spontaneity or playfulness. 
“He must now be content with general beliefs and without being able to express them.” 
He never sings nor whistles on his own. We will see below that he never takes the 
initiative sexually. He never goes for a walk, but always to run an errand, and he does not 
recognize Professor Goldstein’s house when walking by it “because he has not gone out 
with the intention of going there.” (…)96 There is something meticulous and serious in all 
of his behavior, which comes from the fact that he is incapable of playing. To play is to 
place oneself momentarily in an imaginary situation, to amuse oneself in changing one’s 
“milieu” (136).    
 
Because Schneider’s lack of playfulness is caused by his inability to put himself into an 
imaginary situation, he would experience a misfit in any “world,” regardless of the social and 
physical environment. While there are ways that those around him can help to lessen the degree 
of misfitting he experiences (for instance, by having expectations that are in line with his 
capabilities), a change in his environment cannot create a perfect fit that will allow Schneider to 
be playful or to achieve other things he would like to be able to do.   
 Weiss suggests that in Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty discusses “allegedly 
abnormal experiences, not as negative examples that reinforce the rigid boundaries of normality, 
but, I would argue, to challenge our conceptions of what is normal, what is natural, and what can 
and should be normative” (2015, 93). Although it is true that Merleau-Ponty locates a continuity 
between the behavior of “normal” and “pathological” subjects, as I argued in the previous 
section of this chapter, rather than calling the distinction between these categories into question, 
his method in Phenomenology of Perception is premised upon it. Here are a few additional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Merleau-Ponty attributes the portions in quotation marks to W. Benary (1922, 213). 
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passages that support my position. Merleau-Ponty queries: “How are we to make sense of this 
series of facts, and how should the function that exists for the normal person, but that is missing 
for the patient, be understood through them?” (2012, 110) He goes on to say: 
Illness, like childhood or like the “primitive” state, is a complete form of existence, and 
the procedures that it employs in order to replace the normal functions that have been 
destroyed are themselves pathological phenomena…We observe that the patient who is 
questioned on the position of his limbs or on the location of a tactile stimulus seeks, 
through preparatory movements, to turn his body into a present object of perception; 
when questioned about the form of an object touching his body, he seeks to trace it 
himself by following the contour of the object. Nothing could be more mistaken than to 
assume that the same operations are at work for the normal person and merely abridged 
by habit. The patient only seeks these explicit perceptions in order to supply himself with 
a particular presence of the body and the object that is given for the normal person and 
that remains for us to reconstitute [emphasis added] (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 110). 
 
He contends that analyses of the behavior of subjects such as Schneider provide insights into 
“normal” behavior, and this is primarily by way of contrast rather than similarity. Although there 
may be instances in the text in which Merleau-Ponty provides helpful descriptions of ways that 
disabled people incorporate implements such as canes into their being in the world, his point is 
not to call into question conceptions of normality. 
 I have highlighted Weiss’ claims about the relationship between the approaches of 
Merleau-Ponty and Garland Thomson as well as my response to her interpretation of Merleau-
Ponty’s use of Schneider and his position on normality more generally. I will now develop an 
assessment of the usefulness of Garland-Thomson’s notions in order to critique 
phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher as well as to bring together work on 
lived experiences of disability with other types of marginalized embodiment.  
4.3 Material Anonymity and Phenomenology: Merleau-Ponty and Some of his Successors 	  
Garland-Thomson’s notions of “material anonymity,” “fit,” and “misfit” are closely related to the 
notion of being in the world as Merleau-Ponty articulates it insofar as they entail the assumption 
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that being is situated, embodied, and dynamic. Both theorists begin with lived experience, which 
enables them to account for embodied subjectivity insofar as they refuse biologically or 
culturally deterministic assumptions. However, Garland-Thomson attends to the significance of 
bodily particularities and social context to a greater degree than Merleau-Ponty does. Since he 
recognizes that ambiguity is fundamental within human existence, I initially thought that what 
Garland-Thomson takes to be novel insights had already been articulated by Merleau-Ponty. 
Upon further reflection, however, I realized that her notions of material anonymity, fit, and misfit 
may serve to highlight important limitations within his approach to phenomenology. While this 
would be significant in itself, it matters even more due to Merleau-Ponty’s extensive influence 
on theorists concerned with embodiment.   
 Garland-Thomson’s notion of material anonymity can be used to highlight the implicit 
assumptions that Merleau-Ponty makes about what types of subjects count as “normal” or typical. 
Although he acknowledges that one’s body is essential for enabling or preventing one from being 
open to the world, his exploration of how bodily particularities and social identity impact the 
ways in which one is situated is limited. To put the point differently, Merleau-Ponty sometimes 
does not recognize that he is universalizing the experiences of particular bodies that fit well 
enough to attain material anonymity.97 As Alison Kafer states, “there is no mention of ‘the’ body 
that is not a further articulation of a very particular body” (2013, 7). I will show that Merleau-
Ponty and others drawing on his work, including S. Kay Toombs, Drew Leder, Havi Carel, and 
Shaun Gallagher assume a sort of material anonymity to be the standard way of being rather than 
a privileged way of being that only a minority of the population experiences on a consistent basis. 
Garland-Thomson seems to go back and forth on this point, and I think this is because in some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 For example, as Alcoff states, “on their [Young, Butler, and Grosz’s] view Merleau-Ponty’s 
shortcomings result mainly from the fact that his analysis of embodiment did not specify sexual 
difference, and thus male embodiment was allowed to stand in for the whole” (2000, 265).  
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parts of her article she uses mis/fitting to refer specifically to dis/ability and in others she 
broadens the scope to include mis/fitting across additional axes. If an inclusive notion of 
misfitting is adopted, then I would suggest that material anonymity is the exception rather than 
the rule. Theorists who provide phenomenological accounts of lived experiences of disability, 
gender, and race tend to think about these social categories in isolation and to assume that 
“normal” subjects (i.e., the subjects that are not marginalized along the axis with which the 
theorist is concerned) attain material anonymity. I call for work that simultaneously considers 
disability and other axes of marginalized embodiment such as gender and race.  
 Merleau-Ponty acknowledges some types of variation among subjects categorized as 
“normal” or “pathological,” but this does not include the ways that bodily features that count as 
markers of race, gender, and dis/ability matter for being in the world. In Disability Bioethics: 
Moral Bodies, Moral Difference, Scully suggests that this may be a result of his desire to develop 
a universal account: 
 Perhaps it is that the commitment to establishing a universal phenomenological ontology 
 renders Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists incapable of acknowledging any 
 variation in the primary normative experience that might challenge the claim that being-
 in-the-world can be described in terms of a common primordial perception (Scully 2008,  
 94). 
 
If it is assumed that it is possible to talk about being prior to and apart from particular 
characteristics and embodiment more generally, then development of a universal ontology makes 
sense. However, since Merleau-Ponty centers embodiment rather than leaving it implicit, doubts 
arise about the possibility of such a universal account.  
 Scully maintains that the divide between “normal” and “pathological” encourages 
homogenization of experiences within the category of “normal.” In her words: 
 a phenomenology that splits the experience of being-in-the-world into the normal (the 
 one we focus on) and the pathological (variants that are only interesting for what they tell 
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 us about normality) obscures the very obvious fact that even fully functioning people 
 vary enormously in their capacity for certain perceptions or actions that, in principle, all 
 human beings are supposed to be able to do. Whenever the “normal” spontaneous body 
 sense is invoked, we need to keep in mind that this sense operates along something like a 
 continuum with multiple axes (Scully 2008, 94-95). 
 
Her discussion focuses on differences in abilities between members of the category “normal.” 
For example, Scully notes that some people “will always have two left feet when it comes to the 
tango” (95). She claims that phenomenologists who attend to embodiment have tended to focus 
on the extreme ends of the spectrum when it comes to ability.98  
  Scully notes that feminist philosophers have criticized Merleau-Ponty for focusing 
almost exclusively on the bodily experiences of men. She observes that this is true not only of 
Merleau-Ponty but also of later phenomenologists. Worse, they unreflectively equate white male 
experience with “normal” experience (2008, 94). These experiences are characterized by 
material anonymity, which, I have argued, is not something most people experience consistently. 
In addition, Scully asserts “[c]riticism of phenomenology’s neglect of the gendered body applies 
equally well to its treatment of other types of phenotypic variance” (94). Although she 
acknowledges that Merleau-Ponty discusses individuals with impairments, she shares my 
contention that his main goal in doing so is to elucidate “normal” experience. Scully puts the 
point this way: “Much of his empirical data comes from neuropathology because the effects of 
disruptions to the standard sensory and motor apparatus were useful in his philosophical 
modeling of phenomenological norms” (2008, 89). Turning to atypical subjects helps to clarify 
the experiences of “normal” subjects.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Perhaps this is a bit of an exaggeration. I appreciate Alex Levine’s remark on this topic: “I don’t know 
of any phenomenological discussion of the lived experience of Olympic-level athletes.” I believe Scully’s 
point to be that phenomenologists have not sufficiently taken into consideration the variations in ability 
between typical subjects. 
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 The trend of assuming that material anonymity is typical is present within the work of 
philosophers who are focused on developing phenomenological accounts of impairment and 
illness as well. This matters because, even though these theorists are working to better describe 
the experiences of people with illnesses and impairments, they are still tacitly assuming a white 
male able-bodied subject as standard or “normal” and making implicit assumptions about the 
race and gender of disabled subjects. Here I will briefly discuss three examples. 
 In “Illness and the Paradigm of the Lived Body,” Toombs asserts that, in illness: 
“Habitual acts (such as walking, running, lifting, sitting up, eating, talking, and so forth), which 
were hitherto performed unthinkingly, now become effortful and must be attended to” (1988, 
208). Surely, it is often the case that illness makes one more aware of one’s body, especially in 
situations in which one must find new ways to or is unable to accomplish certain tasks. It is 
important to detail the ways in which illness and impairment shape being in the world, and this is 
something Toombs’s work does exceptionally well. However, there is much more to be said 
about ways that social expectations—including those related to gender and race—create misfits 
and the corresponding imperative to attend to one’s body, regardless of one’s health and ability 
status.  
 Toombs states that in cases of illness, “[t]he lived experience of the body itself becomes 
the focus of attention. Pain or other bodily dysfunction disrupts one’s ongoing engagement with 
the world. The body can no longer be taken for granted and ignored” (1992, 35). This quotation 
suggests that when one’s body is functioning well and one is not experiencing pain, then the 
body can be “taken for granted and ignored.” Toombs also implies this in the following: 
 Illness precipitates a fundamental change in the relation between self and body. In the 
 first place the body can no longer be taken-for-granted or ignored. It must be explicitly 
 attended to in various ways. Consequently, rather than being simply lived unreflectively, 
 the body becomes an object for scrutiny. With objectification comes alienation. As an 
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 object, the body is suddenly perceived as a “thing” which is exterior to the self, as 
 something Other-than-me (1988, 214).  
 
Here Toombs attends to the individual’s perception of his or her body. If we combine her 
insights with those of Garland-Thomson, we might arrive at the conclusion that objectification is 
the opposite of material anonymity.  
 Although Toombs focuses on experiences of illness, she notes that there are other factors 
that may lead one to sense the body as other, stating: “[w]hile the sense of ‘otherness’ of body is 
by no means peculiar to illness, it is particularly felt in this experience” (1988, 217). While she 
recognizes that illness is not unique in being correlated with the inability to take one’s own body 
for granted, Toombs does not develop ways that social identity is relevant for the experience of 
bodily otherness, among ill and healthy individuals alike.    
 Leder claims in The Absent Body that when one is healthy, the body has a tendency to 
recede, phenomenologically, into the background of one’s awareness. He calls this 
disappearance. He asserts: 
 Our organic basis can be easily forgotten due to the reticence of visceral processes. 
 Intentionality can be attributed to a disembodied mind, given the self-effacement of the 
 ecstatic body. As these disappearances particularly characterize normal and healthy 
 functioning, forgetting about or “freeing oneself” from the body takes on a positive 
 valuation (1990, 69).    
 
I would suggest that Leder assumes that normal and healthy functioning is sufficient to enable 
one to forget about the body in favor of focusing on other things. On his account, the body is 
simply not an issue unless one experiences pain or symptoms of illness. In other words, like 
Toombs, Leder assumes that material anonymity is the typical form that being in the world takes 
for healthy, nondisabled subjects.  
 In “Phenomenology and its Application in Medicine” (2011) Carel contends that when 
there is a disjuncture between the objective and the lived body, one is forced to attend to one’s 
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body, as in the cases of anorexia and phantom limb. When the objective and lived body are “in 
harmony,” on the other hand, she suggests that, “The healthy body is transparent, i.e., taken for 
granted. Thus, transparency is the hallmark of health and normal function. We do not stop to 
consider any of its processes because as long as everything is going smoothly, it remains in the 
background” (Carel 2011, 39). This type of claim is common among philosophers who engage in 
phenomenological approaches to illness and impairment. While there is a limited sense in which 
this type of claim seems accurate—we pay more attention to our bodies when they prevent us 
from engaging in activities or cause us pain (and we have not adjusted to this) than when they 
facilitate our aims and do not hurt—there are varying degrees to which it is possible for any 
given individual to take their body for granted or have it remain in the background.99  
 Factors such as race, gender, and class play a significant role in influencing the degree to 
which one is likely to be able to take one’s body for granted or, at the other end of the spectrum, 
to be compelled to attend to its every move and potential interpretation. Perhaps it is useful to 
expand what it means for everything to be “going smoothly” beyond an individualistic and 
medicalized perspective. I contend that many bodily experiences of those who are considered 
healthy and nondisabled call into question the claim that being able to take the body for granted 
is a universal experience among members of this group. I will develop this position in the 
remainder of the chapter, drawing on insights from theorists concerned with disability, race, and 
gender. I now turn to a critique of Gallagher’s characterization of “normal” subjects in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Young asserts, “The notion of the body as a pure medium of my projects is the illusion of a philosophy 
that has not quite shed the Western philosophical legacy of humanity as spirit” (2015, 52). Even 
philosophy that is explicitly focused on embodiment struggles to remain focused on the variety of 
embodied experiences, i.e., the ways in which bodies are not simply mediums for projects. In addition, 
when bodies are theorized without consideration of context, theorists miss how they are enabled or 
disabled. 
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demonstrate the ways that failure to consider gender and race limit the applicability of his 
account.  
 In How the Body Shapes the Mind, Gallagher’s approach to the case study of Ian 
Waterman is very similar to Merleau-Ponty’s use of Schneider. Namely, Gallagher uses 
Waterman, who “has no sense of touch and no proprioception [which provides one with a sense 
of bodily position and where one’s body parts are] below the neck” in order to help to flesh out 
how Waterman’s strategies for keeping track of his body greatly diverge from typical subjects 
(2005, 43). Gallagher draws on Waterman’s behavior in order to clarify the distinction he makes 
between body image and body schema, terms whose usage has tended to be inconsistent 
throughout the literature within philosophy and psychology. Body image involves perceptions, 
beliefs, conceptual understanding, and emotions about one’s body. Body schema, on the other 
hand, “involves certain motor capacities, abilities, and habits that both enable and constrain 
movement and the maintenance of posture” (2005, 24). Although I agree with Gallagher that 
typical subjects are able to rely on a body schema rather than relying on body image to engage in 
movements to the extent that Waterman does, I maintain that a more nuanced account of the 
variations between typical subjects is needed in order to include the impact of norms related to 
social categories such as gender and race. 
 Gallagher acknowledges, “[s]ocial and cultural factors clearly affect perceptual, 
conceptual, and emotional aspects of body image” (30). So, there is room in his account for the 
ways in which one’s social positioning—including relation to gender norms—impact body 
image. Yet, he doesn’t seem to consider the possibility that these factors may impact body 
schema and thereby, movement and posture. Gallagher assumes that cultural and social factors 
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affect body image but does not seem to allow that either body image or these factors affect 
movement in normal cases. He goes on to say of body schema:  
 In most instances, movement and the maintenance of posture are accomplished by the 
 close to automatic performances of a body schema, and for this very reason the normal 
 adult subject, in order to move around the world, neither needs nor has a constant body 
 percept. In this sense the body-in-action tends to efface itself in most of its purposive 
 activities [italics in original, bolded text added] (26).    
 
I want to raise two related issues in response to this quotation. First, as noted above, Gallagher 
allows that social and cultural factors impact body image, but this isn’t normally relevant, on his 
account, for development of motor capacities, abilities, and habits related to movement and 
posture. Secondly, as I will show, his description of the movements enacted by the “normal adult 
subject” “in most instances” doesn’t address some of the everyday experiences of movement of 
“normal” (nondisabled) female subjects and may, thus, be more likely to actually describe the 
typical movements of “normal” (nondisabled) (white) male subjects. Gallagher notes that there 
may be differences between individuals regarding just how much the body effaces itself in action 
(2005, 27). Of course, this is an important point. What he doesn’t consider is that there may be 
norms in place that influence how likely it is that one’s body will be effaced in purposive 
activities—in other words, whether or not material anonymity is possible.  
 Though he uses gender-inclusive language, Gallagher makes further claims here 
regarding the “normal and healthy subject” that I would suggest are not the default in the case of 
many normal and healthy female subjects’ lived experiences. He maintains: 
 With respect to moving around the world, the normal and healthy subject can in large 
 measure forget about her body in the normal routine of the day. The body takes care of 
 itself, and in doing so, it enables the subject to attend, with relative ease, to other practical 
 aspects of life. To the extent that the body effaces itself, it grants the subject a freedom to 
 think of other things. The fact that Ian, who lacks proprioception, is forced to think about 
 his bodily movements and his posture much of the time demonstrates the degree to 
 which, in the normal subject, this is not the case [emphasis added]” (2005, 55). 
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Like Schneider, Waterman “knows” the location of his body in one sense but not the other. It 
should be noted that Gallagher does concede that body image may affect body schema when one 
is engaging in some types of novel activities that involve movement. He states in footnote 6 of 
chapter 6, “in cases of learning dance or athletic movements, focusing attention on specific body 
parts can alter the established postural schema” (141). Yet, it remains the case that he thinks that 
it is exceptional for bodily awareness to “interfere with the performance of the body schema” 
(141). This account may accurately describe many of the experiences that able-bodied men and 
women have of movement. Yet, I would venture to say that there are more men than women and 
more white people than people of color in sexist and racist societies who would agree with 
Gallagher’s assertion that, “With respect to moving around the world, the normal and healthy 
subject can in large measure forget about her [or his] body in the normal routine of the day” (55). 
Here again, this description seems more applicable to those whose bodies are privileged through 
social norms and the built physical environment.  
 Iris Marion Young’s work is especially helpful for clarifying what is missing in 
Gallagher’s characterization of “normal and healthy subjects.” In “Pregnant Embodiment: 
Subjectivity and Alienation” ([1984] 2005) she notes: “The dominant model of health assumes 
that the normal, healthy body is unchanging. (…) Only a minority of persons, however, namely 
adult men who are not yet old, experience their health as a state in which there is no regular 
change in body condition” (2005, 57). The oversights within Gallagher’s discussion are common 
rather than exceptional. Since he focuses primarily on the relationship between posture and 
movement, on the one hand, and body schema and body image, on the other, I will turn to 
another of Young’s essays that deals with gendered negotiation of space. 
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 In “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, 
and Spatiality” Young explores how girls and women “situated in contemporary advanced 
industrial, urban, and commercial society” develop ways of moving and relating to space that are 
feminine ([1980] 2005, 30). She draws on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the lived body in order to 
consider how women and men come to embody social norms regarding gender. Young defines 
“feminine” as “a set of structures and conditions that delimit the typical situation of being a 
woman in a particular society, as well as the typical way in which this situation is lived by the 
women themselves” (31). This definition allows for variation between the situations of women in 
different societies as well as how particular women within the same society embody norms of 
femininity (or don’t). Young notes that while boys tend to be socialized to use their bodies in 
ways that maximize their strength when accomplishing physical tasks, girls are often cautioned 
to be careful and not to get hurt when engaging in these same tasks, and this is one reason that 
females tend to approach tasks that require strength with more hesitancy than males. Young also 
notes that the theme that emerges when comparing the approaches of men and women to tasks 
requiring strength and coordination, for example, throwing, running, climbing, and swinging, is 
that men tend to use their entire bodies while women tend to only engage the parts of their bodies 
that are absolutely necessary (33). As a result, women often use their bodies in ways that are less 
effective than men’s use of their bodies in these purposive activities.  
 Young’s account of feminine movement can be used to flesh out Gallagher’s discussion 
of body image and body schema. In Gallagher’s terms, the body images of women and men are 
likely to differ greatly insofar as the standards for evaluating their bodies differ, though there is 
certainly variation within these groups. Even if it is conceded that cultural and social factors 
directly impact body image on a regular basis but only affect body schema indirectly via 
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attentiveness to body image when one is learning dance or athletic movements, cultural and 
social factors would continue to impact subsequent enactments of these movements even without 
conscious reflection on body image. If Gallagher is willing to allow that we attend to body image 
when learning dance and athletic movements, it seems he should recognize that other novel 
movements also require attending to body image. In this case, it is easy to see how social and 
cultural factors, such as norms of femininity and masculinity, could play an important role in 
shaping “motor capacities, abilities, and habits that both enable and constrain movement and the 
maintenance of posture,” i.e., body schema (2005, 24). After all, many novel movements become 
everyday movements. 
 In addition to norms of femininity influencing women’s movements indirectly through 
body schema’s reliance on body image in engaging in unfamiliar movements that may become 
habitual, I think that body image is more likely to affect women’s movements directly. 
According to Young, “We [women] feel as though we must have our attention directed upon our 
bodies to make sure they are doing what we wish them to do, rather than paying attention to what 
we want to do through our bodies” (2005, 34). If this is the case, women’s bodies are unlikely to 
efface themselves in at least some types of purposive activities. Young claims that women often 
divide their attention between the task they are accomplishing and their bodies as objects. This is 
in alignment with the findings of social psychologist Stephen Franzoi that women tend to view 
their bodies primarily in terms of its status as an object while men tend to focus on the abilities 
of their bodies. In Franzoi’s words:   
 Consistent with the perspective of women objectifying their bodies and men having a 
 more process-oriented view, when females engaged in body awareness their focus of 
 attention tended to be on specific body parts, while men's focus was more global, and 
 tended to be concerned with physical movement and function (1995, 418).   
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If Young and Franzoi are correct in their suggestion that women are likely to objectify their 
bodies, i.e., attend to body image, while engaged in everyday physical tasks, then it seems that 
cultural and social factors may impact body schema and movement in a wider variety of cases 
than Gallagher acknowledges. 
 As exemplified in the work of Toombs, Leder, Carel, and Gallagher, theorists of the body 
often focus on one axis of social identity as it is embodied. It is easy to understand why one 
would take this approach, given the complexity and range of experiences related to disability or 
race, for example. Yet, it is not possible to completely separate the effects of the multiple ways 
one is categorized upon lived experience. When we discuss one’s own body, we are always 
already tacitly assuming multiple axes of identity. For instance, discussions of disability that do 
not talk about race tend to assume whiteness while discussions focused on race tend to assume 
able-bodiedness. It is time to work toward developing phenomenological approaches that are 
explicitly intersectional, meaning that they consider the ways that multiple categories impact 
one’s own body, and the effects often cannot be neatly delineated into these categories. So far, 
my discussion has focused on ways that norms related to femininity encourage women to attend 
to the appearance and movements of their bodies in ways that diverge from what Gallagher 
characterizes as the normal adult subject. Considering norms related to race adds to the 
difficulties facing the type of standard account he presents, and adds to the evidence that his 
description is really most fitting of a nondisabled white man.  
 As Weiss notes: “Fanon presents a trenchant critique of the race-neutral, generic, and 
ultimately quite positive account Merleau-Ponty and the Gestalt theorists provide of the body 
schema” (2015, 86).100 She goes on to state: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Sara Ahmed makes a closely related remark in “A Phenomenology of Whiteness”:   
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 By providing this confirmatory account of how the body scheme should operate in the 
 allegedly “normal” subject, Fanon enables us to see exactly how and why it can become
 an impossible achievement for those whose bodies are deemed inherently inferior, that is, 
 for those who are ruled out, from the outset, from achieving the status of “normal” 
 subjects. Being viewed and treated as a “normal” subject, then, is revealed by Fanon not 
 to be one’s “birthright” as a human being, but as an inherited privilege that white bodies 
 (if, I would add, they are able-bodied) enjoy and that non-white bodies do not (86).  
 
One of the significant differences between those who are considered “normal” subjects and those 
who are not is whether or not one’s body is treated as an obstacle to one’s status as human. When 
a person is in an environment that is sustaining—socially and materially—it is easy to think that 
the body is irrelevant for their life prospects. However, in the converse instance, the ways in 
which social norms privilege some types of bodies while marginalizing others—creating fits and 
misfits—are more readily apparent.  
 There are cases in which it is inadvisable to ignore one’s body because, in instances of 
misfitting, doing so may result in misunderstandings or even violence. In “White Gazes: What It 
Feels Like to Be an Essence” (2014) George Yancy provides an illustration of some of ways that 
Black men are compelled to attend to their every movement in the presence of white women. He 
recounts a recurring experience he, a Black university professor, has, of sharing an elevator with 
a white woman in which her gestures indicate fear that he will harm her or steal her purse. Yancy 
is placed in a double-bind insofar as there is no good response, only gestures that are, at best, 
likely to be interpreted in ways that reinforce stereotypes, or, at worst, are seen as manifesting 
the violent intentions he is assumed to harbor. He states:   
 She fears that a direct look may incite the anger of a Black predator. She fakes a smile. 
 By her smile she hopes to elicit a spark of decency from me. But I don’t return the smile. 
 I fear it may be interpreted as a gesture of sexual advance. After all, within the social 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 Husserl and Merleau-Ponty describe the body as “successful”, as being “able” to extend itself 
 (though objects) in order to act on and in the world. Fanon helps us to expose this “success” not 
 as a measure of competence, but as the bodily form of privilege: the ability to move through the 
 world without losing one’s way (2007, 161). 	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 space of the elevator, which has become a hermeneutic transactional space within which 
 all of my intended meanings get falsified, it is as if I am no longer in charge of what I 
 mean/intend. (…)It is through her gaze that I become hypervigilant of my own embodied 
 spatiality. On previous occasions, particularly when alone, I have moved my body within 
 the space of the elevator in a noncalculative fashion, paying no particular attention to my 
 bodily comportment, the movement of my hands, my eyes, the position of my feet. (…)I 
 now begin to calculate, paying almost neurotic attention to the proxemic positioning of 
 my body, making sure that this “Black object,” what now feels like an appendage, a 
 weight, is not too close, not too tall, not too threatening (2014, 56). 
 
Yancy illustrates how race and gender norms, which are structural, influence how one 
experiences and is compelled to comport one’s body. In this example, he perceives his body 
through this white woman’s gaze and his interpretation of what her smile means. Yancy’s 
hypervigilance is a response to the normalization of white men inflicting violence upon black 
men for even the slightest perceived transgressive manner of comportment.   
  When philosophers develop accounts of one’s own body that purport to be universal or 
normal, they fail to consider ways that norms related to ability, gender, and race enable the 
smooth functioning of certain types of bodies while marginalizing and obstructing others. The 
assumption that being healthy and nondisabled entails being able to ignore one’s body fails to 
include many people’s lived experiences. By drawing on Garland-Thomson’s notions of fitting, 
misfitting, and material anonymity, I have suggested that there are some commonalities between 
experiences of disabled people and people marginalized on the basis of gender and race. It is 
imperative for future work on embodied subjectivity to center ways that the intersection of these 
identity categories shapes lived experiences rather than continuing the trends of considering 
social identity to be irrelevant or theorizing each axis individually. 
4.4 Conclusion 	  
In this chapter, I have argued that although Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology is 
useful for theorizing embodiment within disability theory, it is important to assess his use of case 
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studies of people with illnesses and impairments—especially Schneider—within Phenomenology 
of Perception in order to clarify his concerns and assumptions. I have drawn on Garland-
Thomson’s notion of material anonymity in order to make explicit the ways that the assumptions 
of Merleau-Ponty and several of his successors limit the applicability of their approaches. Even 
theorists of the body who are concerned with disability, gender, or race tend to imply that 
material anonymity is typical or “normal.” Toombs, Leder, Carel, and Gallagher examine ways 
that illness and impairment affect being in the world, but they assume, like Merleau-Ponty, that 
healthy, normal subjects typically only need to pay minimal attention to their bodies. In other 
words, they assume the experiences of those with illnesses and impairments are exceptional and 
that material anonymity is the standard experience. Young, Weiss (drawing on Fanon), and 
Yancy provide examples that illustrate that the experiences of nondisabled white women and 
black men are likely to diverge from these descriptions and to involve misfitting. Perspectives 
arising from the starting point of disabled people’s lived experiences add to the trenchant 
critiques of Merleau-Ponty that feminist philosophers and philosophers of race have developed, 
and material anonymity helps to clarify his tacit assumptions as well as to tie these critiques 
together. This shows that the type of embodied experience he takes to be standard or “normal” is 
actually one that only a privileged few consistently have. Phenomenologists need to account not 
only for the impact of bodily conditions and particularities but also for the ways in which one’s 
being in the world is structured by norms related to disability, race, and gender.  
 Although I have been critical of Merleau-Ponty in this chapter, my position is that his 
approach to phenomenology—with the appropriate correctives, namely, making considerations 
related to disability, race, and gender in relation to bodily particularities explicit—is a productive 
approach to theorizing embodied subjectivity. My focus has been on various ways in which 
	   	   	  
199 
bodies are marginalized and objectified. In chapter 5, I will engage in the constructive project of 
highlighting the benefits of applying a Merleau-Pontian approach informed by disability theory 
to body integrity identity disorder—a condition that entails the strong desire to acquire an 
impairment in order to embody a certain type of social identity.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE DESIRE TO BE 
AN AMPUTEE 
 Healthy people seeking amputations are not nearly as rare as one might think. In May 
 1998 a seventy-nine-year-old man from New York traveled to Mexico and paid $10,000 
 for a black-market leg amputation; he died of gangrene in a motel. In October 1999 a 
 mentally competent man in Milwaukee severed his arm with a homemade guillotine, and 
 then threatened to sever it again if physicians reattached it. The same month a legal 
 investigator for the California state bar, after being refused a hospital amputation, tied off 
 her legs with tourniquets and began packing them in ice, hoping that gangrene would set 
 in, necessitating an amputation (Elliott 2004, 208-209).  
 
to speak of disability ontologically, as a way of being, rather than pathologically, as a 
way of being medically out of whack, is to replace a well-charted set of questions with 
less familiar ones. If disability is a way of being, what sort of being is it? How exactly 
does it develop? Which (that is, whose) representations of disability have authority? 
What relationship does disability have to other social or ontological categories, like 
gender, ethnicity, or class? Is disability in fact a genuine ontological category—is it really 
an authentic way of being, or is it just a useful organizing category for a motley 
collection of bodies? And if it is an identity, can it ever be anything other than a spoiled 
one (Goffman 1971) that we are morally obliged to restore to normality if we can, or 
prevent from happening if we can’t? (Scully 2008, 3-4) 
 
 
In this chapter, I will apply Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology as well as the insights 
of disability theorists in order to critique some of the assumptions theorists tend to make when 
discussing what has commonly been called “apotemnophilia” or “body integrity identity disorder 
(BIID),” less commonly termed “transability.” These are a few of the many terms proposed to 
refer to the desire, which often takes the form of an obsession, to have one’s body altered in 
order to acquire an impairment such as paralysis, blindness, deafness, and loss of one or multiple 
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extremities (e.g. fingers, toes, legs, arms, and/or penis).101 A phenomenological approach is 
superior to other ways that this condition has been theorized because it rejects the dichotomies 
they assume, which manifest, for example, in questions about whether this condition is related to 
sexuality or identity. In addition, a phenomenological approach informed by disability theory is 
able to consider living with limb loss and other impairments as ways of being in the world rather 
than simply lack or pathology.   
 I will focus on the desire for amputation of limbs, specifically, because this is the 
instantiation of the desire for impairment that appears to be most common, and most of the 
literature focuses on it. The first known report of a case of this condition dates back to 1785 
(Johnston and Elliott 2002, 431). Those who desire to have one or more healthy limbs removed 
typically have a very specific point at which they want the limb(s) in question amputated (Blanke, 
Morgenthaler, Brugger, and Overney 2009, 185) and tend to favor leg amputations and 
amputations on the left side of the body (Blanke et al. 2009; First 2005). Generally, the focus 
remains constant, but some have reported a shift in which limb they want to have amputated. 
Almost all of the participants in studies on this condition are white men with at least a college 
education (Baril 2016, 146; Blom et al. 2012; First 2005, 921; Noll and Kasten 2014).102 For 
example, in Michael First’s study, fifty of the fifty-two participants were white, forty-seven were 
men, and ninety percent had attended college (2005, 921). Some people report seeing what it is 
like to have an amputation by removing a finger or toe (e.g. with a saw or pruning shear), even 
though they really want their arm or leg amputated (First 2005, 922). All indications suggest that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 I will limit my discussion here to cases in which individuals desire to have one or more legs and/or 
arms amputated. Further, for the sake of simplicity, I will generally speak of the desire to have a limb 
amputated, with the understanding that some individuals seek to have multiple limbs amputated. 
102 Not all of the studies included race in the demographic information, but, in the studies that did, most 
participants were white. 
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this desire is infrequent within the general population, but it is difficult to develop a precise 
estimate. 
 Philosophers and other theorists have typically written about the desire of able-bodied 
people to acquire impairments in order to attempt to understand its origins and whether or not it 
is ethical or legal for medical professionals to use their expertise to cause impairments upon 
request.103 While there is little consensus on these questions, most authors do share an orientation 
toward disability, and it is worth clarifying their assumptions. In 2003 Carl Elliott noted that 
fewer than half a dozen articles had been published on this condition; since then the literature on 
this topic has increased exponentially (210). I would posit that the desire for impairment is of 
special interest to bioethicists and other theorists, in part, for the following reasons. First, it 
challenges the assumption that life with an impairment is inevitably worse than life without an 
impairment. Second, prima facie, it departs from thought experiments in which the reason it is 
considered wrong to cause impairment is that the person (or potential person) has not provided 
consent (Barnes 2014, 95). Indeed, these two characteristics are connected. The question of 
whether or not it is morally permissible to amputate limbs on demand is thought to largely hinge 
upon whether or not individuals are capable of providing informed consent—the primary 
concern being that such a decision cannot be truly voluntary because no one who desires to 
obtain an impairment should be considered competent to make health care decisions (Bridy 2004, 
154; Elliott 2003; Sullivan 2014a, 123).104 Third, this condition raises salient questions about the 
limits of both patient and physician autonomy as well as the proper scope of medicine (Bridy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Medical expertise is required in order to cause impairment in ways that are less risky than would 
otherwise be the case. If it were possible to safely create the desired impairments without surgeons and 
other medical professionals, these bodily alterations would perhaps have avoided medicalization in favor 
of being classified as body modifications that differ only in degree from piercings and tattoos (Bridy 
2004; Elliott 2003). 
104 This is not a question I will address.  
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2004, 154-155; Schwartz 1992). Much has been written on the relationship between this 
condition and gender dysphoria; a detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the scope of the 
present discussion (Bayne and Levy 2005; Elliott 2003; Kovacs 2009; Noll and Kasten 2014). 
The literature raises ethical and legal questions as well as attempting to answer the question of 
how we should understand this condition. Although these are intertwined, my primary focus in 
this chapter will be on accounts of the latter.    
 There is a lack of consensus on what this condition should be called and how health care 
practitioners ought to treat individuals experiencing it. This is a condition that is difficult to 
research because the level of stigmatization associated with it makes those experiencing it 
hesitant to participate in studies, which has led researchers to allow individuals to respond to 
survey questions anonymously through on-line forums or telephone interviews. In the very 
limited empirical work conducted to date, researchers have recruited participants through 
encountering them in clinical settings, through snowball sampling (in which people known to 
have the relevant characteristic find others willing to be part of a study), and via Internet sites 
centered on the desire to have a limb amputated. Both the format of this research and ways of 
locating participants raise questions about the reliability and generalizability of the resulting self-
reports (Blanke et al. 2009; Blom, Hennekam, and Denys 2012; Brang, McGeotch, and 
Ramachandran 2008; Everaerd 1983; First 2005, 921; Money, Jobaris, and Furth 1977; Noll and 
Kasten 2014). Because research participants are scarce, it is vital that the questions they are 
asked are carefully formulated in order to prompt participants to share as much quality 
information as possible. Inevitably, the questions posed will, to some degree, shape the responses 
given. In addition, how and whether this condition is included in future editions of the DSM will 
be a value-laden decision. As Annemarie Bridy states: 
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 It is important to recognize in this context that the mental disorders and illnesses 
 categorized and defined in the DSM are not natural and immutable constructs; they are 
 instead the products of a fluid and evolving disciplinary discourse that is itself shaped by 
 a constellation of powerful social and cultural factors (2004, 150).  
 
Thus, it is important to articulate the social values and interests informing research on and 
classification of the desire for amputation of a healthy limb. Although the focus of theorists has 
been on whether, how, and when it is appropriate to diagnose and treat someone with BIID, their 
characterizations of this condition are remarkably useful as a gauge of attitudes toward disability.  
 In focusing on this desire for amputation and the results of interventions (such as self-
amputation, black market amputations, or intentional damage to a limb that will medically 
necessitate its amputation) only in terms of pathology, the broader ontological questions are 
likely to be obscured. For instance, what are those seeking amputations hoping to attain? How 
does living with limb loss impact how one is in the world? In section one, I will begin with a 
survey of the literature, discussing terminological issues in order to provide a sense of historical 
and contemporary views on the desire for amputation. Section two will examine assumptions 
about impairment and three types of dichotomies informing theorization, research, and 
experiences of the desire for amputation. Section three will draw on Merleau-Ponty in order to 
develop an approach to thinking about the desire for amputation in a way that refuses these 
dichotomies by starting from being in the world. 
5.1 Terminological Issues 	  
Numerous terms have been suggested to refer to the condition of feeling as though one needs to 
acquire an impairment. Currently, there is a lack of consensus regarding what this condition 
should be called, which is motivated by disagreement about how to understand the underlying 
desire. While many agree that the desire for amputation(s) and/or other kinds of impairment is a 
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type of mental disorder, the decision was made not to include it in the recent (2013) DSM-5 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) due, in part, to low prevalence. The 
appendix of the DSM-5 mentions BIID as requiring additional research in order to make a 
determination about its inclusion in future editions. Paradoxically, the exclusion of BIID from 
the DSM may impede this research (Elliott 2003). I will provide a brief overview of some of the 
terms posited, along with the reasoning behind each.  
 John Money, Russell Jobaris, and Gregg Furth first used the term apotemnophilia 
(“literally ‘amputation love’, from ‘apo’, away; ‘temno’ to cut; ‘philo’ to love”) (De Preester 
2013, 172) to refer to the desire to have a healthy limb or multiple limbs amputated in their 1977 
article “Apotemnophilia: Two cases of Self-Demand Amputation as a Paraphilia.” A paraphilia 
is a disorder of sexual arousal in which a person has sexual urges, fantasies, and/or behaviors 
involving “unusual objects, activities, or situations” which “cause clinically significant distress 
or impairment in social, occupational or other important areas of functioning” (De Preester 2013, 
172). The limited research that has been conducted suggests that there is significant overlap 
between those who want to have amputations themselves and those who are sexually attracted to 
amputees, which has been called acrotomophilia (Bruno 1997, 253; De Preester 2013, 173; 
Elliott 2003, 209-210). In less formal parlance, those who want to become amputees are referred 
to as “wannabes,” those who are attracted to amputees are termed “devotees,” and those who are 
able-bodied but present themselves as having an impairment are called “pretenders” (Bruno 
1997; De Preester 2013, 173; Elliott 2003, 210; Kafer 2012, 332).   
 Some have posited that the desire to have a healthy limb removed should be considered 
to be a manifestation of body dysmorphic disorder (BDD), in which those affected are obsessed 
with altering or at least hiding a part of their body that they perceive to be a defective (Bayne and 
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Levy 2005, 75-76; Blanke et al. 2009, 192; Bridy 2004; Elliott 2003, 213; Furth and Smith 2000). 
However, Elliott points out, “[a]mputee wannabes more often see their limbs as normal, but as a 
kind of surplus” (214). They do not appear to think their limbs are defective or unsightly: rather, 
they simply want to be amputees. Out of the fifty-two participants in Michael First’s study, only 
one said that the ugliness of the limb in question was the reason for wanting an amputation 
(Bayne and Levy 2005, 78; First 2005). As Bridy puts it, the “problem is not that he [the person 
seeking an amputation] perceives something in his appearance that isn’t there, but that he 
believes something in his appearance that is there shouldn’t be there” (2004, 149). Thus, BDD 
does not seem to be a fitting classification for this condition. 
 In “Devotees, Pretenders, and Wannabes: Two Cases of Factitious Disability Disorder” 
Richard Bruno suggests that there are sufficient commonalities—and indeed, a great deal of 
overlap—between those who could be labeled devotees, pretenders, and wannabes to warrant 
classification of these desires and behaviors related to impairment as “factitious disability 
disorder” (1997). On his account:   
 That a similar mechanism is operating in pretenders and wannabes is suggested by the 
 finding that the majority of acrotomophiles are also pretenders (61%) and wannabes 
 (51%) whose childhood experiences may have rendered them unable to meet their own 
 needs and caused them to conclude that disability is the only socially acceptable reason—
 even the only possible reason—for one to be worthy of love and attention (253).  
 
In light of this assessment, Bruno recommends cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy directed at 
helping patients to attain insight into the role that impairment-related obsessions and 
compulsions serve as well as working to develop “appropriate behaviors” (1997, 257).  
 Robert Smith, a surgeon who amputated the healthy legs of two patients upon their 
request, posits that the desire to obtain amputations is akin to gender dysphoria (formerly called 
gender identity disorder), which may lead one to seek surgical and other interventions to 
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transition some of the bodily characteristics that are perceived to be indicators of sex. In some 
cases of gender dysphoria and all cases of the condition under discussion, individuals want to 
radically alter their bodies in order to bring them into alignment with the way they conceive of 
themselves or their desired social identity (Elliott 2003, 212; Barnes 2016, 36). Drastic visible 
changes to one’s body may be felt to be necessary in order to be publicly perceived in a manner 
consistent with this self-conception. In regard to gender dysphoria, public intolerance for gender 
ambiguity is likely to play a role in motivating individuals to take steps to surgically and 
chemically alter their bodies in order to make themselves clearly recognizable as men or women. 
Lack of tolerance for ambiguity in regard to impairment status and pervasive suspicion among 
the general public regarding the legitimacy of others’ claims to the status “disabled” are likely to 
be factors that make using durable medical equipment (wheelchairs, walkers, etc.) in order to 
give the appearance of an impairment a less tenable/satisfying way to live as a disabled person 
than actually acquiring a verifiable impairment. More concisely, no amount of behaving like an 
amputee will satisfy the desire to be one. However, it should be noted that not all people who 
pretend to have an impairment want to acquire one. 
 In 2002, Furth and Smith suggested the term “amputee identity disorder” because some 
who are affected by this condition report that they seek surgery due to their identification as 
amputees. Some research participants claim that they desire an amputation in order to “feel 
complete” (First 2005, 920). However, the term “amputee identity disorder” may suggest an 
overly narrow classification, given that people desire to live with a wide range of impairments. 
There is growing support for categorization of this condition as “body integrity identity disorder” 
(BIID), a term that combines the focus on identity and completeness (Bayne and Levy 2005; 
Blom et al. 2012; First 2005, 926). Research participants with this condition report that they 
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believe that acquiring an impairment—in many cases through amputation of a limb—is 
necessary for them to feel “whole” (Elliott 2003; Sullivan 2014a, 120-121). As Nikki Sullivan 
notes, “[r]esearchers have been keen to determine from whence this experience comes, 
particularly given that the integrity of a fully limbed and fully functional body is commonly 
taken to be visibly self-evident” (2014a, 121). Indeed, the notion that limb loss could increase 
one’s sense of body integrity continues to puzzle researchers. Nonetheless, the term BIID 
presently has the most currency within the literature. However, some authors continue to use the 
term “apotemnophilia” (First 2005; Patrone 2009). First suggests an approach that uses both 
terms; he suggests categorizing separately those who desire amputation in order to align their 
body with their identity (BIID) from those whose desire is sexual (apotemnophilia). Other 
theorists posit additional alternatives such as “self-demand amputation” (Tomasini 2006), 
“xenomelia” (“foreign limb” syndrome) (McGeoch, Brang, Song, Lee, Huang, and 
Ramachandran 2011), and “transabled” (O’Connor 2009). 
 Sean O’Connor105 coined the terms “transabled” and “transability” to refer to those who 
seek to acquire an impairment or illness (2009). This term covers a wide range of impairments 
and illnesses, such as amputation, blindness, paralysis, and HIV. O’Connor and others who adopt 
the label “transabled” seek both to reduce the stigma associated with this set of desires and to 
make an explicit connection with the experiences of transgendered people. He states 
“[t]ransabled means to me that I am in a transitional position, between a body that is not what I 
need it to be, and hopefully reaching that body at some point soon” (2009, 89). He explicitly 
connects this term with “transsexual” as a way of referring to someone with gender identity 
disorder [gender dysphoria]. Indeed, in line with usage of “trans*” and cis* to refer to a range of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 This is a pseudonym for a man who asserts that he needs to become paralyzed from the first lumbar 
vertebra (L1) downwards (O’Connor 2009, 88). 
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ways of being sex/gender nonconforming, disability theorist Alexandre Baril uses “transabled” 
for those who seek to/have altered their ability status voluntarily and “cis(dis)abled” to indicate 
those who have not altered their ability status (2015, 42). Transability advocates hope to obtain 
medical legitimatization so that medical professionals will perform the wanted bodily alterations. 
They also seek social acceptance and support, from the disability community, in particular. As I 
will discuss later in the chapter, few members of the disability community have voiced such 
support.  
 Although there are a number of positions regarding the origins and proper categorization 
of the condition under discussion, both remain contested. The terminology one uses marks one’s 
stance; it is readily apparent that there is no neutral position. I will use “BIID” here because it 
seems to be more inclusive than “apotemnophilia” and compatible with a wider range of views 
of impairment than the term “transability.” In addition, the label BIID presently has the most 
support within the literature. 
5.2 Psychological Approaches 	  
Anna Sedda and Gabriela Bottini assert: “Understanding whether the desire to amputate a 
healthy limb is of psychological/psychiatric or neurological origin is a determinant of guiding 
development of possible treatments, especially considering that most of the approaches that have 
been tried until now have proven ineffective” (2014, 1256). Until recently, psychiatrists and 
psychologists were the sole researchers focused on BIID. They have posited that BIID may be a 
type of paraphilia, response to fears about castration or homosexual desires, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, or an identity disorder with some parallels to gender dysphoria (First 2005; 
Money et al. 1977; Müller 2009, 36-37). Their research typically has taken the form of 
interviews with one or a few individual patients (Bruno 1997; Everaerd 1983; Money et al. 1977) 
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or, more recently, surveys involving numerous participants (Blom et al. 2012; First 2005; Noll 
and Kasten 2014). I will discuss a couple of examples of this type of research before turning to 
neurological research and speculation on BIID.    
 Through their involvement with the psychohormonal research unit (PHRU) at Johns 
Hopkins Hospital, Money et al. (1977) separately came into contact with two male individuals 
who expressed the need to have an above the knee amputation. These men contacted PHRU 
because they considered their desires to be similar to the desires of “qualified transsexual 
candidates” for whom the center provided counseling (1997, 116). In fact, one of the men 
identified himself as a qualified candidate, adding that, “his problem did not involve his genitals 
but rather his leg” (116). Thus, from the beginning of research on this condition—in recent 
history at least—it has been connected with what is currently referred to as gender dysphoria. 
Although this experience was beyond the purview of PHRU, these two men corresponded 
extensively with the center through letters, telephone conversations, and, in the case of the 
second man, in-person interviews. 
 In the cases Money et al. discuss, both men make explicit connections between the desire 
to have a leg amputated and their sexuality—in the sense of being aroused by amputees and in 
the sense that they consider obtaining an amputation to be a way of preserving masculine identity 
(in the first case) or attempting to be heterosexual (in the second case). The first reports that at 
times:  
 I “feel like a woman,” viscerally, in terms of body image, and in these situations I loathe 
 myself—it makes me very apprehensive. Somehow this seems linked with the amputation 
 fantasy. I would rather this [amputation] than lose the penis which would mean that I 
 would be like a woman (…) It is almost as if I will be establishing my male identity by 
 means of the amputation (Money et al. 1977, 118; 119).   
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Thus, it seems that the patient interprets his condition in psychoanalytic terms, as a response to 
fear of femininity and castration.106 In discussing the patient’s childhood, Money et al. assert that 
his mother was very overprotective, and “he closely identified with her,” while his father was 
“hypercritical” of the close mother-son relationship (119). In the case of the second individual, 
he posits that his desire for amputation of his right leg may be “an avenue out of homosexuality” 
insofar as he projects that he will enjoy sex with women more as an amputee (123; 122). He also 
considers the possibility that having an amputation might be a way of responding to rejection by 
his father (123). Both subjects report that psychotherapy has had little to no effect in regard to 
decreasing the desire to obtain an amputation. Money et al. conclude that the question of whether 
self-demand amputations constitute effective treatment will be determined through research 
involving participants who have managed to obtain the amputations they desire (1977, 125). 
 Bruno takes a similar approach to that of Money et al. in his examination of two cases in 
which women perceive impairment as a means for gaining the love and attention that was 
missing during childhood. The first case study, to which the bulk of the article is devoted, 
involves a nondisabled white woman referred to as Ms. D who both sought out men with visibly 
identifiable mobility impairments and publicly presented herself as having an impairment by 
using a wheelchair. Rather than attempting to acquire an impairment, she simply wanted to be 
perceived as having paralyzed legs—especially by disabled men. Although she emphasizes the 
pleasure and excitement she experiences when strangers treat her as if she has an impairment, 
she states that she would not want to actually have an impairment and expresses pity for a 
disabled woman she encountered (248). Bruno then turns to analysis of a case in which a white 
woman referred to as Ms. W claimed to have post-polio syndrome and require the use of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 One wonders how much this interpretation owes to his three years of involvement in individual and 
group psychotherapy prior to contact with PHRU.  
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crutches, but was able to walk without difficulty or crutches during psychotic episodes (255-256). 
In both of these cases, the patients are said to have remarked that they thought parents and others 
would treat them better if they had impairments. In neither of the cases Bruno analyzes did the 
individual seek to acquire an impairment—Ms. A wanted a relationship with a disabled man and 
Ms. D believed herself to have an impairment. Nonetheless, he concludes that all of these 
phenomena should be classified as “factitious disability disorder” and treated in the same way. 
As mentioned previously, Bruno advocates cognitive-behavioral therapy.  
 Now that I’ve discussed a couple of influential articles offering psychological accounts of 
BIID, I turn to theories and research regarding neurological explanations for BIID. While there 
are exceptions, most authors seem to consider these types of accounts to be mutually exclusive.  
5.3 Neurological Accounts 	  
In “Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation” Tim 
Bayne and Neil Levy enumerate several possible explanations for BIID. They note that there 
may be “a mismatch between their body and their body as they experience it – what we might 
call their phenomenal (or subjective body)” (2005, 76). They suggest that this “mismatch” could 
either take the form of incongruence between the body and the body image or body schema.  
 Drawing on Shaun Gallagher, Bayne and Levy define body schema as “a representation 
of one’s body that is used in the automatic regulation of posture and movement” which guides 
“the parts of one’s body to successful performance of action” (2005, 76). As evidence against 
this position, they cite a lack of “impairments in control of movement” among people with BIID 
(76). Bayne and Levy mention that those who obtain the amputations they seek seem “content to 
use a prosthesis,” which also serves as evidence against the notion that those with BIID have a 
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distorted body schema (76). They contend that it is more likely that BIID entails a discrepancy 
between the body and body image.    
 Bayne and Levy also adopt Gallagher’s conceptualization in their definition of body 
image, characterizing it as:  
 a consciously accessible representation of the general shape and structure of one’s body. 
 The body image is derived from a number of sources, including visual experience, 
 proprioceptive experience, and tactile experience. It structures one’s bodily sensations 
 (aches, pains, tickles, and so on), and forms the basis of one’s beliefs about oneself 
 (2005, 76). 
 
On this account, experience and body image are co-constitutive. If it turns out that BIID does 
involve a difference between the objective body and body image, this would not be a unique 
occurrence: disorders classified as asomatognosias involve this phenomenon. Bayne and Levy 
explain that asomatognosia can be caused by stroke or as an aspect of depersonalization (77). 
They note that one might think of BIID and the eating disorders of anorexia and bulimia as being 
similar insofar as they involve a distortion of body image, 107 but the authors point out “[w]hereas 
the person with anorexia or bulimia fails to (fully) recognize the discrepancy between her body 
and her body image, the wannabe is all too aware of this discrepancy” (77). In spite of 
considering a discrepancy between body image and the actual body to be the most credible of the 
hypotheses they examine, Bayne and Levy conclude their discussion of this explanation by 
reporting that they know of no evidence that wannabes manifest behavior in common with those 
with a form of asomatognosia, e.g. neglecting affected parts of the body (79). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 For example, D. Patrone contends, “[b]oth BIID and anorexia nervosa are thought to be disorders 
concerning a discrepancy between body type and body image, and both express themselves in patient 
choices that, were they respected, would cause serious physical harm” (Patrone 2009, 544). In the case of 
anorexia, the affected individual does not perceive a divergence between the body image and body; this is 
only apparent to observers. Thus, her/his goal is not to bring the body into alignment with the body image, 
but to succeed making both “thin enough.”  
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 In “Apotemnophilia: A Neurological Disorder” Brang, McGeotch, and Ramachandran 
(2008) suggest that BIID108 is similar to a type of asomatognosia called “somatoparaphrenia,” 
which is a neurological syndrome in which a person denies that a part of their body—e.g., an arm, 
leg, or half of the body—is theirs, possibly claiming that it belongs to another person as well as 
developing an aversion to that portion of the body (1305). Accordingly, Brang et al. hypothesize 
that BIID “is caused by dysfunction of the right parietal lobe leading to a distorted body image 
and a desire for amputation of one or more limbs” (1305). One of the reasons the authors cite for 
this hypothesis is that, in the research carried out to date, those who wish to have a leg amputated 
overwhelmingly favor having the left leg amputated—a fact that the authors claim would not be 
expected if BIID was a psychological disorder but might be explained by dysfunction of the right 
parietal lobe (1305).  
 Brang et al. tested the skin conductance response (SCR) of two men with BIID—one who 
desires a below-knee amputation of his right leg and the other seeks a below-knee amputation on 
the left and an above-knee amputation on the right. They contrasted their responses to pinpricks 
above and below the line of desired amputation on each leg (pinpricks were applied to the upper 
thighs and feet), and found a much stronger response to stimulation below the level of the 
desired amputation(s). Their test was unable to differentiate responses between the desire to 
undergo below versus above-knee amputations. Because skin conductance is not thought to be 
under volitional control, it is considered to indicate “general sympathetic arousal,” and the 
authors contend that “the failure of a congenitally dysfunctional right superior parietal lobule to 
form an [sic] unified body image leads to abnormal sympathetic outflow via the insula; 
manifesting itself as the observed SCR changes” (1306). They contend that BIID is similar to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Brang et al. acknowledge both “apotemnophilia” and “body integrity identity disorder” as terms for 
this condition. They use the former without explaining their preference for this term. I use BIID for the 
sake of consistency. 
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somatoparaphrenia insofar as “the brain seems to rationalize the discrepancy [caused by 
dysfunction in the right superior parietal lobule] by denying ownership of the limb” (1306). This 
research is obviously extremely limited insofar as it only involved two participants. 
 Deborah Vitacco, Leonie Hilti, and Peter Brugger suggest that BIID is the opposite of the 
experience of a phantom limb and for this reason refer to it as an instance of a “negative phantom 
limb” (2009, 202). Specifically, they focus on cases in which people with aplasia—meaning they 
were born without one or more limbs—experience phantom limb(s) (202). They contend that 
such cases serve as evidence against the conceptualization of phantom limbs as “neural 
memories of the lost limb” (202). Researchers have hypothesized that “motor representations of 
a limb are already present at birth and may even be genetically hard-wired (Abramson & Feibel 
1981)” or it is the ‘human mirror system’ (Buccino et al., 2001; Rizzolatti et al., 2001)” in which 
phantom limbs are triggered by observing those who do have those limbs moving them (Vitacco 
et al. 2009, 205). Vitacco et al. note that neither of these hypotheses is satisfying because they 
fail to explain why few people with aplasia develop phantom limbs (Gallagher 2005, 87). In 
addition, they posit that falsification of the human mirror system view would require research 
participants who are congenitally blind and experience congenital phantom limbs.   
 I would suggest that Gallagher’s account (2005) of aplasic phantom limbs offers a 
response to Vitacco et al. He discusses two hypotheses for the experience of a phantom limb 
among those born without a limb; both involve the notion that the individual’s neural 
representation (it is left an open question whether this entails the body schema or body image) 
developed as if the limb was present. For those reporting a phantom limb, this representation 
persisted, while for the others, it faded before conscious awareness or language to describe the 
sensation developed and was forgotten (Gallagher 2005, 97-99).  
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 The suggestion that BIID stems from a “negative phantom limb” entails the 
presupposition that rather than developing a neural representation of a limb that did not develop 
in a typical way, one has failed to develop a neural representation of a limb that did develop in a 
typical way. If it is the case that a person with BIID seeks to have a limb amputated due to a lack 
of that limb’s inclusion in their neural representation of the body as a result of atypicalities in the 
somatosensory cortex or a parietal lobe, these atypicalities demand explanation. In the case of the 
suggestion that BIID is neurologically similar to somatoparaphrenia or other types of 
anosognosia, the latter is caused by damage to the right parietal lobe, e.g. as the result of a stroke. 
How might damage to the parietal lobe be sustained in the case of BIID in the absence of stroke 
or brain damage?  
 Deborah Vitacco, Leonie Hilti, and Peter Brugger maintain, “BIID is a neurological 
disorder in the sense that a very early ontogenetic incident may have prevented the establishment 
of an individual’s proper representation of one or more limbs” (2009, 206). This is as specific as 
their suggestion gets. Although they find it implausible, Erich Kasten and Frederike Spithaler 
note that it has been proposed that BIID might be explained as resulting from: 
 a developmental mistake of the CNS [central nervous system] in a fetal status or in early 
 childhood, e.g. as a consequence of cranio-cerebral injury or of sickness of the mother. In 
 this theory it is supposed that the somatosenstory cortex for the limb in question has a 
 dysfunction, i.e. a reduced representation of the concerned leg or arm in the CNS (2009, 
 27). 
 
If a dysfunction in the somatosensory cortex is responsible for a distorted representation of a 
limb, which then leads to the desire to have that limb amputated, one would expect that the limb 
that is the target for amputation would remain constant (27). However, Kasten and Spithaler, 
among others, have found that the target limb can shift; six of the nine participants in their study 
reported such a change.  
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 Alternately, if the “human mirror system” contributes to aplasic phantoms, it might be 
suggested that observation of amputees may play a role in changing the neural representation of 
a limb. However, even if this is possible, Vitacco et al. report that it is the pervasive contact with 
nondisabled people that is supposed to lead to aplasic phantom limbs. It seems unlikely that this 
would be the case for people with BIID, unless looking at photographs of amputees was 
sufficient to activate the mirror system.       
 Noll and Kasten (2014) contend that if the hypothesis that people experience BIID 
because of a parietal lobe dysfunction that results in exclusion of a limb in the body image is 
correct, then those who obtain the desired amputations will not experience phantom limbs. 
However, in their survey of eighteen “successful wannabes,” seventeen (94.4%) did experience 
phantom limbs (2014, 229).        
 Even Vitacco et al. express dissatisfaction with the view that neurological atypicalities 
provide a comprehensive explanation of BIID. They conclude that BIID “may well have 
‘neurological’ and ‘psychiatric’ components” (206). Sedda and Bottini assert, “the few available 
experiments show discordant results, as do the psychological/psychiatric descriptions and 
surveys. (…) they lead to the same confounding results” (2014, 1263). They go on to say: “A 
strict separation between the methods and theories of psychology/psychiatry and neuroscience 
does not appear to be the solution to understanding such a complex condition” (1264). Their 
suggestion is for researchers to combine these methods and theories, for example, using 
neuroimaging along with experiments concerned with “body representations and 
psychological/sexual components” (1264). Sedda and Bottini do not provide further specification 
of how this might be done. 
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5.4 BIID, Being in the World, Fitting, and Misfitting 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s remarks on the incompleteness and seeming incompatibility of psychological 
and physiological accounts of the phenomenon of the phantom limb could just as easily refer to 
the current state of research on BIID. To reiterate, he asserts, “[i]f the phantom limb depends 
upon physiological conditions and is thereby the effect of a third person causality, then it is 
inconceivable how it could also result from the personal history of the patient, from his 
memories, his emotions, or his desires” (2012, 79). In regard to BIID, while there are cases in 
which evidence of a connection between the desire for an amputation and one’s personal history 
is suggestive, there is also inconclusive evidence that atypical functioning of the brain may play 
a role. Both types of accounts are tied to categories of the objective world, and are unable to fully 
address experiences of people with BIID (83).  
 Merleau-Ponty contends that since existential analysis is carried out at the level of being 
in the world, it is able to avoid the split between psychological and physiological accounts. He 
states: 
 Because it is a pre-objective perspective, being in the world can be distinguished from 
 every third person process, from every modality of the res extensa, as well as from every 
 cogitation, from every first person form of knowledge – and this is why “being in the 
 world” will be able to establish the junction of the “psychical” and the “physiological” 
 (Merleau-Ponty 2012, 82).   
 
Researchers providing psychological accounts have been able to locate some patterns in subjects’ 
reports of their experiences of BIID. However, participants’ narratives are limited at the outset 
by the format of this research: e.g., the choices they are allowed to select on surveys in regard to 
why they desire to have a limb amputated. Neurological research largely disregards the 
experiences of people with BIID as irrelevant epiphenomena—attempts to rationalize what is 
really going on, e.g., dysfunction in the right parietal lobe of the brain (Brang et al. 2008).  
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  Havi Carel notes: “Patients are often quick to mimic the medical discourse, which may 
lead to a sense of alienation and a lack of first-person voice in patients’ discourse about their 
illness” (2012, 98). Although, she does not address BIID specifically, her discussion of the 
relationship between medical discourse and experiences of illness is helpful for considering 
experiences of this condition. Carel draws on Schkade and Kahneman’s (1998) notion of the 
focusing effect, which is a biasing effect that leads us to focus narrowly on one aspect of a 
category such as well-being. Carel provides the examples of attending to winning the lottery or 
having an impairment. She states, “The focusing illusion causes us to overemphasize the 
significance of that feature, thus overweighting it” (2012, 98). Carel suggests that standardized 
interview questions may lead research participants to adopt the focusing illusion. This notion is 
also helpful for understanding reactions to BIID, which have the tendency to narrowly focus on 
the impairment a person seeks to acquire rather than considering impairment as one component 
of a person’s life as a whole. 
 While medicalization may be the pragmatic way forward in terms of being able to obtain 
medical validation as well as possible social recognition and insurance coverage for treatment for 
people who desire impairments, it entails its own problems. Sullivan suggests that labeling the 
desire for impairment as a body integrity identity disorder, covers over a multitude of 
assumptions about what bodily integrity means as well as what is actually experienced. She 
elaborates: 
 What is denied in this process is the fact that for (many) wannabes the source of suffering 
 lies not in the bodies they want but do not have, nor even in the fact that they desire 
 amputation, deafness, and so on. Rather, suffering is engendered as the effect of a life 
 lived “out of place,” of not being at-home-in-the-world or in the body that gives one a 
 world, a “here” from which to extend into phenomenal space and by which to shape that 
 space (132-133) 
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As Sullivan implies, her claim is not true of all people with BIID. Stigmatization of this 
condition exacerbates the suffering associated with it because it compels many people to keep 
their desires secret and even to isolate themselves. For instance, some wish to hide usage of 
durable medical equipment such as a wheelchair in order to simulate living with an impairment.  
 The obsessive form that the desire to obtain an impairment often takes, combined with 
lack of social acceptance, can influence those with this condition to withdraw from others. One 
man with BIID reports:  
 Through this unfulfilled desire my entire existence has been seriously hindered. It 
 controls and limits my thinking. It has hampered my social intercourse because I cannot 
 be, or can hardly be, interested in others. (…) Even if I only regain my ability to function 
 socially that in itself, in my view, justifies the realization of my desire (Everaerd 1983, 
 289). 
 
This passage illustrates an experience that is common among people with BIID: limitations in the 
ability to function as a nondisabled person and the expectation that obtaining an impairment 
would allow for greater overall functionality, in spite of the accompanying difficulties.  
  Being perceived and recognized as a disabled person is of central importance within the 
accounts provided by people with BIID. A blogger who goes by “Gordo” states: 
 One reason why we’re [people with BIID] so hated is the misconception that we’re doing 
 it “for the attention.”…But sometimes I wonder if it’s a misconception at all…I don’t 
 mean “attention” as in the “look at me, I want sympathy” kind of attention, but rather the 
 “being able to live as a normal active wheelchair user amongst friends” kind of attention 
 (Davis 2014, 443). 
 
 “Sophie” asserts: 
 
 I think there is a vast difference between doing something purely for the attention and 
 finding an action beneficial as it validates our mental/neurological problems. It’s like 
 anyone with a problem in their lives that can’t be solved with will power, it becomes 
 easier to live with when people treat you as you should be (Davis, 442). 
 
Just like the examples Merleau-Ponty discusses of aphonia and a husband forgetting where a 
book his wife gave him is while he is angry with her, the desire to acquire an impairment 
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originates beneath the level of the will. Thus, rather than attempting to will away this desire, 
many people with BIID seek to obtain an impairment in order to be able to be comfortable with 
their bodies and to be able to cease directing their attention to an unrelenting unfulfilled desire. 
 Sullivan contends that “BIID is constituted as an individual(ized) pathology that has little 
or nothing to do with one’s being-in-the-world” (2014a, 120). We might alternately think of the 
desire for an amputation as enacting a shift in being in the world—both in the sense of how one 
is oriented towards others as well as how one’s own body is experienced. Obtaining an 
amputation would then be expected to further—or intensify—this way of being in the world. To 
adopt Garland-Thomson’s terminology, a normative body engaging with the world in primarily 
normative ways may appear to be a fit, even as it is experienced as a misfit. To return to a 
quotation included in chapter four, Gail Weiss asserts: “Garland-Thomson stresses that what 
might look like a misfit to others, namely a non-normative body that engages with the world in 
non-normative ways, with the right support from others and from the environment, may actually 
be lived as a fit” (2015, 92). If amputees encounter an enabling environment, e.g., appropriate 
and affordable medical care, mobility devices, accessible housing, and social support, they can 
attain a fit, even if not to the level of material anonymity. In part, it seems that this is what those 
with BIID seek: not simply to acquire an impairment, but to enact a new way of being in the 
world and receive social recognition as amputees. 
 There is ambiguity regarding the relationship between BIID and social identity: should 
we think of people with BIID as already being disabled and trying to align their self-conceptions 
with their bodies or as seeking to become disabled through alteration of their bodies (Elliott 2003, 
212; Barnes 2016, 36)? Narratives of people with BIID answer this question in different ways, 
some stating that they identify as amputees while having all of their limbs while others report 
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that they feel as though they are supposed to be amputees. The distinction between wanting to 
acquire an impairment and having voluntarily done so is elided in some discussions of this 
condition (Baril 2015a; Bruno 1997).  
 Elizabeth Barnes expresses her view on the relationship between BIID and identity in the 
following: 
 In the case of transability, a person self-identifies (very strongly) as disabled, and 
 typically has done so since childhood or early adolescence. But that self-conception 
 doesn’t match up to what their body is like, and so they will make great efforts to get 
 their body to conform to their self-conception. Perhaps controversially, I want to say that 
 people who are transabled want to become disabled, and often successfully do so, but that 
 before they undergo a body-altering procedure, they are not disabled. That is, I don’t 
 think self-identification as a disabled person is sufficient to make them disabled. 
  
 To press this point, it’s worth noting that people who are transabled don’t identify as 
 disabled in the abstract. They identify as people with a particular disability—as 
 amputees, as paraplegics, etc. And in general, we don’t think people can be disabled in 
 the abstract. You’re disabled in virtue of having some disability or other. But it would 
 require a fairly extreme amount of conceptual revision to say that, pre-transition, 
 transabled people really are amputees, really are paraplegics, etc. And so I’m inclined to 
 say that, pre-transition, they aren’t disabled (Barnes 2016, 36). 
 
If both the objective body and one’s own body are relevant for social identity, then this 
interpretation makes sense. Nonetheless, as mentioned above, some people with BIID report 
already subjectively experiencing themselves as having an impairment. In either case, one aspect 
of what people with BIID are seeking is to have their actual body be perceived as having an 
impairment so that others will respond to them in ways that reinforce their own identification. 
 Although the body is relevant to social identity, it is important to keep in mind that 
bodies, experiences, and social identities are not always correlated in ways that observers may 
expect. As Wendell remarks regarding the relationship between impairment and identifying as 
disabled: 
 some people are perceived as disabled who do not experience themselves as disabled. 
 Although they have physical conditions that disable other people, because of their 
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 opportunities and the context of their lives, they do not feel significantly limited in their 
 activities…On the other hand, many people whose bodies cause them great physical, 
 psychological and economic struggles are not considered disabled because the public 
 and/or the medical profession do not recognize their disabling conditions (Wendell 2008, 
 829). 
 
Thus, we ought not think that it is only people with BIID who have a lack of correspondence 
between their experiences, bodies, and how they are identified by others. Research to date 
largely fails to critically engage with questions about what it means to identify as a disabled 
person and how being in the world is affected by having an impairment.   
5.5 Is BIID about Sexuality or Identity? 	  
Although the desire to be an amputee was originally classified as a paraphilia, some theorists are 
attempting to either disassociate this desire from sexuality completely or to separate those for 
whom it is sexual—they find the idea of being an amputee sexually arousing or otherwise predict 
that being an amputee would lead to more satisfying sexual experiences—from those for whom it 
is about identity—the sense that one either is or ought to be an amputee (Everaerd 1983; First 
2005; Hilti and Brugger 2010). In “Merleau-Ponty’s Sexual Schema and the Sexual Component 
of Body Integrity Identity Disorder” (2013) Helena De Preester argues that examination of the 
history of the condition I am referring to as BIID demonstrates that among theorists, there is a 
“growing reluctance” to address the sexual aspect, despite its pervasiveness (171). She traces the 
shift from the classification of the desire for amputation as a paraphilia in the article 
“Apotemnophilia: Two Cases of Self-Demand Amputation as a Paraphilia” by Money et al. 
(1977), which conceives of the desire for amputation as purely or at least primarily sexual, 
through Hilti and Brugger’s “Incarnation and Animation: Physical versus Representational 
Deficits of Body Integrity” (2010), which claims that most people with BIID desire amputation 
for non-sexual reasons.  
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  In the cases Money et al. discuss, we saw that the desire for amputation of a leg was 
intertwined with issues related to sexual identity—the attempt to shore up one’s masculinity and 
whether or not to identify as homosexual as well as the expectation that sex with women would 
be “more satisfying” as an amputee (1977; 124). One of the interviewees states, “that is not why 
one would want to have an amputation, because he wants to have a higher or greater orgasm” 
(1977, 121). Although he cites sexual satisfaction is part of the motivation for seeking an 
amputation, it is not the sole factor. The analysis of Money et al. does not separate sexuality from 
identity. 
 De Preester locates the beginning of an attempt to distance the desire to be an amputee 
from sexuality in Walter Everaerd’s “A Case of Apotemnophilia: A Handicap as Sexual 
Preference,” which details a case study of a man seeking to have his leg amputated. Regarding 
the patient he interviewed, Everaerd concludes: “Now amputation of his own leg has no longer 
any sexual meaning. He says now that he only could feel complete once his leg has been 
amputated. Wanting to be amputated plays an important role in his sense of identity” (1983, 292). 
He makes this remark immediately after discussing the erotic importance of “the image of 
amputation,” including “self-amputation” for this man’s sexual fantasies! De Preester states of 
Everaerd’s analysis, “[f]or the first time, apotemnophilia seems released from its prominently 
fetishist and thus sexual character, and becomes a matter of bodily identity and one’s body image” 
(2013, 172). However, Everaerd’s attempt to privilege concerns related to identity over sexuality 
seems to have had minimal impact on research on BIID in the subsequent two decades. Between 
1983-2004 a few additional case studies were published, most of which focused on sexual 
aspects of the condition (e.g., Money and Simcoe 1986; Bensler and Pauw 2003). It wasn’t until 
2005, when First published a systematic study involving telephone interviews with fifty-two 
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subjects that the approach of attempting to separate concerns about identity from sexual aspects 
gained influence.   
 De Preester contends that First’s study promulgated the idea that the desire to have a limb 
amputated was most often related to identity rather than sexuality. She shows that his 
presentation of the data from his study distorts participants’ stated motivations in order to bolster 
this position. First emphasizes that only fifteen percent of participants cited “feeling sexually 
excited or aroused” as the primary motivation for wanting an amputation (2005, 922). On the 
basis of this statistic, he suggests that only a small minority would appropriately be diagnosed 
with apotemnophilia (926). However, as De Preester points out, this framing of the results 
ignores the fact that fifty-two percent of participants reported that “feeling sexually excited or 
aroused” was the secondary reason they wanted to become an amputee (2013, 175). First goes on 
to state that a new diagnostic category is necessary for the majority (73%) of participants who 
cited “restoring true identity as an amputee” as a primary or secondary reason (926). He 
advocates usage of the term body integrity identity disorder, of which he states: “this condition 
might best be conceptualized as an extremely unusual dysfunction in the development of one’s 
fundamental sense of who (physically) one is” (926). De Preester points out First’s inconsistency 
in including those who cited concerns related to identity as their primary or secondary motivation 
while only counting those reporting sexual excitement as their primary motivation. She claims 
that his study influenced other researchers and theorists to de-emphasize sexual aspects of BIID 
in favor of focusing on identity (Bayne and Levy 2005; Blanke et al. 2009; Hilti and Brugger 
2010). Hilti and Brugger defend a “pure form” of the desire for amputation that is “relatively 
uncontaminated by aspects related to sexual identity [emphasis added]” (De Preester 2013 178). 
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 De Preester credits First with initiating a new way of thinking about the desire for an 
amputation. Although Everaerd speaks about apotemnophilia in terms of identity, De Preester 
says of First’s study:     
 It is the first time that the issue of bodily identity, i.e., the feeling of self in relation to 
 one’s anatomy is highlighted. Moreover, as we shall see, this happens at the expense of 
 the sexual dimension (2013, 174). 
 
Although De Preester seems to consider bodily identity to be somehow distinct from social 
identity, it is unclear what it would mean to think about social identity apart from the body. She 
notes that one’s “body image or sense of bodily identity” is not equivalent to “one’s objective, 
anatomical body” (177).  
 De Preester raises the possibility that people with BIID may deny sexual components of 
their desire because they consider these to be obstacles to social acceptance. Regarding the term 
“apotemnophilia,” transability advocate O’Connor states, “It implies a sexual fetish (‘philia’), 
which is incorrect, but also seems to be even more undesirable in our society” (2009, 89). 
Nonetheless, the majority of research participants do report that their desire relates to identity as 
well as sexual arousal.  
 De Preester asserts that within the literature on BIID, “[t]he role sexuality plays in one’s 
bodily existence and in the feeling of body identity remained largely unaddressed” (180). She 
maintains that it is impossible to understand BIID without considering the role of sexuality, and 
she advocates adoption of Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology in order to avoid the 
false dichotomy of choosing between sexuality or identity. 
 In “The Body as a Sexed Being” of Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty 
examines Schneider’s inability to situate himself sexually in order to gain clarity on typical 
sexuality. Though Merleau-Ponty disputes some of the central tenets of psychoanalysis, he 
	   	   	  
227 
credits psychoanalysis for reintegrating sexuality into human existence. He contends that 
sexuality should not be conceived of as a separate realm; rather, it is integral to being (2012, 
160). Sexuality orients us toward the world, including our perceptions. Just as we must recognize 
the necessity and centrality of embodiment for human existence, so too, we need to recognize 
sexuality’s permeation within human life (173). Merleau-Ponty contends: 
 There is osmosis between sexuality and existence, that is, if existence diffuses throughout 
 sexuality, sexuality reciprocally diffuses throughout existence, such that it is impossible 
 to identify the contribution of sexual motivation and the contribution of other motivations 
 for a given decision or action, and it is impossible to characterize a decision or an action 
 as “sexual” or “nonsexual” (172).  
 
Contra First, on this account, it is impossible to clearly delineate sexual motivations and aspects 
of existence from nonsexual ones.  
 Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty maintains, “If the sexual history of a man gives the key to 
his life, this is because his manner of being toward the world – that is, toward time and toward 
others – is projected in his sexuality” (2012, 161). This is a helpful way of thinking about the 
experiences of people with BIID; it is not the case that their attraction to the idea of themselves 
as amputees is “just” sexual. On the contrary, accompanying this attraction is an entire form of 
life: one’s conception of the self, how one wants to be perceived, and a striving to alter one’s 
being in the world by altering both one’s objective body and one’s own body. 
 Researchers point out that devotees and people with BIID are fascinated by the everyday 
activities of disabled people (Noll and Kasten 2014). This orientation toward disabled people (or 
at least parts of their bodies) often leads to admiration and sexual desire. Regarding one of the 
two patients they interviewed, Money et al. state: 
His amputee fantasies did not invariably entail erotic imagery. Rather, there was a strong 
 nonerotic imagery of overachievement which provided the erotic turn-on, namely, in 
 visualizing an amputee engaged in some activity which required a considerable effort to 
 surmount a physical handicap (…)His fantasies while having sex leading to orgasm with 
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 a nonamputee male often were of amputees functioning in walking and moving activities 
 and not wearing a prosthesis (1977, 121). 
  
Here the imagined “overachievement of an amputee,” typically considered not to have erotic 
content, takes on a sexual significance. However, these fantasies seem not only to provide a 
source of sexual stimulation but also an ideal to which those with BIID aspire, i.e., they hope to 
exhibit the qualities they fantasize about when they become amputees. 
 People with BIID often simultaneously identify with amputees and find them sexually 
attractive. One of the problems with the attempt to distinguish between people for whom the 
desire to be an amputee is sexual and those for whom it is identity-related is that the conception 
of sexuality is too narrow. As Elliott asserts:  
 When I asked one prominent wannabe who also happens to be a psychologist if he 
 experiences the wish to lose a limb as a matter of sex or a matter of identity, he disputed 
 the very premise of the question. “You live sexuality,” he told me. “I am a sexual being 
 twenty-four hours a day” (2003, 220). 
 
On Merleau-Ponty’s account, even if sexuality is not always in the foreground, it is a type of 
intentionality that situates us in the world. 
5.6 Views of Impairment and BIID 	  
The views of impairment Elizabeth Barnes characterizes in “Valuing Disability, Causing 
Disability” (2014) are helpful for thinking about responses to BIID.109 Although I discussed 
these views in chapter one, I include her descriptions again below.  
 Barnes notes that mere-difference views are typically associated with positive claims 
such as the following: 
(a) Disability [impairment] is analogous to features like sexuality, gender, ethnicity, and race. 
(b) Disability [impairment] is not a defect or departure from “normal functioning.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Although she makes brief remarks about BIID in The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability, she does 
not apply her framework, instead focusing on questions of identity related to BIID. 
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(c) Disability [impairment] is a valuable part of human diversity that should be celebrated and 
preserved. 
(d) A principal source of the bad effects of disability is society’s treatment of disabled people, 
rather than disability [impairment] itself (2014, 93). 
 
Table 3 Barnes’ Three Types of Views of Impairment 
1. Bad-difference Views of 
Impairment 
2. Mere-difference Views of 
Impairment 
3. Good-difference Views of 
Impairment 
 
(i) “Disability [impairment] is 
something that is an automatic 
or intrinsic cost to your well-
being” (Barnes 2014, 91). 
 
(ii) “Were society fully 
accepting of disabled people, 
it would still be the case that 
for any given disabled person 
x and arbitrary nondisabled 
person y, such that x and y are 
in relevantly similar personal 
and socioeconomic 
circumstances, it is likely that 
y has a higher level of well-
being than x” (91). 
 
(iii) “For any arbitrarily 
disabled person x, if you could 
hold x’s personal and 
socioeconomic circumstances 
fixed but remove their 
disability [impairment], you 
would thereby improve their 
well-being” (92). 
 
 
(i′) Impairment is not 
something that is an automatic 
or intrinsic cost to your well-
being. 
 
(ii′) Were society fully 
accepting of disabled people, 
it would not be the case that 
for any given disabled person 
x and arbitrary nondisabled 
person y, such that x and y are 
in relevantly similar personal 
and socioeconomic 
circumstances, it is unlikely 
that y has a higher level of 
well-being than x. 
 
(iii′) For any arbitrarily 
disabled person x, if you could 
hold x’s personal and 
socioeconomic circumstances 
fixed but remove their 
impairment, you would not 
necessarily thereby improve 
their well-being. 
 
 
(i′′) Impairment is something 
that is an automatic or 
intrinsic benefit to your well-
being. 
 
(i′′) Were society fully 
accepting of disabled people, 
it would be the case that for 
any given disabled person x 
and arbitrarily nondisabled 
person y, such that x and y are 
in relevantly similar personal 
and socioeconomic 
circumstances, it is likely that 
x has a higher level of well-
being than y. 
 
(iii′′) For any arbitrarily 
disabled person x, if you could 
hold x’s personal and 
socioeconomic circumstances 
fixed but remove their 
impairment, you would reduce 
their well-being.      
  
Barnes holds that claims a-d are inessential to mere-difference views of impairment. She states: 
“[t]he mere-difference view can be understood simply as the denial of claims like (i)-(iii), and of 
their good-difference converses” (93). Claims a-d are also in alignment with good-difference 
views of impairment. 
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 Discussions about BIID tend to be steeped in ableism and bad-difference views of 
impairment, by which I mean that it is assumed that it is always preferable to be able-bodied 
rather than to have an impairment because one’s quality of life would be worse in the second 
case. There is near consensus in the literature on BIID that this is the correct orientation towards 
impairment. Garland-Thomson nicely sums up the commonly endorsed view of impairment in 
the following:  
 Our dominant understanding is that disability [impairment] is something to be avoided 
 and that the world would be a better place if disability [impairment] could be eliminated. 
 This is sensible because…we understand disability [impairment] to confer pain, disease, 
 suffering, functional limitation, abnormality, dependence, social stigma, and economic 
 disadvantage and to limit life opportunities and quality (2012, 340).  
 
Garland-Thomson’s focus is on the position that impairment should be prevented or cured 
whenever possible, and although she does not address BIID specifically, her remarks are relevant 
for thinking about resistance to the idea of allowing people to intentionally acquire impairments. 
However, bad-difference views of impairment that inform this reaction are not grounded in the 
reports of disabled people.  
 Though impairment might be tolerated when it is unpreventable, most theorists find it 
unimaginable that anyone would voluntarily acquire an impairment with the expectation that it 
would improve quality of life. In “Whose Identity is It Anyway?” Jozsef Kovacs contends that 
the requests of people with BIID for amputation are considered to be outside of the proper scope 
of medicine due to fear of impairment and lack of knowledge about their suffering. He asserts: 
 Our paternalistic prohibition to provide surgery for BIID patients mirrors our own 
 aversion of physical disabilities and our deep ignorance of the psychic suffering that a 
 psychiatric disorder may mean for the person who has it (Kovacs 2009, 45). 
 
He demonstrates greater reflexivity than most theorists about the social concerns that inform 
thinking about BIID. Even though Kovacs contends that amputations of healthy limbs should be 
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considered “as a last resort” because he thinks this could improve QOL, he seems to hold a bad-
difference view of impairment and to implicitly endorse the medical model of disability. He 
states, “By requesting the amputation of her healthy limb the BIID patient in fact wants to 
exchange the symptoms of her mental disorder for a visible and stigmatizing physical disability” 
(44). This quotation suggests that impairment itself is stigmatizing rather than accounting for the 
impact of ableism. He goes on to say that, “If BIID is a valid psychiatric disorder, then BIID 
sufferers do not exchange their health for disability. They exchange the suffering caused by their 
mental disorder for the suffering caused by a physical disability” (45). Here Kovacs assumes that 
impairment in general—not the process of acquiring an impairment or adjusting to it—causes 
suffering. As a result of holding a bad-difference view of impairment, some theorists have 
attempted to find an alternative explanation, for example, suggesting expected social benefits as 
motiving the desire for an impairment or dismissing the idea that people want to acquire 
impairments. In what follows, I will discuss a couple of examples.   
 Often enough, it is claimed within the literature on BIID that if people are allowed to 
have healthy limbs amputated, then they will no longer be able to function as productive 
members of society. Sabine Müller and D. Patrone suggest that lacking a limb dooms one to a 
life of physical dependence and possibly dependence on government assistance. In some cases, 
theorists assume that this is, in fact, the intent of those who desire amputations. Müller suggests 
that people may seek amputation as a means for “financial or social advantages (e.g., insurance 
rates, retirement, attention)” (2009, 41). She highlights the cost of goods and services required 
for amputees, pointing out that, “a welfare state has to finance these costs” (41). Müller adds that 
these financial costs are combined with “lost working income which would stress the society” 
(41). She cites these factors as constituting an injustice and an argument against allowing people 
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with BIID to obtain amputations. She does not consider questions of justice in relation to the role 
of society in assuring accessibility in order to make it more likely that amputees will be able to 
maintain employment.  
 Baril asserts, “for researchers and the general public, principal objections to potential 
transabled surgeries conform to neoliberal concerns for cost and productivity” (2015a, 693). This 
framing of the issue sets aside the empirical question of whether amputees do negatively affect 
cost and productivity in comparison to able-bodied people suffering from BIID as well as the 
question of whether this ought to be the primary concern. Of course, if one causes oneself to 
become disabled, one is readily classified as undeserving of charity, assistance, or sympathy.  
 Vitacco et al. claim that “the assumption that persons with BIID would simply be longing 
for a state of physical disability” is likely to be false given reports that many “plan to have a 
prosthesis fitted immediately after amputation, in order to hide being handicapped” (2009, 206). 
I agree with the position that BIID is unlikely to be explained as “simply a longing for a state of 
physical disability [impairment] [my emphasis],” but the reasoning provided contains 
assumptions that need unpacking. For example, do the authors hold that having a prosthesis 
cancels out having an impairment? Why do they assume that use of a prosthetic limb is intended 
to hide “being handicapped”? Are they assuming that impairments only “count” if they are 
visible? And further, do they assume that those with BIID could only want to undergo 
amputations in order to exhibit their residual limbs? Vitacco et al. do not consider, for example, 
that using prosthetic limbs may facilitate mobility better than wheelchair use in inaccessible 
environments or that it might be part of the appeal of becoming an amputee.   
 One man desiring amputation of his leg asserts: “It pleases me, to be visibly, physically 
different from others: a man with one leg, a man with a wooden leg” (290). He posits that this 
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idea originated in his childhood, and in regard to observing a boy with a “peg-leg” playing in the 
street when he was 8 years old he says:  
 I never felt any pity towards them. (…) They [children who played in the street] got 
 attention and seemed happy to me, even the boy who struck me the most (attracted me 
 the most) had a wooden leg and he was a so-called unhappy boy. Nevertheless I 
 considered him happier than myself and felt it was not so awful to be without a leg. This 
 opinion steadily became stronger and developed into the idea that it must be nice to have 
 a wooden leg (Everaerd 1983, 288). 
 
His characterization of the boy with the wooden leg describes a shift from endorsement of a 
mere-difference view to a good-difference view of impairment. This type of reaction to 
encounters with people with visibly identifiable impairments is common among people with 
BIID.   
 In First’s survey of fifty-two people who desired amputations, “a majority (56%, n=29) 
reported that it [this desire] began soon after exposure to an amputee (in two cases the exposure 
was to media images of an amputee) (2005, 924). Among these participants, 21% thought that 
the amputee they observed had advantages such as “popularity, attention, happiness,” 17% felt 
sexually aroused, and “one subject admired the amputee because of the adversity he had 
overcome” (924). Of the twenty-one participants in their study, Noll and Kasten state: “In 
contrast to normal children, who react with sadness, when they see such a ‘poor’ handicapped 
amputee, the BIID-subjects were fascinated and developed the idea to be like these people” 
(2014, 230). While nondisabled people tend to think of people with impairment as pitiable, 
which is obviously problematic, we might be concerned that people with BIID have an overly 
positive view of what it is like to live as an amputee.  
 Research on BIID pays minimal attention to addressing the question of how people with 
this condition form their views of what it is like to live with an impairment. To the extent that 
this question is addressed, it seems that participants use their imaginations to form views of what 
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it is like to be disabled more than they base their judgments on engagement with disabled people. 
However, it is difficult to draw conclusions about how people with BIID form their views about 
living with impairment. 
 While the research conducted to date provides little sense of how or whether participants 
learn about the lived experiences of amputees, I would certainly not suggest that they seek 
impairments without careful consideration. One man with BIID asserts: 
 Certainly it is true that one’s desires or fantasies are often more beautiful than reality in 
 that a desire once realized can sometimes lead to nothing more than disillusionment. (…) 
 Naturally it is no joke to go through life with one leg. (…) I have thoroughly considered 
 the possibility of a disappointment, of a let-down, and I feel that I must take the chance 
 and bear the consequences (Everaerd 1983, 290). 
 
After interviewing a number of people with BIID, Elliott summarizes their reasoning in the 
following: 
 They realize that life as an amputee will not be easy. They understand the problems they 
 will have with mobility, with work, with their social lives; they realize they will have to 
 make countless adjustments just to get through the day. They are willing to pay their own 
 way. Their bodies belong to them, they tell me. The choice should be theirs. What is 
 worse: to live without a leg or to live with an obsession that controls your life? (Elliott 
 2003, 234)  
 
Beyond the fact that people with BIID want to acquire impairment in hopes of improving their 
quality of life (QOL), surveys and interviews provide further indication that people with BIID 
reject bad-difference views of impairment in favor of mere or good-differences views.  
 One might think that disability theorists would consider BIID to be evidence that 
impairment is not always something to be avoided, given that people with this condition actively 
seek it out. In addition, the limited research conducted to date provides examples in which those 
who have voluntarily attained impairments report a higher QOL than they had when they were 
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able-bodied (Noll and Kasten 2014).110 However, Baril claims that, with few exceptions, 
“disability studies literature, anti-ableist activists, and disabled communities are silent on 
transability” (2015a, 691). He notes that in these exceptions, disabled people and their allies tend 
to have negative reactions. Baril suggests: 
 Anti-ableist activists often consider transabled practices and claims harmful to anti-
 ableist studies and movements because transabled people are perceived to: be inauthentic, 
 falsely disabled, and deceptive about their “real” identity; steal resources reserved for 
 disabled people; and be disrespectful of disabled people by denying, fetishizing, or 
 appropriating their reality (691).      
 
He goes on to say “[t]ransabled people are considered thieves because transability is seen as a 
means to exploit the State and obtain resources to which they are not entitled” (2015a, 693). 
Some members of the disability community have reacted negatively to those who want to acquire 
an impairment, in part, due to their endorsement of this position. Like many nondisabled people, 
those whose impairments are involuntary (in Baril’s words, cisdisabled people) may have 
difficulty comprehending the intentional creation of impairment. Nonetheless, Baril hopes that 
disability rights advocates will realize that the difficulties people with BIID face are intertwined 
with theirs. He advocates for coalition between people with BIID and the disability community 
in order to transform social understandings of impairment and to improve their access to 
resources. 
 Given the overlap between those who seek to become amputees and those who are 
attracted to amputees, it is worth considering the behavior of devotees and the reactions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 While those with BIID are typically referred to as being able-bodied, it is unclear how well they are 
able to function without or prior to undergoing amputation. This lack of information hinders research on 
those who have succeeded in obtaining amputations. In regard to his own study, First remarks: 
 for those subjects who reported improvement in functioning following amputation, the absence of 
 assessment in functioning prior to amputation raises the possibility that reported improvement 
 reflected a bias to over-report improvement to justify their having taken such drastic measures 
 (2005, 927). 	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amputees. Alison Kafer asserts that for devotees, who are often heterosexual men, “taking 
surreptitious photographs, sharing stories about amputee sightings, secretly following women, 
and lying about one’s identity are seen not as harassment but as acceptable behavior” (2012, 340). 
She points out that devotees claim that if society in general, and amputees in particular, were 
more accepting of their desires, they would not engage in this type of behavior (340). Kafer 
discusses the ways that amputee women are disempowered by the harassment and deceptive 
actions of devotees; for example, fear of attending amputee support groups and conferences as 
well as even worrying that their prosthetists are “closet devotees getting secret thrills” (341). 
What emerges clearly within the narratives of devotees is how little many of them actually care 
about the women and men they pursue, reducing them to objects of their desire (Bruno 1997; 
Kafer 2012; Solvang 2007). In sum, while some amputees welcome the attention of devotees, 
many members of the disability community find it disturbing. My point here is that these 
concerns, to an extent, inform the reactions of the disability community to people with BIID. I 
would surmise that the association of wanting to acquire an impairment with having what is 
commonly considered a mental illness—even if it is not included in the DSM-5—also 
contributes to the wariness members of the disability community feel. 
 As emphasized throughout this dissertation, members of the disability community hold 
mere-difference and good-difference views of impairment. Does this mean that they/we must 
endorse the intentional creation of impairments? Regarding good-differences views of 
impairment, Barnes notes: “A positive take on disability [impairment] doesn’t in any way 
involve a positive take on all the ways we can cause disability [impairment]” (2014, 108). Using 
a number of thought experiments to illustrate, she enumerates some of the reasons that those who 
hold mere- and good-difference views of impairment might find the causation of impairment to 
	   	   	  
237 
be morally wrong. Among these are: causing a nondisabled person to have an impairment 
without that person’s consent, the risk that they may not adjust well to having an impairment, 
transition costs related to becoming disabled, and causing impairment carelessly (2014, 95-96).  
In most cases, one or more of these conditions would be applicable. To return to an example 
from chapter four, one of the reasons disability advocates object to the “Ashley treatment” is that 
children under consideration for this set of medical interventions, which limit their growth and 
result in sterilization, are unable to provide consent (Kafer 2013; Kittay 2011). On Barnes’ 
account, causing impairment is usually morally wrong due to contextual factors, even if 
impairment does not automatically result in a low QOL. 
 How does amputating the limbs of people with BIID fare by Barnes’ method for 
evaluation? The question of consent is of utmost importance. Rather than considering people 
with BIID to be categorically incompetent to make healthcare decisions (or categorically 
competent, for that matter), individuals must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. There is the 
risk that people with BIID will not adjust well to living with limb loss, and transition costs are 
inevitable. Clearly, it would not be permissible for surgeons to amputate limbs without careful 
consideration and a rigorous assessment procedure for people with BIID.111    
 Barnes focuses on ways that ableism influences people to focus on bad effects of 
impairment and to have trouble grasping the idea that people want to be or become disabled in 
the following: 
 It is very difficult, of course, for most people to imagine anyone wanting to be disabled 
 (or more strongly—wanting to become disabled). But most people associate disability 
 [impairment] merely with lack of ability. In a society with less ableism, it would be the 
 case not only that many of the bad effects of disability [impairment] would be lessened 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Barnes herself contends: “There’s nothing wrong with—and much that’s good about—a mechanism 
that allows such disabled people to become nondisabled if they wish (and allows, vice versa, nondisabled 
people to become disabled if they wish)” (Barnes 2014, 110).   	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 but also that many of the good effects of disability [impairment] would be more widely 
 recognized (Barnes 2014, 110n28).  
 
As I have shown throughout this dissertation, the bad effects of impairment tend to eclipse any 
good effects within dominant understandings. I agree with Barnes that it is likely that reduction 
in ableism would contribute to a greater recognition that there are good effects as well. A 
question that consideration of BIID raises is whether ableism is the only reason one might 
oppose permitting nondisabled people to voluntarily become disabled. While ableism is 
influential in the literature on BIID, it is reasonable to be concerned that people with BIID may 
not have an adequate understanding of what it is like to live as an amputee in an ableist society. 
After all, nondisabled ignorance is pervasive. However, this is a worry that can be mitigated, in 
part, through learning about the experiences of amputees. Obtaining an amputation is obviously a 
permanent and life-changing operation—one that some think those who opt to have healthy 
limbs removed may regret. Certainly, we often misjudge what will make us feel happy or 
fulfilled, and there is no reason to think this desire is immune from that possibility. Further 
research is needed—research that provides a clearer sense of the level of understanding people 
with BIID have of the lived experiences of amputees as well as providing a better sense of what 
they are seeking. 
5.7 Conclusion 	  
Although this chapter comes to no firm conclusions regarding how exactly medical professionals 
and members of the disability community ought to respond to people with BIID, I have shown 
that views of impairment impact how researchers and people experiencing this condition 
understand the desire to have a healthy limb amputated. Neither psychological nor neurological 
accounts are able to explain BIID, and there are aspects of experience that are excluded from 
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each, either by the ways research is conducted or by the view that BIID is simply the result of 
dysfunction in the brain. Phenomenological approaches allow for more robust accounts of the 
experiences of people with BIID and avoid problematic attempts to clearly demarcate sexual and 
nonsexual aspects of existence. Although I have suggested that people with BIID are hoping to 
alter their being in the world through amputation of a limb, I have also pointed out that research 
to date provides little sense of how much knowledge they have of what it is like to live as an 
amputee. An adequate understanding of the everyday experiences of amputees is important as a 
condition for people with BIID being able to make informed decisions.      
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CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that starting from a feminist disability standpoint, which 
is grounded in the experience and knowledge of disabled people, challenges common 
assumptions within biomedical ethics and phenomenology and reveals the ableism that informs 
these areas of philosophy. Bioethicists’ assumptions about disability shape their positions on 
topics such as the right to refuse treatment, euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, genetic testing, 
selective abortion, organ transplant policies, and healthcare rationing. Given that disabled 
people’s lives are central, and literally at stake, in many of the ethical and legal debates 
surrounding these topics, their concerns and knowledge ought to be the starting point for these 
discussions, but typically they are not because nondisabled people think they know better. Most 
of the bioethicists and phenomenologists discussed here assume that disability is simply an 
objective description of the biomedical condition of an individual. Some further assume that 
illness and impairment—to adopt the terminology of the social model of disability—ought to be 
prevented on the grounds that they inevitably greatly limit a person’s level of opportunities and 
quality of life. Disability theorists contest this view, arguing that many of the disadvantages and 
limitations disabled people face are socially created and only contingently related to impairment. 
 This dissertation has suggested that disability and normality are relational phenomena—
simultaneously bodily and social—that contain a great deal of variation. While these categories 
and the line between them are contingent, they are significant for social practices and embodied 
subjectivity. Accounts of “the” normal subject exclude many types of experiences and obscure 
the influence of the physical environment and social expectations related to gender, race, and 
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ability on who counts as “normal” and the implications of this designation. I have argued that 
Merleau-Ponty and phenomenologists adopting his approach often implicitly assume that the 
“normal” subject is able to attain material anonymity, which allows one to pay minimal attention 
to the body. However, this assumption is not necessary, and I contend that it is possible to 
incorporate lived experiences that diverge from material anonymity into this type of approach to 
phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty recognizes that the effects of bodily injuries are relevant to but 
not wholly determinative of being in the world. Merleau-Ponty’s successors have built on his 
approach in order to draw attention to the impact of bodily particularities more generally on 
social identity and experience. Accounts of misfitting—experiences in which social expectations 
and the physical environment are incongruent with one’s body—serve to increase attention to the 
privileged status of those who attain material anonymity and allow for identification of the ways 
that oppression creates unjust misfits rather than construing them as inevitable consequences of 
inhabiting a particular body. Such accounts also serve to flesh out the richness of various ways of 
being in the world, which cannot be reduced to lack. This is important for all types of 
marginalized embodiment, and descriptions of being in the world as a disabled person need to 
consider other axes related to identity in order to avoid assuming material anonymity is “normal.” 
 In chapter one, I introduced models of disability as well as key concepts for analyzing the 
inferior social status of disabled people. The primary goal of this chapter was to examine 
bioethicists’ assumptions about disability and how those assumptions inform their positions on 
what types of interventions benefit and make conditions more just for disabled people. I provided 
numerous examples of articles within bioethics textbooks in which bioethicists uncritically 
assume the correctness of the medical model of disability, bad-difference views of impairment, 
and genetic determinism. Although these views of disability are pervasive within the biomedical 
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ethics literature, the perspectives of those who endorse the social model of disability and mere-
difference and good-difference views of impairment as well as those who reject genetic 
determinism are beginning to be included in bioethics anthologies. I focused on articles dealing 
with issues related to reproduction such as preconception and prenatal genetic and other testing, 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and selective abortion because bioethicists tend to make their 
assumptions about disability explicit in discussions of these topics. I have shown that adoption of 
developmental systems theory would necessitate changes in how bioethicists discuss genetic 
conditions; they could no longer claim to know a potential child’s phenotype, level of 
opportunities, or quality of life on the basis of genotype alone, given the complex interactions 
that give rise to development. Opposing assumptions about what disability is and its causes lead 
the authors under consideration to very different conclusions regarding personal and societal 
responsibility for preventing harms associated with disability.  
 The exclusion of disabled people’s experiences and knowledge is one of the reasons that 
bad-difference views of impairment have remained dominant within and beyond biomedical 
ethics. In chapter two, I argued that this exclusion is not only unjust but also weakens epistemic 
practices in biomedical ethics, leading to reinforcement of nondisabled ignorance. Appeals to 
objectivity as neutrality have served to mask the ways that social values and interests impact 
these practices while framing disabled people’s reports of their own lives as too subjective or 
value-laden to be taken into consideration. Drawing on the insights of Hartsock, Harding, 
Scheman, and Mills, we learned that knowledge practices are socially located, are likely to 
involve power asymmetries, and require reflexivity on the part of knowers in order to be 
inclusive and trustworthy. In order to engage in just epistemic practices, bioethicists have a 
responsibility to understand the concerns and experiences of disabled people rather than 
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requesting that disabled people understand dominant narratives that devalue their lives. Contra 
Silvers, I have argued that conceptual neutrality regarding disability is not a value-free or viable 
approach to reconciling the tension between bioethicists and the disability rights community. 
However, Harding’s notion of strong objectivity is useful for reframing Silver’s method as a way 
to identify the values and concerns informing these perspectives, which may facilitate dialogue 
between these groups.   
 Throughout chapter two, I made the assumption that embodied experience is 
epistemically valuable. Chapter three examined reasons disability scholars have been hesitant to 
theorize the body, ways feminist disability theorists have advocated for inclusion of embodied 
experience, and debates within feminist theory regarding the status of experience. While Crow 
and Tremain take divergent approaches to incorporating the body into disability theory—the 
former advocating conceiving of impairment as value-free and the latter considering impairment 
to be primarily value-driven—both remain tied to impairment in ways that prevent them from 
being able to capture embodied experiences. I then turned to Scott’s position on experience, 
which has been highly influential within feminist theory, and opposing arguments in order to 
consider whether or not embodied experiences have sufficient merit to make them worth 
including within disability theory. After concluding that they do, I argued that a Merleau-Pontian 
account of embodiment, enriched by the insights of feminists and critical race theorists, is 
superior to approaches that conceptualize the body as impairment.   
 In chapter four, I argued that while theorists concerned with marginalized embodiment—
including disability theorists—have cited Merleau-Ponty’s approach as a starting point for 
addressing experiences of various illnesses, impairments, and social identities, there has been 
insufficient attention to the ableism present in Phenomenology of Perception. Indeed, Weiss has 
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claimed that Merleau-Ponty’s use of Schneider served the purpose of showing that he attains a fit, 
even though the brain injury he sustained has resulted in limitations. I have provided textual 
evidence that this is not the point Merleau-Ponty is making. Rather, I have argued that 
examination of Schneider’s being in the world served to clarify “normal” experience by way of 
contrast and to bolster his case for existential analysis. Throughout this chapter I used Garland-
Thomson’s notions of fitting, misfitting, and material anonymity to critique Merleau-Ponty and a 
few of his successors as well as to provide suggestions for remedying the limitations of their 
approaches to phenomenology.  
 While chapters three and four claimed that Merleau-Ponty provides important resources 
for theorizing experiences of disability, chapter five explored how this type of approach is useful 
for understanding body integrity identity disorder (BIID). Like the disability theorists discussed 
in chapter three, theorists focused on BIID tend to think in terms of impairment, which prevents 
them from adequately addressing lived experience and what people with BIID are seeking. I 
have argued that being in the world provides a better starting point for research on BIID, which 
avoids the dichotomies present within the literature and provides the possibility of expanding our 
understanding of this condition (e.g. what people with BIID think it is like to live as an amputee). 
Bodily particularities matter, but they are not all that matters for embodied subjectivity. 
 This dissertation has demonstrated that disability presents numerous interesting 
philosophical questions. Through examination of issues related to embodied experiences and 
knowledge of disability, I have shown that assumptions informing biomedical ethics, 
epistemology, and phenomenology have the potential to contribute to the oppression of disabled 
people or to incorporate their experiences and concerns. In this dissertation, I have brought 
together seemingly disparate approaches to philosophy in order to explore their connections as 
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well as the ways that taking the experiences of disabled people seriously enriches and transforms 
these areas of philosophy.  
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